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“Everything used to be very very traditional and, you know, with all the activists and all the artists, 
who were allowed to make videos and who were allowed to paint, because graffiti artists were not 
allowed to paint, because they are not painters. I mean, they were nothing, not like recognised art 
and now everything is being broken. I mean, now when you look at Muhammed Mahmoud street, 
these people are actually going beyond graffiti, they are going for something new (...) you know, 
they are not allowed to make it. I mean, the revolution is breaking all these barriers of who is what 
(...) I never used to film videos before the revolution, but now I am learning…” (Darwish:7) 
Lubna Darwish, co-founder of Mosireen Media Collective, founded in the aftermath of 
 the 25th of January Revolution in Egypt. 
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Creative struggles of Tahrir 
Just a few hundred meters from the centre of Tahrir Square, the great roundabout in central capital 
Cairo, a group of diverse people have gathered around a linen-covered bus stop. We, the authors of 
this thesis, are present in the crowd, where the linen has become the screen and the bus stop a public 
cinema. On the linen, a roughly edited film is being projected, showing Egyptian workers behind 
fences, who tell with great frustration about the labour conditions in Egypt. Attentively, we try to 
follow the film and our friend translating, while we observe the surroundings and the lively 
discussions that the film continuously fuels among the spectators. We are the odd ones there, but we 
are not being noticed, as something more sensational, more odd, and more exciting than two young 
and blond foreign women is at stake. This is “Cinema al-Tahrir”. Just one and a half year ago such 
public cinema would have been almost unthinkable in Egypt. Yet that was prior to the Egyptian 
uprising and the 18 day long “revolution”, which began on the 25th of January 2011 and therefore 
have been named “The 25th of January Revolution”. During these 18 days Tahrir Square became the 
epicentre of popular protests leading to a radical transformation of Egypt’s 60 year old dictatorship: 
the withdrawal of former President Hosni Mubarak.  
We arrived in Cairo on April 12th 2012 with the purpose of conducting two months of 
anthropological fieldwork and with a particular interest in the burgeoning youth culture of creative 
grass-roots activism. Cinema Al-Tahrir is an example of the new creative youth initiatives of 
informal political participation, which have arisen within Cairo’s public realm in the wake of the 18 
transformative days. Behind Cinema Al-Tahrir we found a group of young people, who had met 
each other while taking part in the 18 days of popular protesting at Tahrir Square. Some had 
returned from studies abroad to take part in the uprising, others had been engaged in Egyptian 
activism for years. In spite of their often cosmopolitan life style, they felt called upon as Egyptians 
to take part in the transformations of their country as “the revolution” unfolded. These new young 
cultural-political players, whom we found to be independent, strategic and persistent in their 
approach to activism, make up the profile of our core informants, whom we met and interviewed 
during our stay in Cairo. Our informants, however, do not solely make up the individuals behind 
Cinema Al-Tahrir. Our primary area of research became a loosely connected group of “Cairo’s new 
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cultural-political players”, who were engaged in new activist inventions from public video-
screenings to photography, street art and innovative idea generation.  
Prior to our arrival we had primarily read about street art and how street art had been a part of a new 
rising wave of creative and informal ways of political participation in Egypt. Since the 25th of 
January 2011, it had attracted international media coverage as beautiful and daring acts of artistic 
interpretations of the course of events appeared on the Wall of Muhammad Mahmoud Street next to 
Tahrir Square. Yet, we had still a lot more to discover and learn about Egypt’s cultural politics, the 
25th of January Revolution as well as its creative afterlife. In the following paragraph we narrow 
down our field of research to a single research question to underpin the focus of this thesis: The 
creative struggles for ”Tahrir” (Liberation) in Egypt’s capital, Cairo, a year after the 18 days of 
revolutionary protesting.  
The 25th of January Revolution: A revolution of creativity 
With a physical epicentre on Tahrir Square more than a decade of growing protest culture 
culminated at one focal point in the very beginning of 2011. This peak of rioting was triggered by 
the popular revolts that swept through the Middle East and North Africa starting in Tunisia with a 
young street vendor setting himself a light in public protest against the Tunisian regime. This event 
was followed by public uprisings soon spreading across the region, leading to civil wars in both 
Libya and Syria (Bauer & Schiller 2012:1). Like Tunisians, Egyptians had been deprived from a 
free flow of political practices within the public realm for decades, which prior to the uprising had 
for instance had resulted in complying and fearsome self-censorship and a common perception of 
“public space” as a space owned by the government (Sanders VI in Mehrez 2012:143). During the 
18 days of popular protest, however, a common language of liberation with origins in the powerful 
memory and solidarities of rioting at Tahrir Square was developed in Cairo. This lead to the 
distribution of a great variety of creative cultural practices of dissidence encompassing: chants, 
songs, jokes and poems as well as cultural celebrations, theatrical and artistic performances and 
revolutionary banners, hand-written signs and graffiti (Mehrez 2012:15). Sit-ins, demonstrations 
and creative public interventions had been organised in central Cairo before.  
However, they had not reached mass level as the popular embrace of creative resistance practises 
did during and right after the 25th of January Revolution. The occupation of Tahrir Square and many 
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other public spaces across the country meant that Egyptians in unison experienced a break with a 
collective memory of living in fear and oppression, which transformed the activities of the squares 
into powerful symbolic rejections of state domination (Gribbon in Mehrez 2012:108). This resulted 
in what some observers have termed an “explosion” of creative forms of expression (Makar 
2011:310). This culmination, however, was according to others made possible after years of work 
by the labour movement and pro-democracy activism (Stein: 2012:23). Yet it could also looked 
upon as a result of the profound transformations within the practices of cultural production, 
consumption and distribution in Egypt, in particular online social networking and the newer 
creations of Internet campaigns, in particularly mobilised by youth (Elseewii 2012:1197). The days 
after the retreat of Mubarak brought great celebrations in central Cairo, which were later interrupted 
by clashes between Egypt’s Security Forces and protesters, who only saw the retreat of Mubarak as 
the beginning of “the revolution” and not the end. These continued to happen in between art 
festivals and cultural activities “for the Revolution” throughout the year of 2011 and during our stay 
in Egypt in the spring of 2012 (Gribbon in Mehrez 2012:133). The outlawing of strikes and protests 
in the name of stability and security legitimised the use of violent means by Egypt’s Security 
Forces. Several prominent activists, journalists and bloggers were detained, interrogated and 
released on bail on charges of “defamatory insults against the military” or charges of “spreading 
false information.” (Gribbon in Mehrez 2012:114).1 The continuation of a state of emergency, 
declared by Mubarak as he became president in 1981, was kept intact under the rule of Egypt’s new 
presidential substitute, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (the SCAF). This resulted in more 
than twelve thousand civilians, who were being tried in military courts. Egypt’s old military rule, 
headed by the SCAF, sought stability and therefore sought to reinforce its widespread public control 
of as it simultaneously paved the way for parliamentary and presidential elections (Gribbon in 
Mehrez 2012:133, Stein 2012:24). To many observers, the retreat of Mubarak seemed to become 
the pivotal unifying demand that created a new revolutionary national identity among Egyptians and 
as such it was a first symbolic step towards a state of “bread, liberty and human dignity” in Egypt 
(Gribbon & Hawas in Mehrez 2012:112). These were the demands that initiated the protests on 
January 25th and as the chanted demands spell out, Egyptians had for decades been deprived of 
economic prosperity, the freedom of oppositional politics, a just legal system, which finally left the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Stork, Joe (10-09-2011): Egypt: Retry or Free 12,000 After Unfair Military Trials - Civilians Tried Since February Exceed Total 
Under Mubarak. Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/10/egypt-retry-or-free-12000-after-unfair-
military-trials. Read: 15-02-2012.  
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majority of the country’s population on the edge of retaining human dignity.2 This leads us to one 
of our central research questions: In a context in which extreme poverty, illiteracy and 
unemployment is a daily reality and internet access is far from a common household, what 
difference does a self-organised open air cinema a few meters from Tahrir Square actually make?  
Questioning the transformative potential of Cairo’s new creative activisms 
With 24 percent of Egypt’s 82.2 million population making up the youth demographic in 2010 and 
a recent awaking of informal political participation among youth with the popular uprisings, there is 
a momentum for putting forward the question of whose realm or whose terms should represent 
Egypt’s national identity and subsequently dominate Egypt’s future path.3 This thesis deals with the 
question of how a group of urban middle class youth and new cultural-political activists in Cairo 
aspire to create socio-political change through practices of creative forms of activism in a context 
that needs to be understood as curtailed, but which does not need to be confined to or exclusively 
defined by its constraints. In the wake of the Arab uprisings, academic interpretations of the 
emancipatory processes of the Arab uprisings are pointing in rather different directions. Professor of 
Iranian studies, Hamid Dabashi for instance sees an end to the dividing vocabulary of post-
colonialism and the subsequent curtailing of Arab subjectivity and agency. Assistant Professor of 
Communications and New Media, Ingrid M. Hoofd, on the other hand sees a beginning of a new 
form of neo-colonialism enforced by new media, which she terms “speed-elitism”. We seek to 
illuminate and question the transformative potential of our core informant’s insistence on creative 
public interventions of idea generation, street art, photography and video making. We do that by 
determining whether the activism, of which these interventions spring, may be defined as “cultural 
activism” in reference to discourse theory and theories on contemporary activism. We have chosen 
to apply a discourse theoretical approach that allows us to determine on the basis of our interviews 
how Cairo’s new cultural-political players construct alternative identities and subsequently practises 
for “revolutionary” action. We discovered that Cairo’s new cultural-political players are not 
confined to residual practises of activism. To the contrary, they are tapping into what may also be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Approximately 35% of the Egyptian population are internet users, while only 15% are facebook-users. Internet World 
State – Usage and Population statistics. Egypt. http://www.internetworldstats.com/africa.htm#eg. Read: 05-03-2013. 
The minimum wage in Egypt is above poverty line in Egypt, but poverty persists among workers in all sectors public, 
private and informal due to for instance extensive family sizes (Saif 2011:18).  
3 Young people in the age group 18 to 29 year, like our informants approximately, is estimated at 23.5% of the total 
population in 2010, or 19.8 million (UNDP 2010:2). 
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defined as a global set of practises and that these practises are captured by the terminology of 
American political scientist, Stephen Duncombe, and the cultural activist practises of his “Ethical 
Spectacle”. According to theories on contemporary activism, the contemporary model of global 
activism seeks to meet the more “spectacular” possibilities of modern time, in which new media 
enables us to imagine our lives differently in spite various forms of constraints. Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players tap, by means of their activism, into the new language of liberation in 
Egypt and the Revolutionaries, as well as the historical memory of the Egyptian people. They do 
this in order to gain political significance and affect the public imagination of the Egyptian identity. 
Yet while discourse theory and theories of contemporary activism enable us investigate how Cairo’s 
new cultural-political players aspire to create “socio-political” change, these theories do not enable 
us to understand why and which kind. We therefore draw on our interviews as well as several 
researchers within the field of Egypt’s cultural politics besides Mehrez, who have investigated how 
cultural-political players in Egypt struggle to navigate the Egyptian context. This context is 
characterised by a regime that benefits extensively from economic privileges of neoliberal policies, 
while one third of the population lives below poverty. Moreover ingrained forces in the Egyptian 
society point to “western influences”, including middle class cosmopolitan Egyptians and civil 
rights practises, as subverting factors and a threat to national security and identity. We cannot 
reinvent the academic language of speaking about Egypt, but we may contribute to a “de-
Europeanisation” and explore what signifies the language of those seeking to implement and 
express how we are to speak of Egyptian culture and politics in the future. Our final research 
question therefore is: 
In post-revolutionary Cairo, how does a group of new cultural-political players aspire to create 
socio-political change through creative approaches to activism in spite of authoritarian constraints 
and various forms of complicity? 
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Egypt’s cultural politics  
In this introductory chapter, we introduce the reader to Egypt’s cultural politics, in which our 
informants, Cairo’s new cultural political players, are situated. We term it “cultural” politics as 
culture plays a significant role in the political logics of the Egyptian regime and its multiple forms 
of exclusions. These multiple forms of exclusion are at the core of our informants’ activism and the 
revolutionary movements, which they are a part of. The high degree of moral and political authority 
in Egypt imposes social and political control. “Youth” movements have therefore been reclaiming 
their “youthfulness”. In spite of the age of their members, they have been claiming their right to 
autonomy, change, idealism and mobility (Bayat 2010:118). Owing to Egypt’s cultural politics of 
multiple forms of exclusions, pro-democracy movements have been engaged in dissidence before 
the 25th of January 2011. They have played a significant part in paving the way for the 18 days of 
popular protests as well as they have played a significant part in the emergence of the new popular 
identity of Revolutionaries. The 25th of January Revolution, however, has facilitated a revival and 
reshaping of Egypt’s political landscape towards greater popular inclusion and public political 
participation. Cairo’s new cultural political players identify themselves with the forces of Tahrir 
Square and struggle through practices of creative grass-roots activism along with the forces from 
Tahrir Square to keep the “revolution” alive. That is in spite of the politics of Egypt’s new 
authoritarian substitute “president”, the Supreme Court of Armed Forces, and the present risks of 
being arrested and tried in unjust military courts for political dissidence. In the following, we take a 
point of departure in the political reality of youth in Egypt, who make up more than 50 percent of 
the under 24 demographic, and who prior to the uprising responded to the multiple forms of 
exclusion through dissenting youth activism. Then we take a closer introductory look at the 
Egyptian regime’s cultural politics of “facade” democracy, which play a decisive factor in 
legitimising those multiple exclusion, which the Egyptian people were protesting against. This leads 
us to the politicised and pluralised political landscape of Egypt after the 25th of January Revolution, 
in which a struggle over the course of “the revolution” among the Revolutionaries, the SCAF and 
the Islamist Forces including the increasing powerful Muslim Brotherhood, is prevalent. Finally 
before moving to our methodological chapter and the fieldwork process that lead us to Cairo’s new 
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cultural-political players, we zoom in on these new cultural-political players in Cairo and how they 
position themselves in the aforementioned political landscape of Egypt in the spring of 2012.        
Political youth paving the way for the 25th of January Revolution  
Among youth from the urban middle class, who were born into the Mubarak-era, as our informants 
were, it was rare to vote and participate in grass-roots activism, social movements, demonstrations 
or other forms of political activities (Boserup 2011:46). In the years before the 25th of January 
Revolution a perception of the Egyptian youth as a depoliticised and apathetic generation therefore 
flourished among international development organisations and certain observers (Boserup 2011:46). 
According to Asef Bayat, Professor of Middle East studies, this was due to youth’s lack of trust in 
“electoral games” and their distrust in party politics, which was the only legitimate channel for 
political participation (Bayat 2010:130). Diane Singerman, however, who is Associate Professor of 
Middle East studies, argued in 2007 that it is a generalisation to state that Egyptian youth have a 
difficult time representing and voicing their complaints. By this Singerman referred to the online 
voicing of ideas, sharing of information and organisation, which fuelled the demonstrations of the 
Kifaya Movement for Change and their sister organisation Youth for Change in Egypt (Singerman 
2007:39). These two movements were along with the 6th of April Movement, which emerged in 
2008 in support of labour strikes on the 6th of April, and the online campaign “We are all Khaled 
Said”, which was formed as a critical respond to police brutality, powerful forces paving way the 
25th of January Revolution to happen. The Youth for Change’s strategy for mobilisation has been 
described as almost “guerrilla-style” as they were organised into loosely structured networks and 
because they constantly moved around and changed the locations of their meetings (Fahmi 
2009:96). What further characterised these youth movements, especially 6th of April and “We are 
all Khaled Said”, were their great technological skills, which enabled them to spread their dissident 
messages and to mobilise people.4 These movements thus became vanguards for online political 
participation, but their success of mobilising people for the 25th of January was also due to the fact 
that members of the movements went to poor neighbourhoods, towns and villages in order to 
mobilise people for the mass protests, who were not likely to know about the demonstrations 
through online resources.5 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Hammelmann & Mesard in Ibrahim & Stroud 2011:26-27 
5 Hammelman & Mesard in Ibrahim & Stroud 2011:26-27 
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The dissidence of the aforementioned three movements and their focuses on respectively a just 
political system, labour rights and condemnation of police violence are closely related to the 
Egyptian state’s multiple exclusions of its citizens. The Egyptian regime have for decades not 
addressed the issue of corruption or the lacking job opportunities. It had not sought to reduce the 
high number of people living in poverty or to facilitate a space for political participation (BTI 
2012:3). This had especially affected the growing young population of Egypt, which subsequently 
had been marginalised for decades.6 Possibilities and venues for civic participation for youth in 
Egypt have been very limited and Egyptian youth have “…been allowed little scope to question, 
reject, or offer alternative visions, demands, and arrangements for societal change and economic 
and social justice” (Herrera 2010:127). In the following we look further into the cultural politics of 
the Mubarak regime legitimising these multiple forms of exclusions, to which these acts of 
dissidence and the 25th of January Revolution were a respond.  
Egypt’s façade democracy  
The multiple forms of exclusions, which were not addressed by the Egyptian government, were 
instead masked by a reform friendly image that was open to political change and thus on the right 
path to “modernity”. The state initiated political liberalisation in order to legitimise itself and to 
uphold this reform friendly image in line with international prescriptions. This liberalisation, 
however, may rather be described as a superficial image and the reforms as superficial reforms 
(Mehrez 2010:15). The reform image was upheld by the Egyptian state through the “modern” 
young cultural producers. This enforced an ambiguous relation between the state and the cultural 
politically engaged youth as the state came to play both the role of their patron as well as their 
persecutor  (Mehrez 2010:6). The Egyptian state provided the young people in Egypt with 
“scientific advancement” or technical education to enhance global competition. This, however, was 
also, according to Bayat, the state’s way of guiding young people into religious piety in order to 
keep them away from foreign cultural influence and political Islam (Bayat 2010:131). Such pro-
democracy rhetoric was guiding patronage under the rule of Mubarak, but it was also utilised to 
echo the vocabulary of the international community in order to obtain financial contributions. Yet 
instead of creating just reforms, the Egyptian state further induced postcolonial structures of 
dependency and socio-economic inequality. Egypt became formally independent in 1923, but this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Egypt has since 1995 experienced a youth bulge. In 2010 young people between the age of 18 and 29 made up 23.5 % 
of the total population 19.8 million people (UNDP 2010:2). 
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did not prevent British domination, which later provoked the 1952 revolution and lead to socialist 
reforms under popular Gamel Abdel Nasser (Shohat 1992:104). Mubarak, however, represented 
stability, when he came to power in 1981 after the assassination of president Anwar Sadat. Sadat 
had accomplished a peace deal with Israel and a new relationship with the United States, yet at the 
expense of Egypt’s relations with the Arab world and an increasing conservative, dissatisfied and 
outlawed Islamic opposition with militant offspring (Mehrez 2010:16-17). Egypt’s integration into 
U.S. development aid and World Bank adjustment programs secured the strategic alliance with the 
U.S. and Israel and solidified neoliberal policies (De Koning 2009:161). Simultaneously, however, 
it degraded other questions of development and enforced Egypt’s dependency on foreign aid often 
termed post-colonialism or neo-imperialism due to the Western forces putting Egypt out of control.7 
Neo-liberal state policies became a part of the Egyptian state’s reform package. These policies 
advocated for the role of the state to become minimised by privatisation of the public sector and 
abolition of social welfare measures. During the 25th of January Revolution protestors called for 
“bread, liberty and human dignity”, highlighting their dissatisfaction and discontent after years of 
economic disposition, lack of political freedom of speech and an opaque and unfair state system in 
Egypt. Hence exposing the hypocrisy of the government’s façade reforms and demanding a change 
within the Egyptian state’s authoritarian practices and neoliberal policies are at the core of the 
Tahrir forces’ demands for “bread, liberty and human dignity” or as Mehrez terms it the new 
political language of Tahrir (Mehrez 2012:15).  
The expansion of public dissident and subsequent creative grass-roots activism was made possible 
owing to the creation of, what Assistant Professor of Anthropology at American University of 
Cairo, Hanan Sabea, describes as a 18 day long rupture in time, space and consciousness in Egypt. 8 
This rupture induced processes among the Egyptian population of redefining their political identity 
into a popular identity of Revolutionaries, who acted jointly on the repressed needs of “bread, 
liberty and dignity”. In the following we look into the politicised cultural life and the pluralised 
political life in wake of the 25th of January Revolution, which flourished in Cairo during our time 
of fieldwork in the spring of 2012. The rather ambiguous and conflictual relation between the state 
and the Tahrir forces, including Cairo’s young cultural-political players, literally came to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Hickel, Jason (29-03-2012): Neoliberal Egypt: The Hijacked revolution. AlJezeera. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/201232784226830522.html Read: 10-12-2012. 
8 Sabea, Hanan (01-02-2012): A ”Time out of Time”, the Political and the Imaginary in the context of the January 25th 
Revolution in Egypt. Cultural Anthropology Journal of the Society for Cultural Anthropology.	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surface in the shape of for instance dissident street art. Yet it was also forcefully repressed by the 
state, whose fight against “foreign conspiratorial influence” as the prevailing argument for 
censorship and control, legitimised state interventions and even state violence during the 
reappearing clashes between Egypt’s Security Forces and the Tahrir forces. 
 
The cultural and political afterlife of 25th of January Revolution  
After the 25th of January Revolution, the Egyptian society and state are in a process of redefining 
and re-establishing itself. Professor Nathan J. Brown, who is specialised in Arab politics, points to 
this process in Egypt not just as a “rupture”, but as a “total rupture” of decentralisation and 
increased autonomy and independence from state control: 
 
“...the growing engagement of large parts of the population in political life, and the uncertain political environment are 
allowing all kinds of Egyptian institutions to wriggle free of state control. (...) Important institutions in Egyptian life 
may come to play very different roles than in the past in a manner that may be difficult to anticipate and will not always 
be democratizing.” (Brown 2011:3). 
The uncertainty, however, of Egypt’s political climate and future is embraced by grass-roots forces 
as well as it is enforced by the somewhat erratic performances of Egypt’s leading military council, 
the SCAF. The SCAF quickly showed that they were willing to use the same repressive tactics as 
Mubarak: state violence, tear gas, intimidation, and bullets, and they predictably blamed the 
resultant disorder of protesters on “criminal thugs” or “agents of foreign powers” (Gribbon 
2012:114, Stein 2012:25). Observers accounts, however, for an unregulated flow of aesthetic 
creation and communication within Cairo’s public space after the 18 days of popular protests and 
for how this lead many artistic cultural-political players to become explicitly political engaged 
(Sanders IV 2012:146). An accelerated valorisation of Egypt’ youth, culture and underground was 
in other words happening. For instance the Al-Fann Midan (Art is a square) festival became a 
reality along with other cultural festivals celebrating “the revolution”. A myriad of creative forms of 
expression furthermore unfolded in Cairo’s public realm independently such as poetry recitation, 
street art, theatre plays and even public video screenings of footage of military assaults took place. 9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 One of the bigger cultural events that took place during our stay in support of the Revolution was the D-CAF, Down 
Town (Cairo) Contemporary Art Festival. http://d-caf.org/	   
Lindsey, Ursula (01-2012): Art in Egypt’s Revolutionary Square. Middle East Research and Information Project. 
http://www.merip.org/mero/interventions/art-egypts-revolutionary-square. Read: 21-06-2012.   
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This politicisation of Cairo’s cultural life took place along with a pluralisation of Egypt’s political 
scene.  
Numerous new secular and religious parties were formed in the wake of the 25th of January 
Revolution, amongst these the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) of the formerly illegal opposition 
party, the Muslim Brotherhood (The MB) (Stein 2012:24). Meanwhile the forces from Tahrir 
Square or “the Tahrir forces” comprised a heterogeneous patchwork of movements with diverse 
political agendas from prodemocracy liberal representatives to Islamist parties (Stein 2012:25). 
With Mubarak’s defence Minister, Field Marshal Muhammad Tantawi, at the helm of the SCAF 
absolute authoritarian procedures were kept intact, although parliamentarian elections were held. 
The SCAF’s objective stayed in the background, yet remained a non-transparent arbitrator of 
decisive influence:  
“Once it had ousted the president, it follows, it felt it had accomplished the revolution’s goals. As a corollary, the SCAF 
was and is inclined to view any who continued to protest after Mubarak’s fall as serving either their own narrow self-
interests or, worse, those of foreign powers (read: the U.S.) aiming to weaken and fragment a proud Arab nation. (ICG 
2012:i). 
The SCAF took an adverse position against trusting civilian attempts, in particular that of the liberal 
protesters and Islamists, to direct the course of “the revolution” by referring to Egypt as a country of 
uncertainty and widespread internal insecurity in the wake of the 18 days (ICG 2012:i). By drawing 
on rhetoric of foreign distrust, the SCAF effectively managed to legitimise raids against “foreign” 
NGOs in the late 2011 and early 2012. The Egyptian government continued its scare campaign 
against civil society organisations such as human rights democracy groups by referring to their 
illegal foreign activities and acceptance of illegal foreign funding. Like this they were sending a 
clear signal to civil society actors such as our informants about the risks they ran, if they worked 
with human rights, democratic reforms, or the rule of law.10 The electoral mandate of the Islamists, 
especially the MB, and their established local presence throughout the country meant that they 
possessed an increasingly significant power-position, which separated them from the Tahrir forces, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
10 Human Rights Watch (13-03-2012): Statement at the Human Rights Council on the Human Rights Situation in Egypt. 
Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/13/statement-human-rights-council-human-rights-situation-
egypt Read: 05-06-2012. 
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who lacked significant parliamentarian representation and later presidential representation as well 
(Stein 2012:25).  
The relation between the SCAF, the MB and the Tahrir forces intensified with the upcoming 
presidential election in the spring of 2012. Especially differences between and within these groups 
over the process of the writing of a new constitution were prevalent. The MB and the Tahrir forces, 
including the Islamist forces, were concerned that the SCAF would attempt to grand itself political 
as well as economical privileges in the process of writing the constitution and ultimately slow down 
the transition period in order to stay in power.11 This lead to demonstrations against the SCAF in 
the spring of 2012, in which both the Tahrir forces and the MB participated with the aim of 
reinstating public pressure on the SCAF and demanding a faster transition period by going through 
with the planned presidential elections. These demonstrations became fragmented with multiple 
aims. Liberal parts of the Tahrir forces for example were anxious that a constitution written by the 
MB and Islamist forces would not include their principles.12 The Tahrir forces protested against 
what they perceived as parliamentary monopolisation by the SCAF and the MB.13 At the same time 
the supporters of the disqualified Salafi presidential candidate Hazem Salah Abu Ismail protested to 
show their dissatisfaction with the SCAF disqualifying their candidate. This situation at the 
beginning of May escalated into more violent clashes between Egypt’s Security Forces and the 
Tahrir forces. 
 
Cairo’s new cultural-political players  
When we interviewed a group of Cairo’s cultural-political players in the spring of 2012, some were 
more hesitant to participate in the struggle for an “ongoing revolution”, meaning that they withdrew 
from creative forms of activism related to the “revolution”. The independent filmmaker, Ahmed 
Abdel Mohsen, for instance expressed to us that he believed that the more established artists like 
himself were confused about how to approach the overwhelming transformations and the moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ottaway, Mariana (03-11-2011): Egypt’s Democracy: Between the Military, Islamists, and Illiberal Democrats. 
Carnegie Endowment. http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/03/egypt-s-democracy-between-military-islamists-and-
illiberal-democrats/6m0w Read: 07-10-2012 
12 Ottaway, Mariana (03-11-2011): Egypt’s Democracy: Between the Military, Islamists, and Illiberal Democrats. 
Carnegie Endowment. http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/03/egypt-s-democracy-between-military-islamists-and-
illiberal-democrats/6m0w. Read: 07-10-2012 
13 AlJezeera (13-04-2012): Cairo Protests against Mubarak-era Candidates. Al-Jezeera.  
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/04/2012413111914609921.html Read: 13-04-2012. 
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pressure put on them to act on “the revolution” (Mohsen:23). While Mohsen felt relieved that he 
was to do something different after having contributed to “the revolution” with a documentary 
about revolutionary activists, the young media activist, Lubna Darwish, in comparison was 
determined to continue her revolutionary engagement. Among Cairo’s new cultural-political 
players, identity and group formation processes are driven by persistent visions for autonomy from 
the state and revolutionary change (Darwish:8). They identify themselves with the broad identity of 
the liberal Tahrir forces or the Revolutionaries, as our informants term those, who believe in “an 
ongoing revolution” in opposition to the SCAF and formal powers. They may be inclined to vote 
for limited progress, but in general our informants view formal politics as “conspiratorial” with the 
hidden aim of reinforcing the power of the Egyptian military at the expense of the Egyptian 
population. Rather Cairo’s new cultural-political players are trying to outlive their own aspirations 
for personal development and growth, as well as they aspire to facilitate aspirations on behalf of the 
Egyptian population. The photo activist, Mostafa Shestawy, for instance shared with us how he saw 
it as a misconception to believe in the formal structures of the Egyptian society at this point in time. 
Rather he believed in the informal sphere and its capacity to build NGOs and movements through 
charity and voluntary engagement for socio-political change (Sheshtawy:24-25). Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players’ aspirations for independency from the state and formal politics are 
realised within Egypt’s public space informally through newly established spaces and networks of 
Revolutionaries. The collective identity of the Revolutionaries has since the 18 days of popular 
protesting at Tahrir Square sparked new groups and communities for change and seems to have 
expanded the amount of grass-roots participation in Cairo.  
In the following methodological chapter we return to the question of the impact of the 25th of 
January Revolution and the particular identity of Cairo’s new cultural-political players, however 
with a different focus as we now turn to the conditions of doing anthropological fieldwork and 
interviewing cultural-political players in post-revolutionary Cairo.  
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Anthropological fieldwork in post-revolutionary Cairo 
In this methodological chapter we seek to illuminate the process of our two months of fieldwork in 
Cairo, the empirical outcome of this process consisting of observations and interviews and the 
implications of conduction fieldwork in this transition period of post-revolutionary Cairo. The 
inconsistency of normalcy in the transitional period in Egypt, we found calls upon the 
anthropological method’s contextual sensitivity for the subtle dynamics of society. We draw on 
central anthropological concepts in fieldwork and what sociologist Michael Burawoy terms “The 
Extended Case Method” (1998). “The Extended Case Method” has inspired our outline and the 
reflections tied to the process of conducting fieldwork in Cairo. This process has lead to a 
categorisation of our informants as either key informants or core informants.14 Finally we look into 
the process and implications of conducting interviews in the post-Mubarak, authoritarian context of 
Egypt and we round off with a characterisation of our core informants, whom we also term cultural-
political players, and their distinctive social profile. First, however, we deal with the implications of 
conducting fieldwork within Egypt’s transition period and how this specific context and our 
research endeavours are connected to the anthropological approach as well as “the Extended Case 
Method”.      
Conducting anthropological fieldwork in a “time out of time”  
The post-revolutionary transition period, which characterised Egypt during our stay, did not only 
affect our informants’ creative approaches to activism, but also our process of conducting 
fieldwork. Since we carried out fieldwork before the presidential election and while there was no 
certainty for what would happen in the election and if it would happen at all, we argue that what 
Sabea describes as a “time out of time” situation was not just present during the 18 days of protests 
as Sabea refers to, but also one and a half year after the fall of Mubarak in the time leading up to the 
presidential election. Sabea describes this “time our of time” as follows: “…a slice of time out of 
the rhythm of the familiar (the ordinary and the known) and, through that rupture (and an 
assumption of reconstitution), making it possible to imagine other modalities of being – in this case 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Appendix 1 provides a list of our informants (divided into key informants and core informants who we also term 
cultural-political player informants), their age, occupation and if relevant their cultural-political practices/mediums.   
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of the political and the social”15. Hence, the uncertainty and contingency of our field of research 
were basic conditions of the Egyptian society during our stay in Cairo. This field we to some extent 
had the privilege of just observing and writing about from a distance as foreigners visiting our field 
of immersion temporarily. Sabea as well as other ethnographers, who have conducted fieldwork 
during and after the 18 fatal days, highlight that in this “time out of the ordinary” the modalities of 
being are in need of a language, through which the transformations can be captured and articulated. 
“How to write anthropologically about Egypt after the 25th of January revolution?” is in other words 
a crucial methodological question, asked by several anthropologists in Egypt and elsewhere after 
the events of January 2011.16 Understanding and documenting social dynamics and processes as 
well as action and the ideas and beliefs that shape it, is according to Burawoy best reached through 
reflexive science.17 Burawoy writes that: “Premised upon our own participation in the world we 
study, reflexive science deploys multiple dialogues to reach explanations of empirical phenomena” 
(Burawoy 1998:5). In other words, what Olivier de Sardan describes as “immersion” into the field 
through observations18, and the conduction of interviews is at the core of the anthropological 
approach as a method to understand social phenomena (Olivier de Sardan: 2008).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Sabea, Hanan (01-02-2012): A ”Time out of Time”, the Political and the Imaginary in the context of the January 25th 
Revolution in Egypt. Cultural Anthropology Journal of the Society for Cultural Anthropology. 
http://www.culanth.org/?q=node/490 Read: 20-10-2012. 
16 “How and why to write ethnographically about Egypt after the January 25th Revolution?” were asked by the AAA 
(American Anthropological Association) in November 2011 and resulted in the compiling of the “Hot Spot on Egypt”, 
where Egyptian ethnographers or ethnographers living in Egypt shared their thoughts. Elyachar, Julia, Winegar, Jessica 
(31-01-2012): Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt a Year after January 25th 
http://www.culanth.org/?q=node/484 Read: 20-10-2012. Elyachar, Julia (01-02-2012): Writing the Revolution: 
Dilemmas of Ethnographic Writing after the January 25th revolution in Egypt. Cultural Anthropology Journal of the 
Society for Cultural Anthropology http://www.culanth.org/?q=node/492 Read: 20-10-2012.  
17Anthropological fieldwork is often termed “ethnography” or “reflexive science” and their differences may be 
discussed, we, however, do not go into this discussion, but stay with the term “anthropological” unless we refer to 
scholars using other terms. (In reference to Olivier de Sardan 2008:4).  
18 Observation is one the key instrument in obtaining ethnographic knowledge. Here we find a spectrum of involvement 
from complete participant, through participant observer and observer as participant, to complete observer. We have to 
some extent adopted a position in the middle of this spectrum, however as we during the time span of our two months 
research process never became a part of our informants’ social world during a longer and continuously period of time, 
we here make use of the term observation(s) or observers as participants (Bloor, Wood 2006:71).  
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The three phases of our fieldwork: From immersion and loss 
of case to structuration  
In retro perspective our fieldwork process from the 4th of April until the 4th of June 2012 can be 
divided into three determining and therefore defining phases. The three phases structure the 
following paragraphs, in which we will point out, how specific experiences and situations were 
significant for our fieldwork and research process and for our final empirical data collection and 
research topic. We link these three phases to the “four ways of benefiting from a greater 
methodological self-consciousness” introduced by Burawoy in “The Extended Ease Method”, 
which are: “Intervention”, “Process”, “Structuration” and “Reconstruction”. These four “concepts” 
constitute the process of reflexive science or the process of conducting anthropological fieldwork as 
well as they reflect the different levels of dialogue the anthropologist may engage in. Burawoy 
describes this process as follows:  
“Reflexive science starts out from dialogue, virtual or real, between observer and participants, embeds such dialogue 
within a second dialogue between local processes and extralocal forces that in turn can only be comprehended through a 
third, expanding dialogue of theory with itself.” (Burawoy 1998:5). 
In other words what Burawoy here describes is a process starting from the first immersion into the 
field to the final considerations between empirical findings and theoretical choices. Our 
anthropological immersion into the field further generates certain limitations in terms of “power 
effects” such as what Burawoy terms: “Domination” and “Silencing”.19  
In the following, we outline the process of our two months of intensive fieldwork in Cairo, which 
has determined our choice of informants, observations and research question.    
Phase one: Immersing into the cultural political scene and life of Cairo 
From prior experiences it was no surprise to us that our presence or rather our “otherness” was an 
intervention in itself. Burawoy notes that it is by mutual reactions that we discover the properties of 
the social order. Our role as social scientists and female foreigners both had its pros, in terms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Burawoy further includes the power effects: Objectification and Normalization. We, however, have chosen to focus 
on the power effects of domination and silencing. 
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great interest in our presence, and cons, in terms of being foreign and quite unfamiliar with what 
signifies normalcy in Cairo. In this way we could not avoid what Burawoy terms “domination”. On 
the one hand our possibility or privilege of being able to travel to Cairo can be seen as a form of 
intervention of domination, as this privilege does not apply to the majority of Egyptians. This 
economic domination was furthermore explicit as we within the segmented streets of Cairo came to 
represent the easy upper class life of western foreigners. This exact element of domination 
manifested itself in the radical difference between beggars in the streets and fashionable 
cosmopolitans in coffee shops, which made it uncomfortably clear that we were participants trapped 
in a visible hierarchy of unequal power relations. On the other hand we were also being dominated, 
as we did not have the same knowledge of the norms of the local context as the locals themselves. 
In short we had to immerse into the different contexts of Cairo on the premises of the local norms, 
which at times were difficult to decode as newcomers.  
The first two weeks of our stay in Cairo we spent exactly on decoding, exploring and immersing 
into different art spaces, events and collectives working with art or what we regarded as a kind of 
art activism: art with a political purpose. We learned that the cultural political scene of Cairo had 
its own “post-revolutionary language” so to speak and so had the people we met. This meant that 
almost all cultural events and initiatives were related to the “revolution” and for that reason always 
had an element of political purpose. This was also the case of Cairo’s prominent community art 
gallery, The Town House. One of the exhibitions the Town House displayed in their gallery was an 
exhibition about the censorship of the art world called “I am not there”. The exhibition was 
organised by the non-profit art initiative, the Contemporary Image Collective (CIC). Due to the 
exhibition’s theme of censorship, we thought it relevant to contact the artistic director of CIC, Mia 
Jankowicz, who agreed to meet with us. We conducted an interview with Jankowicz, in which she 
shared her thoughts about a simultaneous presence of censorship and the dilemmas of art as 
propaganda in Egypt, which we will return to in the analysis. Jankowicz referred us to the highly 
active media collective Mosireen, which we shall return to in phase two. In this way Jankowicz 
came to play the role of a key informant. Our “key informants” are those research subjects in our 
study, who have a disproportionate weight and role in the conduct and outcome of our research. 
They are ‘key’ in the sense that they facilitate the access through the comprehensiveness of their 
social networks. In this way they acted as “gatekeepers”, particularly in the early stages of our 
research (Bloor, Wood 2006:109). Jankowicz was one of our first informants to be interviewed 
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because of her insights into Cairo’s contemporary dissident art scene. During our fieldwork we thus 
relied on the anthropological method of “branching out” or “snowball”, when choosing our 
informants, meaning that attending an event or conducting an interview lead to the possibility of 
direct or indirect suggestions and ideas for other informants (Olivier de Sardan 2008:36). 
As we were exploring the connection or fusion between post-revolutionary forms of political 
participation and artistic means of expression among Cairo youth, we did not only attempt 
immersion into the cultural and artistic scene of Cairo, but also the informal political one. Within 
the first weeks of our stay in Cairo, we thus observed two large “Friday protests”, one of them 
arranged by the MB and the other one by the Revolutionaries. These demonstrations took place at 
Tahrir Square just a few minutes from our home. Despite calls for unification and similarity in 
demands, the heavily fractured front of the political life was divided between the Islamist forces and 
the Revolutionaries. This fragmentation of the political life became symptomatic for the two months 
we spend conducting fieldwork in Cairo.  
At this point in our fieldwork process we went from an open and broad approach to the immersion 
into our field to an attempt to find a more specific case for our empirical endeavours. We were 
eager to find a specific case related to our thesis topic, at this point in time “artistic activism” and to 
get deeper into what Burawoy describes as the “process” of moving with the participants through 
their time and space. We, therefore, followed Mia Jankowicz’s suggestion about contacting 
Mosireen. 
Phase two: Choice and loss of case 
Mosireen described themselves as working with “cultural activism” in the wake of the “revolution” 
and they invited us to take part in their “media collective”. Lubna Darwish, one of the founders of 
Mosireen, encouraged us to use their space as our working place and she agreed for us to use 
Mosireen as a case and to conduct interviews with the members. Mosireen, thus, appeared to be a 
suitable case for us. However, we had difficulties conducting interviews with the people belonging 
to Mosireen’s network. Actually they did not have time to contribute to our research or involve us 
in their work. During these two weeks we only managed to conduct one interview with Darwish. In 
general we felt more as a hindrance to their work than being able to contribute. Our ambition to 
pursue action-based research and immerse with the field, in this specific case Mosireen, was a great 
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challenge due to several factors, one of these factors being the limited amount of time we had to get 
to know the members of Mosireen and conduct fieldwork.20 Finally we never became actively 
involved or immersed with the work of Mosireen. The people engaged in Mosireen were all busy 
taking part in clashes and documenting the police-violence taking place. In this sensitive time we 
felt it wrong to push for interviews with the members of Mosireen. Becoming familiarised with the 
space of Mosireen was further difficult due to our position as foreign researchers fairly new to the 
Egyptian context. At this point in our research process we decided to draw on someone familiar and 
at home in the field of cultural activism in Cairo. Nasly Hussein, one of the women engaged in the 
work of Mosireen and the cultural-political scene of Cairo agreed to help us move forward with our 
research process. Nasly advised us to conduct interviews with individuals and abandon the idea of a 
case study. She believed that following a specific group of cultural-political players would be too 
difficult due to activists’ huge amount of work in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution, of 
which Mosireen was an example. Nasly believed that no group would be truly inclusive and let us 
follow their work due to time pressure and complications related to being connected to two 
foreigners, which could potentially harm their work. We interpreted this as the distrust tied to the 
“foreign agenda discourse”. We further became aware of the impossibility of escaping “the 
foreigner discourse”, as we attempted to interview the co-founder of the mobile art initiative, 
Mahatat, Astrid Thew. When we introduced our thesis topic as “artistic activism”, Thew hesitated 
to be interviewed by us. She did not want personnel from the state bureaucracy or the media to 
connect the activities of Mahatat to activism or politics. This could have consequences as it had had 
with regards to the foreign NGO workers put on trial over “banned activity” claims, as described in 
the previous chapter.21 With the experience of “losing” Mosireen as our case study and our 
struggles with the “foreign agenda discourse”, we decided to follow Nasly’s advice to abandon the 
idea of Mosireen as our case. This choice led us to what we describe as the third and final phase of 
our fieldwork process. This phase was characterised by Nasly’s important role as our “gatekeeper” 
and the interviews this facilitated and by what Burawoy terms structuration: meaning a narrowing 
down of the multiple voices in our field.       
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Many researchers agree that fieldwork should take time, but that professional life within academia is seldom 
organised according to this (Kleinman, Copp 1993:9-8). 
21 The Guadian (05-02-2012): Egypt to put foreign NGO workers on trial over ’banned activity’ claims. The Guadian.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/05/egypt-foreign-ngo-workers-trial Read: 10-09-2012. 
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Phase three: structuration of the empirical data  
Within the time span of our last three weeks in Cairo Nasly arranged four interviews for us with two 
street artists and two photographers, who also term themselves “citizen journalists”. Furthermore 
we managed to set up and conduct interviews with two more street artists, an interview with a 
member of the 6th of April movement and with an interview with two representatives of the 
community development project and youth space, Mesaha. During this phase Nasly as our “gate 
keeper” helped us to step beyond limitations of the distrust tied to the “foreign agenda discourse”. 
While conducting these interviews we became more aware of the different roles our informants 
played in Cairo’s world of cultural politics. In other words we became aware of the categorical 
distinction between our key informants and our core informants, whom we term Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players. In other words this distinction we made between our informants became a 
tentative “structuration” of our empirical findings. Based on this structuration we were further able 
to structure or make a distinction between our new cultural-political players’ different kinds of 
activisms. Among the activist practices of Cairo’s new cultural-political players, we detected three 
kinds of activisms: civil society activism, art activism and media activism. How we define these 
three kinds of activism and their potential for creating socio-political change we shall return to in 
the in the first analysis chapter. The process of reducing the multiple voices in a field of study 
refers, according to Burawoy, not only to a structuration of empirical findings, but also to a 
structuration or reconstruction of the multiple voices within one’s theoretical field and the process 
of connecting or creating a dialogue between theory and the empirical. This we shall elaborate on in 
the chapter “Constructing a theoretical approach to Egypt’s new cultural politics”.    
As we have now outlined the three phases of our fieldwork, we in the following turn to an important 
part of this process: conducting interviews. Here we look into the reasons behind our choice of the 
qualitative interview. Moreover we once again return to the question of the importance of 
confidentiality in relation to our informants and the authoritarian and uncertain context of Egypt. 
What we interpreted as sensitive topics requiring confidentiality, such as how to cope with 
repression, violence and dissidence, played a central role in all our interviews. We therefore 
highlight some of the ethical considerations we had relating to conducting interviews in a context 
marked by a “time out of the ordinary” of violent clashes and uncertainty about controlling state 
mechanisms.        
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Conducting interviews and fieldwork in a transition period in 
Egypt’s history 
We have chosen to make use of the qualitative interview. 22 The qualitative interview helped us: ”… 
step beyond the unknown and enter into the world of participants, to see the world from their 
perspective and in doing so make discoveries that will contribute to the development of empirical 
knowledge” (Corbin, Strauss 2008:16). In other words it enabled us to understand personal 
experiences and how these are constructed in and through cultural settings. Through this method we 
thus enhanced our understanding of the logics, limitations and possibilities connected to creative 
activism and how our informants practice it in post-Mubarak Cairo. 
 
There are different ways of structuring and conducting a qualitative interview. We have chosen to 
conduct semi-structured interviews meaning that we followed an interview guide loosely and at the 
same time let our informants talk freely in line with the anthropological approach (Kvale 1997, 
Gaskell 2000). The semi-structured interview requires a row of in-depth questions asked in relation 
to a restricted subject. Here we shaped our interview questions around three themes: organisation of 
activism, challenges and limitations for political expression through creative means of expression 
within the public space of Cairo and the connection between forms of expression and the creation of 
change. In the interview situation we attempted to create an atmosphere of trust and confidentiality 
due to our experiences with the suspicion connected to foreigners. We attempted this by being open 
about our research topic and ourselves and by ensuring our informants of their right to refrain from 
participating in the interview and their possibility of being anonymous. None of our informants, 
however, found any of our offers of confidentiality necessary. There may be several explanations, 
but one thing was the fact that the street artists in particular already carried nicknames or cover 
names. While conducting our interviews it was important for us to give the informants time and 
space to talk without interruptions (Mikkelsen 2006: 89), since the interviews often included, what 
we anticipated as sensitive topics such as the experience of violence, arrests and death, as some of 
our informants gave accounts of their determined participation in the violent clashes between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Appendix 2 provides our considerations related to the conduction of our interviews in English, a foreign language for 
both us and our informants and comments on the process of transcribing the interviews.   
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security forces and revolutionaries. However, we did not experience that any of our informants felt 
explicitly uncomfortable in the interview situation. Whether this was because we managed to create 
a trustful atmosphere or due to silencing is difficult to know. However, our informants for instance 
handled the “sensitivity” of the topics, we think, by primarily sharing the brave, heroic and 
righteous narratives of fighting, while their arrests and suffering were not illuminated. This has 
affected our research focus in the sense that we do not focus on, which role religion plays within the 
activism of our informants. As Burawoy states silencing is inevitable for observers as participants. 
In this specific situation our intervention into the field as foreign researchers inexperienced with the 
often brutal reality of the Egyptian context might have refrained some of our informants from 
sharing their experiences form a more vulnerable and sensitive point of view. To our surprise our 
informants did not talk about topics related to religion or the influence of the MB and the Islamist 
forces despite the major role these played within the political scene during our stay and the major 
role religion plays for the Egyptian population at large23. We did not ask directly about the role of 
religion, but when we asked about major challenges to our informants’ aspirations for change 
making they to a large extent focused on the SCAF and the foreign agenda discourse. Yet we have 
enclosed an appendix (appendix 4) discussing exactly this matter.   
 
With this elaboration of both our choice of the anthropological approach, including qualitative 
interviews, and our fieldwork process we now turn to the characterisation or social profile of our 
informants.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibrahimi, Solava has conducted research in two poor communities in Egypt one in Upper Egypt and one in Cairo. 
Based on her research she concludes that what the people living in these areas ”value most in life” is religion. Ibrahimi, 
Solava (13-01-2013): Why are Egyptians and the west surprised by Islamists victory in post-revolutionary Egypt. 
OpenDemocracy. http://www.opendemocracy.net/solava-ibrahim/why-are-egyptians-and-west-surprised-by-islamists-
victory-in-post-revolutionary-egypt. Read: 20-02-2013. 
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Cairo’s new cultural-political players  
During our time in Cairo, we conducted 14 interviews of approximately one hour with 15 engaged 
cultural-political players. They estimate a group of four women and 11 men in the age between 16 
and 38. Despite a wide range of differences among our informants in terms of age, gender, 
nationality, ethnicity, education, profession and medium of expression, our Egyptian informants do 
not differ in terms of political affiliation as they identify themselves with the identity and the 
demands of the Revolutionaries (only the graffitist Sad Panda find the cause of “the Revolution” to 
be lost already). In the following we will present our core informants, among whom we have even 
less gender balance24, as they estimate 8 men and 1 woman in the age between 16 and 33. In the 
following we define the distinctive social profile our of core informants, whom we call Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players. What first and foremost distinguishes Cairo’s new cultural-political 
players from the majority of our key informants is their individualised, persistent and strategic 
approach to activism. The majority of our key informants, on the other hand, may be defined as less 
persistent, yet more established cultural-political professionals, some of them with foreign 
background and older in age.  
 
As class is a pervasive everyday reality in Cairo, it generates strong associations between class and 
culture according to the anthropologist, Anouk De Koning, whose prior research has focused on 
young middle-class professionals in Cairo and their experience of economic liberalisation in an era 
of globalisation. De Koning points out that a key marker of elite belonging in Egypt has for a long 
time been the capacity of having connections to the “outside”, while rootedness, locality, and 
authenticity have identified the popular classes, often the lower class (De Koning 2009:46). Class 
divisions in Cairo have therefore created contrasting cultural worlds. These became remarkably 
reconnected, at least momentarily, with the 25th of January Revolution, yet we would say that it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 In the book Life as Politics Asef Bayat examines sociological phenomena such as class, generation, urbanisation, 
globalisation and gender. He draws attention to the importance of gender relations in Egypt and how different gender 
experiences depending on one’s social background influences youth identity. Bayat argues that gender distinctions in 
Egypt remain very explicit (Bayat 2010:129). Some of our informants did touch upon this matter, but we as a part of our 
delimitation do not examine the role gender plays for our informants, their activisms and the Egyptian society at large.     
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enabled Cairo’s new cultural-political players to become more “rooted” in Egypt despite their 
cosmopolitan nature.25  
 
Rooted cosmopolitans of urban middle class background 
Our core informants may be defined as “cosmopolitan” as they are either based abroad, have family 
outside Egypt or have lived abroad for several years. However, if we look at our informants’ 
political identity and connectivity, our informants do not refer to themselves as primarily engaged 
in international communities, organisations or movements.26 Their focus is on Egypt and their 
cultural political engagement is in the wake of the 25th of January focussed on “the ongoing 
revolution”. Their rootedness in Egypt is furthermore expressed through their initiative to become 
highly engaged in the uprising or to return from abroad to do so. The 25th of January Revolution 
facilitated a common feeling of being Egyptian, or Egyptian identity and “authenticity” that 
penetrated socio-economic stratifies such as lower and upper classes.27 One of the central 
characteristics of our core informants is therefore their multiple belongings and identities, which 
make us term them cosmopolitans rooted in Egypt or “rooted cosmopolitans” in reference to the 
research of Maha M. Abdelrahman, who is an Assistant Professor in Sociology at the American 
University of Cairo (Abdelrahman 2011:408). Abdelrahman terms the new generation of activists in 
Egypt “rooted cosmopolitans”, because they have the capacity to operate between “multiple 
belongings and flexible identities” and with “equal ease in their national context and in the 
international arena” (Abdelrahman 2011:416). According to De Koning are the “…situational 
performances of superiority and deference, and senses of belonging and nonbeloning” (De Koning 
2009:9-10) closely tied to the concept of “class” and therefore also closely tied to the privilege of 
having an education rather than “a certain minimum life-standard” (De Koning 2009:12 in reference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 With references to the everyday manifestations and contestations of class in Cairo, De Koning takes up “the 
complexity of the stratified social life in Cairo” as her primary theme of ethnographic investigation in her book from 
2009 (De Koning 2009:9-10).  
26 Abdelrahman refers to the political scientist Mitchel Cohen’s concept of “rooted cosmopolitanism”. He called for 
“the fashioning of a dialectical concept of rooted cosmopolitanism, which accepts a multiplicity of roots and branches 
and that rests on the legitimacy of plural loyalties, of standing in many circles, but with common ground” (Cohen 1992: 
480, 483). 27 As Professor of Sociology, Asef Bayat, writes in an article for OpenDemocracy.net The Egyptian revolution had the 
quality of being nationwide, in which people from different walks of life - religious, secular, leftist, men and women, 
middle classes, working classes participated. Bayat, Asef (08-02-2011): Egypt, and the post-Islamist middle east. 
OpenDemocracy – Free thinking for the World. http://www.opendemocracy.net/asef-bayat/egypt-and-post-islamist-
middle-east. Read: 06-05-2012. 
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to Armbrust 1999). Class from this perspective means to be acquainted with modern institutions and 
having the opportunity to enjoy a “clean” life away from Cairo’s lower class existence (De Koning 
2009:12 in reference to Armbrust 1999). Our core informants largely correspond to Abdelrahmen’s 
definition of “rooted cosmopolitans”, who are “…well-educated, professionals and often fluent in 
foreign languages” (Abdelrahman 2011:416) and for this reason may be defined as middle class 
youth. Only one of our informants, the teenager and street artist, Mostafa Tefa, is in secondary 
school in contrast to the rest, who are either university students or hold university degrees and are 
fluent English speakers. They are all well-educated in various fields from engineering, 
pharmaceuticals to comparative literature, which means that their education does not necessarily 
correspond to the activism which they practise. The co-founder of the Mosireen Media Collective, 
Lubna Darwish, interrupted her PhD in comparative literature and began to learn how to make 
films, as she became engaged with the collective’s activist work. Mohammed Yassein, who is the 
co-founder of Mesaha, an NGO for creative idea and project development, works for a youth NGO. 
Yet for first time in his life he has tried to establish an NGO from scratch namely Mesaha. The 
street artist, Keizer, who had abandoned a career within advertisement and began another as a street 
artist during the 18 days, shared with us that:     
“An activist is a person, who is politically aware, first of all (...) just sharing their knowledge, whatever it is to 
contribute to cause of the revolution. If you are good at photography then use your photography forces, if you are good 
at directing, use your directing and if you are good at street art do that.” (Keizer:7). 
Keizer, among others of our informants, tied the activism of the 25th of January Revolution very 
closely to contributing to “the revolution” by means of personal capacities. The majority of our core 
informants took up during or after the 18 days an unexplored activist tool of either street art, 
photography or film-making and some even began to pursue a professional career by means of it 
later on. The young educated pharmacist, Mosaab El-Shamy, for instance began to pursue a career 
within photojournalism: 
“I would never have thought that it would affect me so much on a professional level. I was just like any other 
photographer who joined the protest but it was something I had passion about at the same time. And day after day and 
week after week I started taking my camera to the protests and through the followers I mainly build on Twitter I was 
able to reach more people on weekly basis with my photo and get more exposure of my work.” (El-Shamy:1) 
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The 25th of January Revolution had an immense impact on the personal as professional lives of our 
informants as the cause of “the ongoing Revolution” within Egypt’s public realm provided a space 
for new alternative identities and solidarities to be pursued and transformed into collaborative 
networks, collectives and even physical establishments of activist ventures such as the apartments 
of Mosireen and Mesaha aiming to engage Egyptians in change for “the ongoing Revolution”. 
Through our fieldwork and as we made our interviews, it became evident that our core informants 
were well aware of, although not always comfortable with, their privileges and ”otherness” as a part 
of the cosmopolitan elite. The specific social profile of our informants as rooted cosmopolitans and 
urban middle-class youth has, as we shall discuss later in the analysis, challenging implications for 
their activism and attempts to facilitate change in Egypt. 
The two months we spent conducting fieldwork in Cairo were characterised by being a “time out of 
time”. Within this abnormal transition period in Egypt’s history we experienced both limitations 
and possibilities for conducting observations and interviews with cultural-political players. The 
“time out of time” might have encouraged cultural-political players to take action, but the unstable 
period of time also furthered controversial security measures exercised by the state on both cultural-
political players and often in relation to the “foreign agenda discourse”. In this time out of the 
ordinary we choose an anthropological approach with a focus on conducting semi-structures 
interviews and observations. In doing so we were able to pursue immersion into the cultural-
political scenes of Cairo. As we immersed into the field we attempted to locate a case we could 
explore. This, whoever, appeared to be more difficult than expected, as we could not avoid context- 
and power effects such as domination, silencing and intervention. The loss of Mosireen as our case, 
however, led to the conduction of 14 interviews with a wide range of cultural-political players 
practicing different kinds of cultural activism. What is characteristic about our group of informants 
is their background as young urban middle class rooted cosmopolitans.  
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Constructing a theoretical approach to Egypt’s new cultural 
politics  
In this chapter we illuminate how we constructed our theoretical framework for analysing the 
interviews and the fieldwork that we conducted in the spring of 2012, and we make a theoretical 
and literary review. As noted in the prior methodological chapter, anthropologists situated in the 
Egyptian context were still struggling a year after the 25th of January Revolution to make sense of 
the overwhelming course of events and to create a language to speak of them. As Sabea noted, the 
rhythm of the familiar, the ordinary and the known had experienced a rupture making it possible to 
imagine other modalities of being in Egypt. Cairo’s new cultural-political players, however, do not 
dwell in the imagination of possible modalities in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution, they 
act on them. Cairo’s new cultural-political players are taking an active part in shaping Egypt’s post-
revolutionary and even national identity as they through creative grass-roots practices make new 
forms of socio-political action possible within Cairo’s public realm. Therefore we have chosen to 
apply Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s discourse theoretical approach, which we find 
particularly open and sensitive in terms of wording the new ways, in which Cairo’s new cultural-
political players understands their Egyptian identity and are organising the Egyptian society 
accordingly. Creating socio-political change from a discourse theoretical perspective, however, 
does not mean to destroy for instance authoritarian structures from the outside, but to take a starting 
point within a given structure to facilitate socio-political processes that may enable transformations 
in that direction. By means of discourse theory we therefore do not intend to uncover reality, but to 
explore how Cairo’s new cultural-political players facilitate socio-political change from within the 
given structures and therefore also how they deal with acts of complicity. As Cairo’s new cultural-
political players are rooted cosmopolitans, who are not confined to residual practises of activism, 
we do not solely draw on a discourse theoretical approach to the creation of socio-political change. 
We furthermore draw on theories on contemporary creative or cultural activism. On a global scale 
there has been a shift in the practices of activism from an “old” to a “new” culture of protest and 
resistance. The contemporary model of global activism seeks to meet the more spectacular and 
imaginary possibilities of modern time. We have therefore chosen to draw on a tentative definition 
of “cultural activism”, which we apply in the analysis to determine whether the activism of Cairo’s 
new cultural-political players may be defined as such. In our attempt to find a language and 
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terminology, which could further clarify how Cairo’s new cultural-political players are practising 
their activism, we draw on academics within the field of cultural activism, in particular the 
American political scientist, Stephen Duncombe, who is specialised in cultural activism. In doing so 
we seek to define and specify the activisms of Cairo’s new cultural-political players and their 
transformative potential. Yet we are also seeking to illuminate embedded constraints and forms of 
complicity. By means of the discourse theoretical approach and theories on cultural activism, we are 
in other words equipped to word how Cairo’s new cultural-political players create socio-political 
change, but we are not enabled to understand why. We found that our interviews and fieldwork call 
upon a theoretical approach that combines globally and locally oriented theories and 
conceptualisations on contemporary activism, which we found to overlap with studies of cultural 
politics in Egypt and the overwhelming transformations in the Arab region. Egypt and the Arab 
region have not exclusively been influenced by the popular rising against former institutionalised 
norms and practises, so has academia and academics across the world engaged in the studies of 
progressive politics or the Arab region. In this theoretical chapter we therefore tap into the academic 
language applied to speak of the transformations in the Arab region and Egypt as liberating 
processes. This academic language of “Tahrir “ or liberation is spoken by academics ranging from 
Professor of Iranian studies, Hamid Dabashi, who sees an end to post-colonialism to Melissa Wall, 
Professor of Journalism, who notes on an emancipatory individualised political language facilitated 
by new media in Egypt. Yet one of our major references is Professor of Anthropology, Samia 
Mehrez, and the graduates from the American University of Cairo, who in the book “Translating 
Egypt’s Revolution – The language of Tahrir” (2012) provide an in-depth contextual linguistic and 
semiotic “translation” of the Egyptian 25th of January Revolution. By means of the academic 
language of Tahrir, we speak of how post-revolutionary processes of popular inclusion and public 
participation such as street art and citizen-based journalism are breaking with former hierarchies 
and transform the grounds for censoring actions. These anti-authoritarian and non-hierarchical 
practises respond to the efforts of the Revolutionaries, yet they take place simultaneously with a 
process of redefining or recreating Egypt’s national identity. In this parallel or simultaneous 
practise, Cairo’s new cultural-political players play a central role. At the core of their public 
creative practises is the possibility to shape the public imagination of Egypt. Like the Egyptian 
political system is in a process of transition in the spring of 2012, so is Egypt’s cultural politics. 
However, Egypt’s cultural politics have for years been marked by struggles with hierarchical and 
authoritarian structures, censoring mechanisms and global influences, such as the globalisation of 
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neoliberalism and “western” values. There are in other words various forms of limitations, which 
may have been challenged with the new space for political dissidence, yet which have not 
disappeared with the emancipatory processes of the 25th of January Revolution. We may therefore 
also speak of an academic language of limitations to the emancipatory processes of the 25th of 
January Revolution. The theoretical outline and discussion of the languages of liberation and 
limitation are not encompassing all the academic literature, which we apply in the analysis, yet by 
discussing these divergent languages, we make a theoretical review. Before we initiate this 
theoretical chapter with a rendering of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, we would like to add 
that we draw on quite a few shorter academic articles and academic news articles in our 
methodological chapter as well as in our analysis due to the fact that the study of post-revolutionary 
activism in Egypt has only just begun. 
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A discourse theoretical approach to Egypt’s cultural politics  
Mairanne W. Jørgensen and Louise J. Phillips provide in their book “Discourse analysis as theory 
and method” (2002) a rendering of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, based on Laclau and 
Mouffe’s principal work “Hegemony and Socialist Strategy” (1985). We take advantage of 
Jørgensen and Phillips’ work and insight into Laclau and Mouffe and their major theoretical 
sources, the two theoretical traditions: Marxism and structuralism (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:25). 
Without going into scrutiny with neither Marxism nor structuralism, this theoretical starting point 
presupposes a certain understanding of the social field, which is not determined by economy as 
within Marxism nor by the structures of language as within structuralism. We understand the field 
of cultural politics as a web of social processes, in which signs are positioned in different relations 
to each other to acquire new meanings and therefore are to be understood as contingent. They are 
contingent in the sense that they are always in “danger” of being deconstructed, reorganised and 
rearticulated (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:26).  Such webs of social processes may be verbal or 
written forms of expression or social action, yet these webs of signs embody what Laclau and 
Mouffe term “discourses”. We do not make full use of Laclau and Mouffe’s terminological 
repertoire. Concepts like “moments” and “nodal points” we do apply to analyse our empirical 
material, but not explicitly. In the following we rather focus on those concepts that are central to our 
later analytical endeavours. Furthermore we do not deal with the post-revolutionary context of 
Egypt from the point of view of for instance political science in the sense that we do not deal with 
the study of party politics or theories on the change of a political system, rather we deal with 
Egypt’s informal politics. The discourse theoretical individual or subject is in a continuous yet 
impossible search for wholeness or identification in the plurality of often contradictory discourses 
within the given public space. This leaves the subject with an imagination of wholeness or identity, 
which the subject therefore is obliged to create itself.28 The discourse theoretical subject is therefore 
not as autonomous subjects with an inner core, but it is rather to be understood as subject positions 
within discourses. Identity is in other words a matter, which is continuously accepted, refused and 
negotiated, while group formation is sought to gain a sense of wholeness or representation to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Laclau and Mouffe have, as Jørgensen and Phillips writes, imported the psychoanalyst Jacque Lacan’s theories, via 
the philosopher Slavoj Žižek, in order to develop the subject further and to explain why subjects are interpellated by 
discourses (Jørgensen 2002:42).  
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mobilise forces for change according to the aspired organisation of society. The formation of groups 
or practices of representation, however, leads to closure in the sense that fixes meaning to an 
identity. This reduces diversity, the possibilities for identification and marginalises alternative 
forms of social action. Such practices may result in a temporary closure or “hegemony” or 
“hegemonic intervention”, meaning a temporary organisation of consent or momentary situation of 
uncontested normalcy.29 Hegemony is to be understood as temporary as alternative group formation 
could also fuel the rise of an “antagonism”, meaning the occurrence of a situation in which 
identities are making contrasting demands within the same terrain. We look upon the political 
struggles in the aftermath of the Egyptian uprising as an antagonism between the anti-authoritarian 
and rights-based discourse of the Revolutionaries, viewing “the revolution” as ongoing, and the 
stability seeking SCAF, regarding “the revolution” as completed with the fall of Mubarak. Within 
the common terrain of Egypt’s public space an antagonism of contrasting demands of action has 
occurred. Yet in spite of the state enforced hegemonic interventions, such as the NGO raids, the 
Revolutionaries resist closure by tying a different meaning to the sign: “revolution” (Jørgensen, 
Phillips 2002:47). Breaking with the barrier of fear during the 18 days of popular protest and the 
subsequent struggle to articulate the preferred course of “the revolution” in Egypt’s public space 
have created a public space for contesting former hegemonies as well as for imagining or dreaming 
about a different Egypt. In other words a space, in which new subject positions and identities 
suddenly seemed possible and began to flourish. Mouffe points out in the article “Artistic Activism 
and Agonistic Spaces” from 2007 that it is important to properly approach present dynamics of 
democratic politics by acknowledging both its antagonistic dimension as well as how it is 
contingent upon any given social order in order to grasp how cultural and artistic forms of activism 
may gain political significance (Mouffe 2007:1-2).  In order to broaden our vocabulary of how 
cultural and artistic forms of activism may become political significant today, we turn our attention 
towards theories on contemporary cultural activism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Antonio Gramsi is a major source of inspiration to for Laclau and Mouffe, according to Jørgensen and Phillips. By 
means of the concept of “hegemony”, Gramsi enables them to speak of the production of meaning as the key instrument 
for the stabilisation of power relations and not as a matter determined by economy (Jørgensen, Phillips 2002:32).   	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Cultural activism and cultural activist practices 
Associate Professor of Sociology, Begüm Özden Firat, and doctoral candidate, Aylin Kuryel are 
both specialised in visual culture and radical arts and politics. In the book “Cultural Activism – 
Practices, Dilemmas and Possibilities” from 2011, they provide a tentative definition of a new 
influential type of global activism:  
“Contemporary activist practices (are) directed towards disturbing and reorienting the cultural and politic spheres by 
attacking the narratives of truth by a way of diverse tactics. This form of activism, with it’s insistence on creative 
interventions based on the notions of humor, playfulness, and confusion appears to bring a novel dimension to 
conventional strategies of protest. ” (Firat & Kuryel 2011:10). 
Firat and Kuryel further notes that such cultural activist practises are hardly new, although they 
bring a novel dimension to the traditional protest practises (Firat & Kuryel 2011:11). Several 
academics within the field of cultural activism refer to the cultural-political movement of the 50s 
and 60s, The Situationist Internationals, as a major source of inspiration behind newer global forms 
of cultural activist intervention and resistance. The Situationist Internationals created “situations” 
by means of expressive and creative street action in order to intervene in the daily reproduction of 
capitalist culture and habits (Plant 1992:86). To apply a discourse theoretical formulation, we would 
say they rearticulated dominant or hegemonic discourses in order to show the contingency of a 
given hegemonic order. A successful act of rearticulation is as Jørgensen writes when: “One 
discourse is undermined from the discursive field from which another discourse overpowers it, or 
rather dissolves it, by rearticulating its elements.” (Jørgensen, Phillips 2002:48). The Situationist 
Internationals and in particular the Situationist Guy Debord’s book “The Society of The Spectacle” 
(1967) is a clear source of inspiration for one of our major references, Associate Professor of 
Sociology, Stephen Duncombe. His research in the history of mass and alternative media and the 
intersection of culture and politics has among other things resulted in a theory about the current 
power of cultural activism, which he terms “dream politics”. Duncombe advocates for a 
“progressive” type of activism that adapts to a world, in which fantasy, irrationality and spectacular 
practices have become the second language for communication (Duncombe 2007:8). Duncombe 
emphasises that today:  “…politicians speak to people’s fantasies and desires through a language of 
images and associations. By manipulating symbols, exploiting memories and spinning stories, the 
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political elite is able to guide the direction of public opinion” (Duncombe 2007:8, italicise by us). 
Instead of situations, he promotes an activism based on “ethical spectacles”.30 The possibility to 
dream is at the core of his ethical spectacle, because dreams should not just be imagined, they need 
a space to be articulated and performed. In reference to social movement theory, Duncombe draws 
attention to the practice of “pre-figurative” politics as a definitive feature of a new global form of 
cultural activism according to him. Pre-figurative politics is a process, in which the practices of the 
present erase the distinction between means and ends by prefiguring a vision of future (Duncombe 
2077:171). In our attempt to word the activist practises of our informants, we will apply the 
terminology of Duncombe’s ethical spectacle, which may be shortly described as “disruptive” 
public interventions of “participatory” processes of popular inclusion and “open” spectacles for 
popular interpretation and participation amplifying “excluded real life dramas”. Yet all these 
elements, we shall return to in the analysis.  
Duncombe advocates along the lines of the antagonistic discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, as 
he advocates for a change of attitude away from modernist rationality towards “the manufacture of 
dissent” in order to guide the public imagination and set the political agenda. Both Duncombe and 
Mouffe argue that ineffective forms of activism today base their work entirely on the belief in 
reason, truth and the essentiality of the reality due to the imperialist modernist discourse, which 
historically have embraced the ideas of “Enlightenment and empiricism” and “liberalism” as 
exclusively progressive (Duncombe 2007:3, Mouffe 2007:1). Maha M. Abdelrahman, who is an 
Assistant Professor in Sociology at the American University of Cairo, writes that a new wave of 
political opposition has emerged in Egypt in the years leading up to the 25th of January Revolution. 
Characterising this new wave of informal political participation, Abdelrahman illuminates 
principles of non-hierarchical and decentralised forms of participation, which have become central 
to avoid state control and facilitate political participation. Initiatives to strengthen informal political 
participation in Egypt are a common response among activists to the excluding and constraining 
authoritarian state institutions. These institutions apply strict measures of control and subsequently 
fail to respond or listen to the needs and demands of the people (Lust-Okar, Zerhouni 2008:8). 
Abdelrahman, however, further highlights that transnational activists also foster the global 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 “The spectacle” refers to the inverted image of society, in which relations between commodities have supplanted 
relations between people and a passive identification with the spectacle supplants genuine activity, according to Guy 
Debord. This culture is, according to Debord (1967) as well as Duncombe (2007), cultivated by capitalism, mass media, 
and governments’ favoring: the spectacle and has certain implications for contemporary activism, which according to 
Duncombe, needs to adapt to the spectacle culture in order to become influential at all. 
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exchange of ideas and models of protest, which flow and travel between the global, regional and 
national levels (Abdelrahman 2011:408). Yet there is reason to question whether these models 
actually foster constructive socio-political change in Egypt, if they reproduce the imperialist 
modernist discourse. According to Abdelrahman, we find in Egypt a new, although not necessarily 
young, generation of Egyptian political activists, who are engaged in a difficult process of 
redefining its position in relation to global structures away from the historically shaped frameworks 
of the imperialist modernist discourse in the region (Abdelrahman 2011:408). Central to the 
discussion of the academic language of Tahrir and its limitations is the discussion of how we should 
speak of the Egyptian identity in the wake of Arab uprisings. Dabashi sees an end to colonialism 
and postcoloniality, which never puts the Arab or the Muslim identity in the purview of full 
subjection or historical agency (Dabashi 2011:xxi). An assumed incompatibility between 
democracy and the Arab political tradition and Islam was articulated within the tradition of 
orientalism and notoriously stated by Samuel Huntington in “The Clash of Civilisations” with the 
sentence “The West and the rest”.31 Furthermore it was institutionalised with development aid in the 
postcolonial era, which still divides the globe into developed and underdeveloped countries today 
and which precedes from a universal modernisation ideal that understands the historical processes 
of social change in Western Europe and North America as mankind’s historical progress (Ziai 
2007:9). Jørgensen and Phillips underline in reference to the discourse theoretical endeavours of 
Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclaugh (1999) that Lauclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory may 
overestimate the potential for change, because they overlook the unequal possibilities for 
rearticulating elements in new ways and hence the actual possibilities for taking part in the creation 
of social change. The risk of applying an exclusive discourse theoretical approach is for instance to 
hide power relations by leaving out the occurrence of structural forms of dependency. People’s 
discourses may often be subjected to constraints that do not seem to originate from a discursive 
level, but from a more structural level of relationally dependency such as having to deal with the 
state bureaucracy (Jørgensen, Phillips 2002:54). As we are striving to determine how Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players aspire to create socio-political change, this means from a discourse 
theoretical perspective that we are striving to analyse how they construct their own discourses, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Orientalism has come to denote a broader complex of discursive assumptions and institutional especially academic 
Practices, which regulate the understanding, appreciation, and domination of the West’s or more precisely, Europe’s 
supposed “Other”: The Orient. “Orientalism” has in particular since the post-colonial literary studies of Edward Said 
(1978) been described as the tendency to mystify, caricature, homogenize, and petrify Asian and North African cultural 
systems either via idealization or via demonization by viewing them as contrasting to and opposing “Western” concepts 
as the belief in liberalism and rationality or the separation of church and state (Vries 2005:6881).  
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identities and legitimise certain forms of social action at this specific point in time. The 
transformative potential of their activism is, however, influenced by the fact that they are situated in 
an authoritarian context of hegemonic state interventions and chafing state bureaucracy of 
relationally dependency. Furthermore they are taking part in a process of redefining Egyptian 
identity, which historically has been struggling to possess an equal position within the global 
community. Although we are particularly concerned with how Cairo’s new activism pushes forward 
new interpretations of the Egyptian identity and what signify these interpretations, we cannot 
overlook the present and institutionalised modernist imperialist discourse. In the following we look 
at how emancipatory processes of greater popular inclusion and political participation in the Arab 
world are entangled into the processes of globalisation, which are enforcing post-colonial and neo-
liberalist complicities.        
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The academic languages of liberation and limitation 
In an academic article for “New Political Science” from 2005, Nicolas Pratt states that a critical 
mass of Egypt’s civil society participants are searching for an “authentic” Egyptian identity 
uncorrupted by Western influences, but that they in the act of doing so have a tendency to 
contribute to a climate, in which it becomes legitimate to harass human rights institutions and 
thereby sacrifice civil and political freedoms (Pratt 2005:69). Pratt argues that civil society 
participants end up reproducing the hegemonic discourse of the Egyptian authorities by repeating a 
need for national security in response to “Western” influences, which are assumed immoral and 
financially incorrupt. Accepting foreign funding or having links to “the West” is according to Pratt 
considered an act of national portrayal. The former history of Egypt reveals that human rights 
NGOs in some cases have come to be perceived as a threat to Egypt’s national unity and security, 
because they were perceived as linked to the “West”. According to Pratt contestations like this over 
Egyptian national culture and security narrow Egypt’s public space and in particular independent 
political action and criticism of the government (Pratt 2005:85). In other words civil society 
participants end up complying and thereby enforcing a binary division and contradiction between 
the discourse on Egyptian authenticity and civil rights practices. The failure of democracy in the 
case of Egypt is according to Pratt therefore closely connected to the local logics of reproducing a 
national identity and culture in this subtle opposition to civil and political freedoms. The hegemonic 
intervention of the Egyptian state against foreign NGOs sought to consolidate a perception of 
Egyptian identity as possibly corrupted by foreign influence in the aftermath of the Egyptian 
uprising. The foreign agenda discourse was in other words applied strategically by the state to 
consolidate hegemony by playing upon the threat of the modern imperialist discourse. In the book 
“Translating Egypt’s Revolution – The Language of Tahrir” from 2012, Mehrez, and her students at 
the American University of Cairo demonstrate through the interdisciplinary field of Translation 
Studies how a new home-grown language of Tahrir continues to resist oppressive authoritarian 
control and counter-revolutionary attempts from below in Egypt in the wake of the 25th of January 
Revolution:  
“Egyptians have articulated their ownership of space, body, and language through a myriad of creative performative and 
cultural practices whose semiotics, aesthetics, and poetics have not only inspired parallel uprisings worldwide, but have 
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also created sustaining solidarities as well as challenging resistances to the unfolding text of Egypt’s revolution.” 
(Mehrez 2012:15). 
In line with Dabashi, Mehrez writes that on a global scale the homegrown language of Tahrir has 
been a source of inspiration and transformation as she points to global activists initiating the 
Occupy-movement in the wake of the uprisings (Mehrez 2012:1).32 Mehrez and co. in other words  
tap into the academic language of Tahrir depicting Egyptians as fitted with a “newfound power” of 
space, body and  language, which she finds in and of itself no less than a revolution (Mehrez 
2012:14). Like Mehrez, Dr. Tarik A. Elseewi also articulates a change in power relations in Egypt 
and in particular in the power to shape the political imagination of national identity. Yet Elseewi, 
who is specialised in Egypt’s transnational media and national identity, does so in a long-term 
historical perspective and with particular focus on the role of new media. In reference to the cultural 
anthropologist, Arjun Appadurai, Elseewi draws attention to the implications of mass media and 
how it facilitates a distribution of new images and scenarios for new life possibilities, which 
Appadurai regards as “semiotic diacritics of great power” (Appadurai 1996:53). With a point of 
departure in the historical transformations in the Egyptian cultural production, consumption and 
distribution from satellite TV to the global internet, Elseewi argues that an enhanced form of 
“individual subjectivity” is flourishing and that “new Arab subjectivities” have appeared (Elseewi 
2011:1198). 
“The new forms of cultural articulation we are seeing in the uprisings of the Arab Middle East are inseparable from the 
recent history of mediated culture in the region (…) a new role for the work of the imagination has transformed culture 
and placed individuals at the centre of their own narratives in profound ways.” (Elseewi 2011:1197). 
According to Elseewi, this has led to the rejection of the official narratives or discourses on the 
Egyptian or Arab cultural-political identity, which have long dominated the official mediated 
production in the Arab Middle East and now continues to encourage the new generation of Arabs to 
imagine themselves as subjects and not objects of their own history. In the wake of the Arab 
uprisings, academics like Mehrez, Elseewi and Dabashi in particular pose arguments indicating that 
colonial and postcolonial narratives have been proved differently and that the Arab subjects have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The anti-capitalist Occupy Movement spring from the events of 17th of September 2011, when activists occupied 
New York’s Manhattan under the name: “Occupy Wall Street”. This small group of protesters soon spread out, as 
“occupiers” around the world began to promote their message. Their common message is that “We are the 99%”, 
meaning that 1 % of the population possesses 40 % of the world’s wealth, while the remaining 99 % shares the 
remaining 60 %. (Stekelenburg, Jacquelien van 2012:1) 
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finally achieved full subjectivity and historical agency. The crafting of new identities and forging 
solidarities by means of new media and creative public action have been defined as some of the 
decisive factors of overcoming the authoritarian regimes and the colonial contradiction between a 
liberal, democratic and secular “West” and “the Rest”, as Huntington puts it (Huntington 1993:22–
49). Yet prior to the Arab uprisings the political anthropologist, Julia Elyachar linked the process of 
economic, social, and cultural dispossession in Egypt to the enforcement of neoliberal development 
programs. The socio-cultural anthropologist, Jessica Winegar for instance demonstrates in line with 
Pratt how Egypt’s cultural-political players prior to the Arab uprisings “reckoned with” a 
postcolonial search for authenticity as well as modernism in their attempt to produce meaningful, 
but challenging versions of national visual culture and in spite of the fact that “culture” in Egypt is 
increasingly globalised and commodified. Like Abdelrahmen noted with regards to Egyptian 
activists, Winegar, Pratt and Elyachar account for how cultural-political players in Egypt struggle to 
navigate in a world, in which the regime disproportionately benefits from IMF-sponsored neoliberal 
policies that leaves the country impoverished and to navigate in a world, in which ingrained forces 
in the Egyptian society points to “western influences”, including civil rights practises, as a 
subverting factor and threat to national security and identity. Mouffe among other researchers in the 
field of global cultural activism (Benjamin 1934, Mouffe 2007, De Cauter 2011, Scholl 2011)33 is 
concerned with the fact that neo-liberalism blurs the difference between cultural expression and 
commercial culture, so that it is not possible to differ between critical artistic expression and 
capitalist productivity (Mouffe 2007:1). Duncombe, however, finds that it is a question of ethical 
monopoly. In other words, he argues that it a question of wrestling back the monopoly on the 
political use of “imagination” and “the mobilisation of desire”, which in a global and historical 
perspective has been taking by “the entertainment state” of authoritarianism and commercialism 
(Duncombe 2007:124). Ingrid M. Hoofd, however, who is an Assistant Professor of 
Communications and New Media at the National University of Singapore, puts a critical perspective 
on Duncombe’s argument as she finds that activism needs to be understood in terms of complicity 
instead of the more widespread and less critical mode of analysis that studies activism as 
successfully opposing, subverting, or resisting neo-liberal structures and institutions (Hoofd 
2012:23). She also challenges Elseewi’s interpretation of the historical transformations in the 
Egyptian cultural production, consumption and distribution as she points to another interpretation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Mouffe 2007:1, De Cauter 2011:15, Benjamin in Scholl 2011:162	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the global information “revolution” and its implications for activism. Hoofd argues that a 
reassessment of the grounds, aims and stories of left-wing activism is long overdue (Hoofd, 
2012:2). She regards the so-called information “revolution” as a form of hyper-reproduction of neo-
liberalism and therefore rejects assumptions of new and social media as neutral (Hoofd 2012:15). 
Her research findings lead her to conclude a rise of the speed elite also among humanist activists: 
“The speed-elitist global society is organized around the physical materialization of a desire for speed by way of 
modern technologies. This desire for speed is fundamentally related to the humanist utopia, because it is the subject’s 
desire for emancipatory transcendence that revels in the logic of acceleration and its usurpation of space.” (Hoofd 
2012:12) 
Hoofd in other words argues that activism fosters a new type of neo-colonialism by pushing all 
these technological possibilities on the speed-elitist subject and makes complicity central to the 
study of activism as humanist activists represent the hope for a more democratic future (Hoofd, 
2012:13,24). We cannot reinvent the academic language of speaking about Egypt, but we may 
contribute to a “de-Europeanization” and explore what signifies the language of those seeking to 
implement and express how we are to speak of Egyptian culture and politics in the future: Cairo’s 
new cultural-political players. The groups, communities and identities, which were fuelled by 
solidarities of the 25th of January Revolution, have by some of our informants been transformed into 
collaborative networks, collectives and even physical establishments such as apartments that aim to 
engage in “the ongoing revolution”. Cairo’s grass-roots society has come to the surface, as one of 
our informants noted, exploring a variety of approaches to alternative representation such as civil 
society activism, street art activism and media activism. Yet as we shall elaborate on in the 
following analytical chapter, the emancipatory processes of the 25th of January Revolution are not 
without constraints and complicities for Cairo’s new cultural-political players and their cultural 
activism.  
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Three of Cairo’s new activisms 
We will begin with an introductory paragraph, which will introduce the reader to the content of this 
analytical chapter. From a discourse theoretical perspective new counter-hegemonic identities and 
group formation processes emerged from the rupture of the 25th of January Revolution with the 
discourse of the Revolutionaries and began to shape new forms of activism in Cairo. In this chapter, 
we seek to define and discuss the transformative powers of three of Cairo’s new activisms: civil 
society activism, art activism and media activism, by means of the terminology of Stephen 
Dumcombe among others, which we touched upon in the previous theoretical chapter “Constructing 
a theoretical approach to Egypt’s new cultural politics”. This conceptual framework supports our 
endeavour to determine whether these three activisms may be defined as transformative or as 
“cultural activism” in reference to the theoretical definitions of the concept provided by Firat and 
Kuryel and discourse theory. We are in other words particularly concerned with whether these new 
activisms manage to attack and rearticulate hegemonic discourses through creative tactics and 
certain cultural activist practises in order to create socio-political change in Egypt. Yet we are also 
particularly concerned with what makes these activisms powerful and capable of creating socio-
political change in the Egyptian context. This implies an understanding of how Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players aspire to achieve influence in a context of authoritarian constraints. Before 
going into scrutiny with Cairo’s new activisms, we will therefore take a point of departure in the 
relation between formal and informal politics in Egypt, as Cairo’s new cultural-political players 
operate from the informal realms for reasons closely tied to the constraints of the authoritarian state 
structures in Egypt. We will demonstrate how the authoritarian state practises in the wake of the 18 
days are challenged through struggles for autonomy enforced by Cairo’s new cultural-political 
players in general, who turn to decentralised organisation and loose networking in their quest for 
self-determination, individuality and socio-political change. These practises are, as we shall 
demonstrate throughout this chapter, crucial for the three types of youth activism in their struggles 
for influence in an authoritarian state like the Egyptian.  
Afterwards we turn our attention towards “the civil society activism” of the NGO, Mesaha. In these 
paragraphs, we shall discover how the theoretical definition of “cultural activism” should not be 
understood straightforwardly, because practises of rearticulation within an authoritarian context 
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may result in a simultaneous process of rearticulation and reproduction of and against the 
authoritarian web of centralised bureaucracy. We therefore include another conceptualisation of 
“cultural activism” applied to understand cultural activist practises within authoritarian states. This 
conceptualisation may explain why the activism of Mesaha is apolitical on the surface, but enacted 
from the formation of a hybrid identity, meaning from “in-between” contradictory state and 
underground discourses and practises. We shall, however, point out that such activist practises are 
reinforcing the contextually constraining binary, illuminated by Pratt. We argue that it is not 
challenging the binary rather it is separating aspirations to secure the Egyptian national identity and 
culture from a political identity corrupted by any “western” discourses on development through an 
apolitical public discourse. Before we elaborate on the new practises of street art activism, we 
ascertain that Egyptian activists, including Cairo’s new cultural-political players, are as inclined to 
engage in centralised authoritarian state practises and that Egyptian activists are perceived as 
implicated in humanistic and capitalistic discourses of contradictory practises of liberation and 
discrimination. In the paragraphs on street art activism, we discover that street art activism in the 
wake of the 25th of January is not only redefining Egyptian culture as fundamentally political in 
contrast to the apolitical civil society discourse imposed by the state and international community, it 
also opens up Egypt’s public space to an alternative public practise of political representation, 
participation and discussion. However, we discover that Cairo’s new cultural-political players are 
implicated in humanistic and capitalistic discourses and not just perceived to be. We, therefore, 
begin to draw attention to the limitations of applying the definition of cultural activism, which Firat 
and Kuryel provide. We tie another hybrid identity to Cairo’s new cultural-political players as they 
are simultaneously seeking to resist as well as they are engaged in reproducing the neo-liberalist 
conditions. In the end we discern that in contrast to the civil society activism of Mesaha, the new 
street art activism and media activism, which we turn to lastly, are not based on an international or 
state-sponsored discourse, but rather on discourses fundamentally political and highly rooted in the 
common collective memory of the Egyptian people and the discourse of the Revolutionaries. Yet as 
we shall discover in the last paragraphs, Cairo’s new activisms, and in particular street art activism 
and media activism, are a part of creating as well as they are constrained by the polarisation 
between the Egyptian political elite and the Revolutionaries. Finally we withdraw from taking a 
point of departure in the limitations of Firat & Kuryel’s simplified definition of global cultural 
activism, as we conclude that these limitations actually rather explain what signifies Cairo’s new 
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activisms in Egypt’s transitional period. Yet we take a point of departure in the relation between 
formal and informal politics in Egypt. 
Cairo’s new informal participatory spaces and loose networks 
Within the Egyptian public space, we noticed how Egyptians, and in particular Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players, valued the capacity and motivation among other Egyptians “to act” and 
“speak up” and thereby articulate a persistent belief in the demand-based discourse of the 
Revolutionaries and the informal and decentralised powers of civil society. The newly established 
and network-based spaces of Mesaha and Mosireen are like the networks of street artists created in 
response to the discourse of the Revolutionaries. They are driven by common aspirations for 
another Egypt. As we shall further clarify in this paragraph, these aspirations are linked to practises 
of independence from the state, individualised activism and spaces for inclusive activist 
participation. In the following, we shall start by clarifying how the work spaces of Mosireen and 
Mesaha are spaces of informal “participatory” practises in antagonist response to chafing state 
structures. We do this before we move on to the other closely tied antagonist practise of 
individualised activism and loose networking. These practices may enable the activism of our 
informants to go beyond not just chafing authoritarian state structures, but also the limitations of 
social technologies as well as demographic distances and class barriers in order to enforce social-
political transformation.  
The video activist, Lubna Darwish, shared with us that Mosireen, which means “Egyptian 
determination” in response to the discourse of the Revolutionaries, provides the opportunity for 
participation in any given way that a person prefers, yet depending on his or her interest in 
collecting footage, editing, uploading videos etc. As emphasised on the homepage of the Mosireen 
workspace in Downtown Cairo: “The Mosireen work space is open to everyone, regardless of their 
level of experience or ability to pay.”34 The work force of Mosireen is unlike that of Maseha more 
tied to the occurrence of political momentum and an interest in media activism owing to the 
collective’s focus on the immediate rearticulation of current public hegemonic discourses and 
practises. As Lubna emphasises: “it all depends on the timing and the need for people 
participating.” (Lubna:3). Like Mosireen, Mesaha’s aim is to create a space for broad inclusion, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 On the front page of the media collective Mosireen’s web page you will find: About Mosireen. 
http://mosireen.org/?page_id=6. Read: 16-03-2012 and 14-01-2013.  
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where participants do not need prior skills or financial resources to take part. Mesaha, which simply 
means “space”, further aims at providing a supportive space for the nascent “revolutionary” 
activism as well as other initiatives for socio-political change in the wake of the 25th of January 
Revolution. According to the co-founder of Mesaha, Mohammed Yassein, such public spaces, as 
Mosireen and Mesaha, are responding to a need in Cairo and Egypt. This is not just a need for 
public spaces for political opposition gathering or youth initiatives for socio-political change, but 
also just a practical matter of suitable meeting spaces: “…we have a crisis, not a crisis, a big 
problem with public spaces in Cairo, not many public places is user friendly for example, even the 
cafés (…) after the revolution, they [Egyptian youth] start to meet in cafés and so on” (Yassein:1). 
Yet they are not only responding to a need of public spaces for collective work and action, they are 
also responding to a need for decentralised organisational structures. Yassein describes the 
organisational foundation of Mesaha as seven people, who are a part of the co-founders: “They are 
taking full responsibility of Mesaha in front of the rest of co-founders and they are like a managing 
board. We don’t use the hierarchy. We use the flat structure.” (Yassein:9). Duncombe terms this 
approach to political participation “participatory” and argues that it is significant for practises of 
cultural activism. He draws attention to how a commercial spectacle demands popular participation 
of the spectator to become a consumer, while cultural activism demands a different sort of 
participation: “The people who participate in the performance of the spectacle must also contribute 
to its construction.” (Duncombe 2007:127). According to Duncombe this breaks down any director-
directed dichotomy: “With the active engagement of its [the Ethical Spectacle’s] participants, a 
progressive spectacle becomes a place, where hierarchies of creator and spectator, producer, and 
consumer, leader and follower are broken down.” (Duncombe 2007:133). The Mosireen collective 
for instance is likewise run by a small group of core members, “an affinity group” as Duncombe 
terms it, but like in the case of Mesaha it is the participatory practices of loose networking and 
interchangeable membership and voluntarism, which are the engine of Mosireen’s work: 
“And just at once there was an entity for Mosireen, that start working together in a network, so even anybody who 
wants to give something are invited to participate, at some moment or another, because some people don’t participate 
for a month, do their own work and come back, so it’s very fluid and very organic. And when there is the action in the 
street and the necessity of footage and work, people are very generous with their effort and their time and time away 
from their job.” (Darwish:3).  
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A more decentralised system, as Duncombe points out, might set a few in charge, but the mission 
and responsibilities are broadly defined by all its participants in a participatory space (Duncombe 
2007:139). What Yassein terms the “managing board” of Mesaha might place certain 
responsibilities with the founders of Mesaha, but as Yassein further explains decisions regarding the 
shape of Mesaha are made collectively by all the members of Mesaha (Yassin:9-10).  
Moving on from the participatory workspaces of Mesaha and Mosireen to their founding principle 
of individualised activism and loose networking, we zoom in on the loosely connected street artists 
and photo activists who we interviewed. The street artist, Keizer, and the two photo activists, 
Mostafa Sheshtawy and Mosaab El- Shamy prefer to be loosely tied, if tied at all, to any space or 
network, which we regard as a clear example of how individuality forms a basis for participation in 
work spaces and networks for cultural-political players (Keizer:17). The individualised activism of 
informal political participation in Egypt is according to Abdelrahman, who we drew attention to in 
the previous theoretical chapter in the paragraph on cultural activist practices, based on loose 
networks, where it is not so much the networks themselves, but the process of networking that 
creates a dynamic of an inclusive political culture (Abdelrahman 2011:408). Abdelrahman argues 
that activist networks are a part of: “a process of networking (…) characterised by interchangeable 
membership and loose, fluid ties” (Abdelrahman 2011:408). The creation of public spaces as 
temporary or more established networks, which are aspiring to create experiences of another Egypt, 
in contrast to centralised authoritarian state practises, signifies Cairo’s new activisms. They may be 
termed exemplary gestures of “pre-figurative politics”, meaning acts, which in themselves can 
embody gestures points to the future by giving hints about how a better or more “participatory” 
world could look like in practice (Scholl in Firat & Kuryel 2011:165).  
In order to determine the capacity of social-political transformation embedded in the new post-
revolutionary activisms, we now move on to an investigation and elaboration of three of Cairo’s 
new activisms in correlation with Firat and Kuryel’s definition of transformative cultural activism. 
We start with the civil society activism of Mesaha.  
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Mesaha’s civil society activism	  
In spite of the widespread motivation for activism within the Egyptian civil society in the wake of 
the 25th of January Revolution, the extent to which disciplining state mechanisms will continue to 
prevail is contested and uncertain. Before further elaborating on the counter-hegemonic discourses 
and practises significant for Mesaha, we take a brief look at the legal constraints of wanting to 
establish a non-governmental organisation for “community development” in Egypt, as the co-
founders of Mesaha are seeking to register Mesaha officially as a “community development 
organisation” in spite of their aspirations for independence from the state.  
As previously illuminated, the choice to select formal realms and spaces to voice demands needs to 
be understood in relation to the constraining practices of the Egyptian state. In “Civil Society 
Exposed” from 2004, Abdelrahman draws attention to how the official classification of NGOs as 
either “welfare organisations” or “community development organisations” conceals the complexity 
of the NGO phenomenon by masking their actual political interests. Abdelrahman finds this 
classification discriminating, because it makes Egyptian NGOs apolitical in spite of their potential 
to provide alternative political representation and facilitate socio-political change (Abdelrahman 
2004:6). In spite of Mesaha’s aspirations for independency and resistant determination for self-
direction, they are, unlike Mosireen, in the process of getting officially registered as a non-profit 
“community development association”. Simultaneously, however, the network of Mesaha is highly 
engaged in political practises of developing grass-roots initiatives for “revolutionary” change. As 
we shall elaborate on in the following, this finally leads us to include another definition of cultural 
or creative activism within authoritarian regimes. We do this in order to demonstrate how the 
practises of Mesaha may need to be understood as creative activism in the transitional aftermath of 
the 25th of January Revolution, as Cairo’s new cultural-political players are situated in uncertainty 
between authoritarian state practises and reprisals and the possible “revolutionary” changes of 
these.  
 
Mesaha’s state-sponsored discourse on “community development” 
Supporting the youth generation of socio-political ideas for change is the core aspiration of the 
youth space, Mesaha. The founders of Mesaha wish to push forward socio-political ideas for change 
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as a basis for identity and group formation in contrast to the formal politics and the former 
generations in Egypt. Nazmi for instance argues: “This is our generation thinking, whether we make 
it a secret or I can’t expect anybody in parliament right now to think or any founder of whatever 
political party now to think about crowd-sourcing in that way that the idea is the leader, not the 
individual.” (Nazmi:27). Yassein further elaborates on the initiative of Mesaha explaining that: 
“The point was to create a space that shed life on initiatives and...whatever movements that weren’t 
registered. They didn’t have a space. But this is an alternative form of recognition” (Nazmi:32). By 
applying the broad term “community development”, it is possible for Mesaha to host and guide a 
great variety of youth initiated projects from creative writing to political organisation for state 
accountability (Yassein:28), while providing the opportunity to take part in Mesaha’s one day 
events of idea generation and project development, which they term “flashhubs”.35 Regarding the 
projects that Mesaha hosts, Yassein elaborates: “…the issue is not that the idea is good or bad. The 
issue is, we are gaining new active member. And the new active member in society will not create 
one idea, they will create another idea and another idea. For me it’s a learning process.” 
(Yassein:5). Social taboos or “excluded realities” are, as Yassein for instance explains, a part of 
Mesaha’s discourse on “community development”, which further emphasises the hosted projects’ 
potential to rearticulate hegemonic discourses and practises:  
“For example I can make a script-writing workshop for documentary for featuring the issue of children…for children 
abuse for example. It’s connected with community development, so our criteria is whether it is connected to community 
development or not.” (Yassein:10).  
“Community development” is interpreted and tied to cultural activism by the founders of Mesaha as 
non-governmental and non-profit-oriented. Nazmi furthermore articulates that due to the 
organisation’s high level of state independence and the post-revolutionary engagement of its 
members, Mesaha is in itself an “anti-establishment”, where an anti-SCAF discourse is prevalent: “I 
mean that in the sense that you are creating an independent anti establishment. I’d say anti-
establishment, you’re clearly I mean, you know…you find a sign here saying ‘No SCAF’.” 
(Nazmi:22). Both Yassein and Nazmi stress that Mesaha is not thought of as a primarily political 
space. Nazmi rather highlights how political initiatives are embracing such places as Mesaha, where 
they can gather and organise collective action: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The co-founders of Mesaha facilitate temporary spaces for the generation of ideas and projects for socio-political 
change through the organisation and hosting of “flash hubs”, which are one day-events aiming to create at least a 
temporary sense of community and mission and a space for it to unfold and grow within (Nazmi:31). 
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“…in December right after what happened with the lady and they were kicking her on the street…so we gathered here 
(…) and we started a movement, “for our dignity” it was called. And for a month and a little we were [organising] 
marches through Cairo. It was just a different form of political strategy, completely based on the fact that we could be 
here and organise here, and we grew very quickly, but then we just couldn’t…you know, that had it’s own life cycle. 
But it started and survived here for the time it needed to.” (Nazmi:22).  
This quote shows how the community space of Mesaha contains “revolutionary” activism 
responding to the political momentum rather than being an organisation or a space taking the shape 
of such initiatives. As Nazmi further elaborates: “I was one of the people organising [the 
movement] and yet this space is a space of these types of initiatives not exclusively political in any 
way, but so long as it meets the social requirements of the day, I think that’s one of the main 
things.” (Nazmi:22). The founders of Mesaha do not intend to create a political organisation, rather 
they see to that socio-political ideas are given room to grow. Whether this actually facilitates socio-
political change in the long run we shall question, yet the broad term of “community development” 
leaves a space for the founders of Mesaha’s own interpretations of what kind of “community 
development” projects such a space may contain.  
Unlike the exclusively media-oriented collective, Mosireen, the members of Mesaha are aspiring to 
contain a great variety of activist projects based in their discourse on “community development”. In 
reference to Duncombe we therefore argue that the activist practises of Meshaha may be termed an 
“open” space or spectacle. The power of an “open” space or spectacle lies in its generative text, in 
this case “community development”, which is purposely unfinished and therefore opens up for 
interpretation and participation within a certain “field of possibilities” or a certain “field of 
relations” (Duncombe 2007:135-136). The meaning of “community development” for instance may 
be contextual or contingent, but applied with certain guidelines and in a way, in which participants 
are capable of making sense out of it. This allows for “participatory” participation not just on an 
organisational level of inclusion, but also on an idea-based level for discourse creation. As 
previously shown, the participants may tie different discourses to “community development” such 
as the state-sponsored apolitical discourse on civil society as well as the discourse developed by the 
co-founders themselves.  From this perspective the practises of Mesaha may be argued to reproduce 
the binary, which we illuminated in reference to Pratt in the theoretical chapter in the paragraph 
“The academic languages of liberation and limitation”. When Mesaha takes on an apolitical surface 
the contrast between an authentic Egyptian identity and the corrupted “western” discourse on 
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development aid is emphasised, as buzzwords like “community development” without any tangible 
outcomes stay intact. Although Mesaha enacts a non-governmental, non-profit-oriented and 
voluntary discourse it is made apolitical through the term “community development”. This 
illuminates the ambiguous relation between the Egyptian state and non-governmental organisations 
like Mesaha, where the members on the one hand may be free to read their own interpretation into 
the term “community development”, but on the other hand the term blurs any concrete political 
interests of the organisation itself. Even in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution the founders 
of Mesaha have chosen to maintain the official term of “community development” for their 
organisation. Dr. Eric Jensen, however, who is concerned with the mediation of social-political 
change in a context of authoritarian state practises, notes that the key to introducing dissenting ideas 
in an authoritarian context is to maintain a hybrid cover or an “in-betweenness” in the act of 
defining the idea of society. In reference to Homi Bhaba’s idea of hybrid identity formation in post-
colonial countries, Jensen argues that by avoiding stating explicitly one’s opposition to the 
dominant assumptions in one’s society, dissenting ideas may be introduced and facilitate socio-
political transformations (Jensen 2012:212, 218). Mesaha’s open space of “community 
development” is an inclusive and participatory practice, because it through the “in-betweenness” 
provides a terrain, in which new signs of identities and innovative sites for collaboration and 
contestation emerge. Yet this approach may assume a continuation of authoritarianism instead of a 
total rupture for future transformation, which makes us question even its “in-betweenness”. As 
Abdelrahman argues, civil society is not necessarily providing an emancipatory function, but 
constitutes a politically contested environment embedded in authoritarian and repressive powers. 
The NGOs making up this environment may rather end up reproducing unequal relations and 
uphold the status quo instead of enhancing socio-political change by providing alternative options 
to the already existing power systems (Abdelrahman 2004:1). This places Mesaha on the edge of 
the definition of cultural activism by Firat and Kuryel, where the facilitation of social-change is 
based on the rearticulation of a certain hegemony. Yet this opens up for another definition, which 
takes the contextual constraints into consideration. The variety of projects, which Mesaha contains 
of dissident and oppositional counter-hegemonic practices and the organisation of flashhubs may 
aspire and work to rearticulate the hegemony of the authoritarian Egyptian state system. Yet not 
knowing the outcome of the transitional period in Egypt, the focus of Mesaha may be put on a more 
long-term-socio-political development, as the founders of Mesaha maintain a cover to facilitate 
counter-hegemonic practices through their “anti-establishment” and the facilitation of, among other 
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initiatives, initiatives of cultural activism. Mesaha’s civil society activism and its contradictory 
position in-between the state-sponsored apolitical discourse and their own political position against 
the SCAF, made us wonder, which discourses were actually tied to “the activist” in Egypt. “The 
activist” is a contested term among our informants, who tie many contradicting discourses to it 
ranging from the liberating Revolutionary to the class-discriminatory elitist. This we shall look into 
in the following. 
The multiple and contradictory discourses on the Egyptian 
activist  
In this paragraph we elaborate on the fine line between activism and elitism among Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players, which is not just imposed by state discourse and practises, but also by 
practises of self-representation. Basing activism on a non-profit discourse of voluntarism does open 
up for popular participation within the informal realm of civil society, yet it may also blur socio-
economic and political hierarchies. Abdelrahman for example argues that activism in Egypt 
continues to be restricted to those, who correspond to the social profile of “the rooted 
cosmopolitans” (Abdelrahman 2011:419). An explanation for this may be found in “Civil Society 
Exposed” (2004), in which Abdelrahman draws attention to how the Egyptian civil society has 
partly been reduced to social service providers as a result of Egypt’s increasingly neo-liberalist 
policies (Abdelrahman 2004:25). Such governmental misallocation of resources may, if continued, 
further enforce not just elitism, but also authoritarianism in Egypt according to recent research 
conducted by the economist, Ibrahim Saif (Saif 2011:2). In general our informants articulate a need 
to go beyond class divisions and therefore also to go beyond Cairo in order to facilitate popular 
processes of socio-political transformation, yet simultaneously they end up complying with 
practises of self-representation, which are misrepresenting the Revolutionaries. Darwish for 
instance illuminates: 
“…these women, who look like me, who are internationally interviewed for the revolution over and over again and 
people everywhere in the US and Europe saying; Aarh she is not veiled, she is like me, she is just like me, but actually 
the people, who made the revolution, they don’t do not all look like us, some of them (…), they don’t dress that way.” 
(Darwish:14). 
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Both the Mosireen collective and Mesaha struggle to make their work inclusive by creating 
participatory spaces. Yassein for instance admits that Mesaha despite its efforts to be an inclusive 
youth space is representing urban youth: “Now we are trying to establish some urban. I admit we 
are urban. We are approaching middle class people. To be honest, this is urban space, but we are 
trying to document this space to inspire other people.” (Yassein:12). As Abdelrahman notes Mesaha 
is tied to a certain neighbourhood in Cairo: “CDAs (Community development Associations) are 
based in one locality, an urban neighbourhood or a village, while welfare organisations are not 
restricted geographically” (M. Abdelrahman 2004:6). Since Mesaha is aiming to be registered as a 
community development organisation, they have to live up to the demands of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs. Hence Mesaha is restricted geographically to the local community, which they are situated 
in, unless other less formal and centralised efforts such as loose networking is applied.  
Activism is, according to Hoofd, globally thoroughly implicated in humanistic as well as capitalistic 
discourses and new media technologies, which enforce elitism. Hoofd therefore underlines that 
activism does not solely emerge from some abstract human craving for freedom or liberation, also 
not in the case of the 25th of January Revolution (Hoofd, 2012:10). Among our informants the 
graffitist, Sad Panda, articulates a discourse on “activism” as an imposed reaction to socio-political 
and economic exclusion rather than an actual desire for socio-political transformation (Sad 
Panda:1). He articulates a discourse on “the activist” as those Egyptians, who are victims of class 
dividing neo-liberal policies and therefore engage in activism: “I just think it is someone, who could 
not find a job and start reading some blogs or newspapers, and like caring about poor people or 
whatever, just became an activist, because in the first place he couldn’t find a job.” (Sad Panda:1). 
Darwish emphasises how several discourses in Egypt are tied to the identity of the “activist”, which 
is both consecrated by the discourse of the Revolutionaries and linked to class discriminatory 
practises. Darwish for instance is annoyed with the “activist” identity, because the term, according 
to her, refers to an active creation of class discrimination. In the wake of the 25th of January 
Revolution, the fine line between activism and elitism is clear to her within Egypt’s public realm:  
“…creating this class of like activists, professional activists, is very very unfair. Because for example, when people are 
arrested or tortured or whatever and you find statements in the media saying that they are activists. They are the people 
of the revolution. But (…) the people on the front line [in clashes with Egypt’s Security Forces], who are mostly poor 
kids. They are like…young men. They are all of a sudden not activists (…) the activists are those they show on TV, that 
talks, who make statements…”(Darwish:12).  
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Yet according to Hoofd, Darwish’s annoyance with the term “activist” is a debated topic within 
research on global activism. Hoofd illuminates how critical and self-reflective discourses on the 
“activist”-position advocate for a real activism that aims to drop the performance of the activist and 
instead work from an authentic position in one’s quest for subversion. Others have according to 
Hoofd argued that activism should be given up all together, because: 
“…identifying oneself as activist indeed provides pleasure in the form of generating a self-image of being ‘special’ and 
of being at the forefront of the revolution. But as the ‘capitalist expert role’ that it is (…) activism must have its basis in 
the division of labour and thus in class society and as such activism does not contest social hierarchies.” (Hoofd 
2012:9). 
As for instance the street artist, Keizer, illuminates, he does not want, like many within the 
movement of young revolutionary activists do, to fall for “the easy trap of wanting to be seen and 
recognised” (Keizer:6). These activists are, according to Keizer, not questioning the implications of 
digital dissident self-expression and representation, although they are at risk of underestimating the 
potential for counter-revolutionary state reprisals even in the transitional period (Keizer:6). As 
illuminated by Hoofd, the popular movement of digital Revolutionaries may rather enforce elitism 
due to the overall limited access to new media technologies in Egypt. Furthermore the uncertainty 
of state reprisals leaves activists in a dilemma of responding to newfound freedoms of expression or 
staying with state-sponsored methods of masked dissidence. In the following paragraphs on street 
art activism and media activism, we look into how Cairo’s new cultural-political players deal with 
the authoritarian constraints differently than Mesaha’s civil society activism and how they in 
general articulate an ethical position in response to their acts of complicity. “The activist” is in other 
words designated a highly debated and contradictory position within Egypt’ public space, in which 
“the activist” is not just the victim or the potential saviour of the situation in Egypt, but also the 
perpetrator of compliance. Nevertheless, “the activist” is designated a position within discourses on 
how to overcome the authoritarian barriers, in which “open” spaces like Mesaha and practises of 
“in-betweenness” are considered powerful and maybe of a more long-term perspective in times of 
uncertainty about Egypt’s future political path. Yet as we shall show in the following paragraphs on 
street art activism, open spectacles are in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution also applied 
within Cairo’s public space without giving in to the authoritarian structures, yet not without giving 
in to neo-liberal modalities and practises.  
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Cairo’s new street art activism  
We now turn to a focus on Cairo’s new street art activism in the following paragraphs, where we 
seek to understand and determine whether this activism’s capacity to rearticulate public hegemonies 
in Egypt corresponds with the definition on “cultural activism" provided by Firat and Kuryel. The 
rupture of former hegemonic identities, institutions and practises, which took place with the 18 days 
subsequently, fuelled processes within the Egypt’s society of redefining former hegemonies and 
hierarchies towards greater popular inclusion and participation of the average citizen. Within 
Cairo’s public space the act of drawing on walls has become a part of the counter-hegemonic 
practises in support of and in response to the discourse of the Revolutionaries. As the street artist, 
Keizer, shared with us, he encountered an old man while making a piece in the streets of Cairo, who 
told him: “You know something, I used to be for the old regime and now I am converted and I 
understand the youth now and I understand what you are doing.” (Keizer:11). According to Lewis 
Sanders VI, researcher in identity formation in Egypt’s underground, a transition in the accessibility 
of political expression has occurred since the 25th of January Revolution. Sanders VI ties this 
transformation to the capacity, obtained by the Egyptian people, during the 18 days of protests, to 
reclaim the city of Cairo through street art as “…properly theirs rather than as an extension of the 
government’s instruments used to monopolise Egyptian life and identity, and to homogenise their 
narrative.” (Sanders VI in Mehrez 2011:143). We look at the afterlife of this transition and 
continuing reclamation or ownership of Cairo’s public space through those of Cairo’s new cultural-
political players, who are engaged in the practise of street art. Where civil society activism, as 
shown in the previous paragraphs, may become confined to a particular space due to the legal 
constraints of the state bureaucracy, street art activism rather bypasses such spatial legal restrictions 
and embraces the decentralised practices of loose networking and Cairo’s public spaces fully. This, 
however, does not mean that street art activists do not experience constraints and limitations to their 
practices within the public space of Cairo. Street art or artistic graffiti existed in Cairo before the 
25th of January such as the work of the graffitist Sad Panda, but according to Sanders VI it did so to 
a lesser extent due to regulating practises of “the state’s disciplining mechanism, the police” 
(Sander VI in Mehrez 2011:146). In the wake of the 25th of January Revolution “the barrier of fear” 
may have been broken and this opportunity to reclaim Cairo’s public space through street art and 
other forms of activism may have been embraced. However, censoring state mechanisms are, as we 
shall show, still the reality of post-revolutionary Cairo. In the following paragraphs, we will go into 
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further scrutiny with the street art activism, which our informants are engaged in. Firstly, we will 
illuminate initiatives in Egypt’s public realm, which have caused the streets of Cairo, and in 
particular the street of Muhammaed Mahmoud Street, to become a “barometer” on the course of 
“the ongoing revolution”. This has merged the artistic identity of the “artist” with the vandalising 
identity of the “graffitist” and made the act of drawing on walls recognised as a part of the popular 
counter-hegemonic practises for “the ongoing revolution”. Street art activism is like the civil society 
activism of Mesaha signified by what Duncombe terms an “open” space or spectacle (Duncombe 
2007:134). Yet in contrast to the activism of Mesaha, street art activism is rather redefining Egypt’s 
cultural identity as fundamentally political and in need of public and pluralistic representation. As 
we shall discover in the following, it even has the capacity to turn censoring state mechanisms into 
opportunities for further political participation.  
Disrupting the streets of Cairo 
The new, more or less self-acclaimed, street artists have, as noted by Professor of Sociology at 
AUC, Mona Abaza, discovered and embraced the power of Egypt’s public spaces as a means to 
enforce pressure on the SCAF and speak to the Egyptian people (Abaza 2012:125). Art works and 
amateur work interpreting Egypt’s historical situation are to be found at Mohammed Mahmud 
Street on the corner of Tahrir Square alongside event-based art works initiated by professional 
artists. They do not only provide the opportunity for public participation in the interpretation of 
these spectacles and Egypt’s political development, but they also provide the opportunity to be a 
part of their creation through loose networking. As the young “graffiti artist”, Ziad Amin, explained 
to us: “...before every graffiti artist was working on his own, but ... this idea connected all the 
graffiti artists to make this all the day” (Amin:2). The outcome of these acts and events have, as 
Abaza, writes, transformed the “graffiti” on the wall of Mohammad Mahmoud Street into a 
“barometer”36 on the course of “the ongoing revolution”, which “speaks” from the point of view of 
the Egyptian people as it visualises contradictions and inconsistencies in the hegemonic discourse 
of Egypt’s political elite. As Sanders VI points out street art of the 25th of January Revolution has 
become a “symptomatic” reaction, in particular to the discourse of Egypt’s political elite and its 
subsequent consequences (Sanders VI 2012:147). The young graffiti artist, Ziad Amin, who has 
taken part in the creation of several pieces on the wall of Muhammad Mahmud Street, argues that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Abaza, Mona (10-03-2012): The Revolution’s Barometer. Jadaliyya. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/5978/the-
revolutions-barometer Read: 03-02-2013.  
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Egyptian people need to learn how to express their opinion and how they feel to the public, whether 
it is counter-revolutionary or counter-hegemonic expressions. Graffiti art becomes to Amin and his 
fellow graffiti artists a tool to ease and facilitate this conflictual and emotional process:     
“If they have their opinion, so we can write it on the wall, sent a the message through the wall and we see it’s a lot of 
people, even the people that are hating us, hating the regime say that 6th April is an Israelian foundation, so they did a 
that message that 6th of April is an Israelian foundation, so it’s the good way, if you want to sent a message through the 
wall”. (Ziad:7).  
What Ziad Amin in this quote explains is how a discursive struggle between revolutionaries and 
counter-revolutionaries is taking place through graffiti. He exemplifies with counter-
revolutionaries’ accusations of the revolutionary 6th of April Movement having ties to Israel37. 
Through these decentralised and largely self-organised practises of political and artistic expression, 
street art may in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution be perceived as a public opportunity to 
facilitate an “unobstructed” flow of otherwise conflictual and emotionally loaded encounters. That 
could be the encounter between counter-hegemonic and counter-revolutionary discourses in Cairo 
such as the fear of foreign conspiracies and the unprecedented power of the 6th of April youth 
movement, which Amin expresses above (Sanders VI 2012:144). Based on our interviews, we 
found out that in contrast to the former and present practises of graffiti in Cairo, based on a 
reproduction of similar tags in the streets of Cairo, Cairo’s new street art activism is signified by 
“open” spectacles putting a particular emphasis on the sudden and often temporary creation of 
public acts making an “open” spectacle available for popular interpretation and participation. The 
power of making a sudden, open and public spectacle is, as several researchers in the academic field 
of cultural activism note, “disruption”, which means temporary autonomous zones to confuse and 
thereby subvert public hegemonies, as we touched upon briefly in the theoretical chapter. The 
capacity to disrupt through street art by expressing counter-hegemonic messages on the walls of 
Cairo stands in contrast to how the very same walls before the 25th of January Revolution, 
according to Amin, mainly were used to spread commercial messages (Ziad:8). The work of the 
street artist, Keizer, is for instance tied to his belief in street art as a tool to empower individual 
thinking by creating disrupting processes in Cairo’s public spaces: “…the purpose of art is to make 
people think for themselves and question authority. “That is it. That is all, I want to do”. (Keizer:6). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This accusation of being tied to Israel should be understood as a harsh accusation due to anti-Israeli attitudes, which 
are fixed, strong and deeply rooted in the core of Arab identity because of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Lynch in 
Katzenstein, Keohane 2007:197). 
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Keizer’s street art activism recalls the Situationists’ rearticulation of the capitalist spectacle: “I took 
everything I learned from advertising and now I am using it to counter-advertise.” (Keizer:3). He 
has come to a showdown with his professional past within advertisement. Instead he is now 
sympathising with the local fight against the commercialisation of “the revolution” as well as the 
global fight of the Occupy Movement against capitalism. Specialist in protest culture, Dr. Christian 
Scholl, refers among others to a range of activist practices among artists and activists in modern 
time, who work to create disruptive messages through a temporary spectacle and process of 
confusion and subversion. As Scholl notes: “…confusion and subversion is a way to disrupt the 
reproduction of ruling relations by taking over symbols and discourses in order to transport a 
counter-hegemonic message.” (Scholl 2011:164). Cairo’s new graffiti artists apply art as a counter-
hegemonic tool in order to create open spectacles for popular inclusion and participation, while 
disrupting and rearticulating public hegemonies, in particularly the present hegemony of the SCAF. 
The two young graffiti artists, Ziad Amin and Mostafa Tefa, shared with us how they have both 
been a part of creating several pieces on the wall of Muhammad Mahmud Street aiming to embrace 
the sensitive stories of the Egyptian post-revolutionary history, which are suppressed by the state 
and the Egyptian people. Professionals within the arts direct these events, but the events also 
involve our informants as well as others such as pedestrians passing by during the process of 
making street art. Amin for instance shared with us how these spectacles are “open” to public 
interpretation and discussion: “…while we are painting. We ask the people passing” and “we catch 
the reaction” (Amin:1). Amin further told us that he had been a part of painting “the Port Said 
martyrs” on Muhammad Mahmud Street. The Port Said martyrs are a row of painted portraits on 
Mohammad Mahmoud street, which as an open yet guided spectacle of young men with angel 
wings38, refer to those killed in what has been perceived as a “massacre” performed by the police 
and Egypt’s Security Forces at the Port Said Football Stadium in February 2012.39 The term 
“martyr” has, according to the research of Laura Gribbon and Sara Hawas on the signs and 
signifiers of the Egyptian revolt, been used to denote death for a noble cause, in this case “the 
ongoing revolution”. In the wake of the 18 days the martyr phenomenon tends, according to 
Gribbon and Hawas, to reinforce a shared sense of victimisation (Gribbon & Hawas 2012:133). As 
Amin expressed his engagement in the making and afterlife of the Port Said murals, we realised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Cf. Appendix 2: Street art of the Port Said martyrs. 
39 Hussein, Abdel-Rahman (07-03-2012): Blog: Martyrs and Mourning Mohamed Mahmoud. Egypt Independent. 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/blog-martyrs-and-mourning-mohamed-mahmoud Read: 20-11-2012.  
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how the martyr paintings through disruptive spectacles of street art facilitate a shared process of 
mourning and healing. Amin for instance aspires to “…go to the (...) mothers of martyrs, the houses 
of the martyrs, every house (…) The point is to make healing. The mother, you know, if she opened 
the window and can see her son in front of her house”. (Amin:16). Yet we found that the martyr 
paintings have another function. They are a call for justice as they amplify the inconsistency of the 
counter-revolutionary discourses and practises such as when the SCAF is calling civil disobedience 
“thuggery” under an unjust state system, which does not impose legal accountability on Egypt’s 
Security Forces in spite of their crimes during clashes with the Revolutionaries. Like this an open 
spectacle like the Port Said Martyrs is an unique example of what Firat and Kuryel term “cultural 
activism” as it through a public act of visual disruption amplifies and thereby rearticulates the 
irrationality or hypocrisy of a hegemonic discourse by recomposing its elements and by providing 
the viewers or the participants of the spectacle with an opportunity to step back and look critically 
at what is accepted or taken for granted (Duncombe 2007:148). In this way street art works are open 
spectacles that work to confuse momentarily in order to reconstruct reality. In the final chapter of 
the analysis, we shall return to the murals of the Port Said martyrs and the power of amplifying 
these excluded realities of violence and oppression.   
Now, however, we turn our gaze towards the obstacles or challenges, which Cairo’s new graffiti 
artists encounter. What for instance becomes particularly remarkable about the art on Muhammad 
Mahmud Street is how the antagonist struggle between Egypt’s political leaders and the 
Revolutionaries echoes in “the war” on the wall between street artists and the SCAF’s security 
personnel, “the professional whiteners”. The latter continuously repaint the walls of Cairo to erase 
“mocking slogans” or “daring insults” of the SCAF according to Abaza.40 Ironically this leaves the 
walls open for new counter-hegemonic rearticulations. The censoring dynamics of  “professional 
whitening” or the removal of street art is not an unfamiliar or necessarily unwanted act of the street 
artists. Keizer reveals how it is not only state agents who remove or covers his street art, but also 
other street artists due to rivalry. In relation to this Keizer shared how: “Once one street artist took it 
upon himself to come and take off all my street art” (Keizer:16). As previously illuminated in 
reference to Amin’s appeal for conflictual discussion through the walls of Cairo, what is important 
to the street artists is not harmony of opinion, but the accessibility of the multiplicity of opinions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Abaza, Mona (10-03-2012): An Emerging Memorial Space? In Praise of Mohammed Mahmoud Street Jadaliyya. 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4625/an-emerging-memorial-space-in-praise-of-mohammed-m. Read: 03-02-
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The “whitening” interventions are merely creating new canvases for the graffiti artists to paint on. 
In spite of the fusion of “the artist” and “the graffitists” a negative discourse on street art is still 
prevalent within the public space of Cairo. Although Keizer finds that the Egyptian police is rather 
unpredictable in its judgement of his public art making (Keizer:9), he nor any of the other street 
artists we interviewed regarded the police as the biggest challenge or hindrance to their cultural 
activist practice. The “professional whitening”, however, indicates ingrained censoring mechanisms 
towards “street art” as “graffiti” or vandalism. The young graffiti artist, Mostafa Tefa, has 
experienced this attitude among the Egyptian people in the streets of Cairo as well. In fact the lack 
of understanding and acceptance of graffiti art was referred to as a major obstacle by the street 
artists:  
“They just think we are drawing on the wall…they just think we don’t have anything to do and just drawing on walls. 
They don’t get that we have a message to tell them (…) they think that we just want to destroy the country and we don’t 
understand what we are really doing and they think that they are in freedom or that Egypt is free and we know that there 
are many things to do to be, to let Egypt be better than this” (Mostafa Tefa:3). 
  
Tefa further points out that this sceptical attitude among the Egyptian people results in people 
calling the police to have them arrested (Mostafa Tefa:10). Changing the attitude of people, who are 
still sceptical towards the practise of street art, is therefore according to the graffiti artists a major 
challenge. A sceptical voice is for instance Mia Jankowicz, who is the art director of one of Cairo’s 
independent art spaces, Contemporary Image Collective. She shared with us how she believes that 
the discourse of the Revolutionaries has enforced a “propagandist function of art” with serious 
implications for the artistic expression and its potential to facilitate socio-political change. 
According to Jankowicz, a moral pressure on artists have enforced them to, either withdraw or try: 
“…to monumentalise it [The 25 of January Revolution] or vitiate this thing as an event and not as a 
process” (Jankowicz:4). However, as previously illuminated, street art activists do not withdraw or 
simplify the 25th of January Revolution into a monument or a past event, rather they open up 
Egypt’s public space to an alternative yet popular and public practise of political representation, 
participation and discussion in the streets of Cairo. Street art activism is hence redefining Egyptian 
culture and identity in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution as fundamentally political and 
pluralistic in contrast to the apolitical civil society discourse imposed by the state and the 
international community.  
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Before moving on to Cairo’s new media activism, we, however, look at another challenge, yet one 
that Cairo’s new cultural-political players have in common and which, as Jankowicz fears, has a 
tendency to simplify or objectify the 25th of January Revolution. That is the imposed neo-liberal 
policies of the Egyptian state and the commercialisation of “the revolution”.  
A commercialised “revolution”  
During our stay in Cairo it became clear to us that Cairo’s new cultural-political players and their 
practices of revolutionary activism were entangled in the commercial industry. Videos, pictures and 
street art about “the revolution” were all hot commercial goods in the wake of 18 days. Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players seek to cope with the struggles and temptations imposed by the neo-
liberalist environment. They do that by deliberately complying yet not without taking an ethical 
position simultaneously, in response to their compliance. 
In the post-revolutionary times of insecurity and economic decline, the opportunity to profit from 
the spotlight on Egypt in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution has not surprisingly turned 
Tahrir Square into a daily marked for “revolution”-merchandise ranging from T-shirts to face-paint. 
We discovered during our stay in Cairo that many articulate benefiting financially from “the 
revolution” as a disrespectful and an immoral act. This places several of our informants in a 
position where they have to find a balance between their aspiration to facilitate socio-political 
change in line with the discourse of the Revolutionaries and their aspiration to turn their practices of 
activism into recognised professional work or into a recognised professional career. The established 
independent filmmaker, Ahmed Mohsen explains how his hesitation to act on the discourse of the 
Revolutionaries through his art is tied to a moral discourse. Within this moral discourse is a 
disapproving attitude of anybody, who takes advantage of the situation, and in particular “the 
revolution”, for his or her own benefits such as to benefit one’s career or financial situation: “if you 
just put your soul, your revolution soul over it, so it’s gonna sell, so it’s not that easy to say; I don’t 
[take advantage], it’s a very critical feeling” (Mohsen:24). Mohsen felt obligated yet struggled to 
act on the discourse of the Revolutionaries through his art, because he was afraid of being deemed 
an opportunist. This fear leads him to withdraw from activism related to the Egyptian uprising. In 
“Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development, and the State in Cairo”, Associate 
Professor in Anthropology, Julia Elyachar, argues that an array of neoliberal state programs for the 
public good have purported to “empower” the poor in Egypt and to accord new value to their 
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cultural resources. These have, according to Elychar, rather aided the opposite, namely their 
undermining (Elyachar 2005:215). Elyachar argues that the expansion of the neoliberal market in 
Egypt, which is enforced by the Egyptian state, can only succeed, if new neo-liberal subjectivities 
are created on the ground (Elyachar 2005:214). Yet a modality of neo-liberalism produces not only 
negative value in Egypt, it invites “attacks of the evil eye”, an ingrained cultural phenomenon in 
Egypt: 
“Those who adopted the neoliberal subjectivities of pure self-interest, and the pursuit of short-term gain without 
attention to the reproduction of longer-term cycles of community life, exposed themselves to dangers. Among these 
were not only bankruptcy and market failure, but also spiritual dangers with real bodily consequences, including 
accidents, illness, social humiliation, or even death.” (Elyachar 2005:218). 
Keizer articulates his disapproval of earning money on “the revolution” by referring to AUC 
students publishing books about street art: “…it’s the commodifying of street art turning it into 
merchandise that’s what I don’t want.“ (Keizer:20). According to Keizer it has to do with selling 
“the Egyptian suffering”, which he perceives as an act of dishonour: “...if you are an Egyptian 
person, alright, who fought on Tahrir and you walk into a store and you find pictures [from Tahrir] 
being sold off, you know, these people might have had a brother that died in the revolution...” 
(Keizer:21). Hence making money on “the revolution” may be viewed as an act of disrespect of 
those who have suffered in their struggles for “the revolution”. Both Keizer and the photojournalist, 
Mostafa Sheshtawy, struggle for financial and ethical independence from companies and news 
agencies wanting to take advantage of their images or art pieces. Sheshtawy for instance shared 
with us how he is fighting for his rightful financial share in those of his pictures, which are applied 
by organisations and news agencies without consulting him or paying him for his contribution 
(Sheshtawy:7-8). This Sheshtawy finds it “disrespectful” first and foremost because of their relation 
to “the ongoing revolution”:  
“I don’t want any exclusiveness with an agency, so I don’t do any exclusive rights for someone. I don’t do that because 
it is about the revolution and that is why the newspapers hate me. So I try to get some money out of it and if I don’t it is 
okay, because it is about the revolution.” (Sheshtawy:8).   
Keizer on the other hand has been in a position, where he had to fight the temptation of unethical 
capitalist profiting. In connection to this he shared that: “Pepsi offered me 200.000 pounds to like to 
make an ad for them and guess what, they did not even want me to do a Keizer piece, they just 
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wanted me to stencil their logo... in Lebanon.” (Keizer:19). In other words, we noticed how Cairo’s 
new cultural-political players in general did not articulate any fear of being deemed an opportunist. 
Rather they justified “using” their activism to earn money through an ethical positioning of their 
compliance. Coping with ingrained moral discourses, which exclude those, who engage in acts of 
pure self-interest, is not articulated as an obstacle to Cairo’s new cultural-political players as 
individuals as much as collectives or communities. Hoofd illuminates how activism is thoroughly 
implicated in humanist as well as capitalist discourses in particular, because of the individualist 
approach. Activists are, according to Hoofd, compelled to be active, creative and free and therefore 
called upon increasingly to subject themselves to take action in accordance to neo-liberalism 
(Hoofd, 2012:7). Duncombe argues that this is a part of the cultural activist practise, in which the 
activist will need to give up some ethical strength in order to push for change among a larger sector 
of society, but that this does not imply giving up ethics completely (Duncombe 2007:17). During 
our stay in Cairo we noticed that Cairo’s new cultural-political players were not afraid of being 
regarded an opportunist. They did, however, seek an ethical balance in response to their 
compliance. Lubna for instance apologises on behalf of Mosireen for taking advantage of “the 
freshness” of the Egyptian “revolution”, but she does not hesitate or share thoughts about giving up 
on practicing media activism. And Keizer aspires to become an established street artist in Cairo in 
spite of the moralising discourses, which designate a subject position for him as an opportunist. He 
justifies his opportunism with his ideological independence:  
“I am translating my art into canvas and through canvas I will take it to a gallery but this is the whole point. They say 
that a street artist who enters the gallery world sells out. I think that is wrong. I think as long as a street artist demands 
what he wants and there is no interference from external factors. At that point you are not selling out.” (Keizer:4). 
Neither Keizer nor Sheshtawy hide their intentions to earn money or make a career out of their 
passion for cultural activism, however, not without their ethical independence (Keizer:4, 
Sheshtawy:9-10).   
Before moving on to the next paragraph on Cairo’s new media activism, we would like to make 
some concluding remarks. Cairo’s new street art activism does not give in to the authoritarian 
structures, in which it is embedded, and which it attempts to rearticulate. Rather it opens up Egypt’s 
public space to an alternative yet popular and public practise of political representation, 
participation and discussion in the streets of Cairo. This may challenge dominant conceptions of 
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Egypt’s national identity and culture as confined to national unity and security. Although the 
activism of Cairo’s new graffiti artists corresponds with the definition of cultural activism, which 
Firat and Kuryel provide, street art activism still cannot, like the other activisms of Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players, be properly understood without taking into consideration the neo-liberal 
complicity, in these activisms are embedded. Unlike the authoritarian state structures, neo-liberal 
complicity is considered acceptable among Cairo’s new cultural-political players in general. It is 
inevitably practised simultaneously with their anti-capitalist activism because of the local and 
global economic conditions for making a living (Hoofd). However, taking into consideration how 
activists in Egypt is in general are confined to rooted cosmopolitans of the middle class and their 
engagement with new media not only enforces a socio-economic distinction, but also the presence 
of another hybrid identity among Cairo’s new cultural-political players as they are simultaneously 
resisting and reproducing hierarchies of neo-liberalism.  
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Egypt’s new photo and video activism 
In the following paragraphs, we will define the emergence of a new kind of media activism in Cairo 
and last, but not least determine whether this approach to activism may be termed “cultural 
activism” according to Firat & Kuryel’s definition. Before we go into further scrutiny with Cairo’s 
new photo and video activism, we will briefly note on the transformations within journalism, which 
occurred during and after the 25th of January Revolution. These transformations fuelled the 
emergence of a new media landscape in Egypt, which had an immense impact on those of our 
informants now engaged in Cairo’s new photo and video activism. Egyptian journalism also 
experienced a rupture of former hegemonic identities, norms and practises with the 18 days. This 
subsequently fuelled processes within the Egyptian society of redefining former hegemonies and 
hierarchies towards greater popular inclusion and participation of the average citizen. While the 
practise of street art activism pointed to a substantial shift in the Egyptian people’s approach to 
aesthetic creation and communication in the streets of Cairo, Associate Professor of Digital Media 
Studies at the University of Denver, Adrianne Russel, draws attention to a substantial shift in the 
discursive practises of Egypt’s media outlets. She points out how decentralised reporting, performed 
during the 25th of January Revolution, by people hooked into digital social networks, actually 
transformed the discursive practises of traditional news outlets towards practises of greater popular 
inclusion and participation: 
“…the purpose or main task of the traditional news outlets shifted. In covering the story of the revolution, they turned - 
unabashedly, and to a significant degree—not to their own reporters to relay events on the ground, but to what 
networked participants in the drama were reporting and saying about what was happening.” (Russel 2011:1238). 
Russel further points out that with the 25th of January Revolution networked and decentralised 
reporting on mainstream news outlets altered: “…both the nature of the news products those outlets 
delivered and the professional norms and practices of the journalists creating that product.” (Russel 
2011:1239). The shift towards greater inclusion of alternative news outlets fuelled a discourse on 
“citizen journalism” in Egypt.41 Melissa Wall42, professor in global participatory journalism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 In a policy brief for the Netherland-Flemish Institute in Cairo, Dr. Sabine Dorpmueller refers to new trends within 
Egypt’s post-revolutionary mediascape among these she as our informants emphasises “citizen journalism” as signified 
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at California State University, draws attention to how new media has, like street art, facilitated a 
new political language in Egypt and thereby a space for Egyptian citizens “to create an individual 
public political self, and modelling a new form of citizenship and activism.” (Wall 2011:1333). In 
line with Elseewi, she underlines how participatory media or citizen journalism has been amplified 
in Egypt with a new intensity, which has pushed forward individual voices as influential discourses. 
Legitimising protesters as influential commentators, analysts and even as influential actors in the 
unfolding events has designated a subject position as “photo journalists” for both Mosaab El-Shamy 
and Mostafa Sheshtawy. They present themselves as potential, if not actual professional 
photojournalists after the 25th of January Revolution (El-Shamy:1). The photo activist, Sheshtawy, 
expressed to us that a passionate voluntary engagement in “citizen journalism” based on the 
discourse of the Revolutionaries was associated with public recognition and credibility, as it 
indicates an ethical position in opposition to opportunism or commercialisation, and state-biased 
television: 
“Citizen journalists have more credibility than professional journalists, because they do it for passion, they don’t take 
money for it, they just do it, because they want to. Citizen journalists are more professional and ethical and I would 
honestly say more bias to the revolution and not un-bias. I am bias and it really helps to be honest, especially if you are 
Egyptian, because the state media is bias as ever to whomever in power. So if the army is in power, they are going to be 
bias to the army.” (Sheshtawy:24). 
Anchored in the discourse of the Revolutionaries, social-political dichotomies and hierarchies 
between “the professional journalist” and “the amateur journalist” have been transformed in line 
with those of “the street artist” and “graffitist”.  
Cairo’s new media activism is based on citizen journalism, but it is also based on participation in 
the violent clashes with Egypt’s Security Forces. In the following paragraph, we draw on our 
interviews with photo and video activists, who are loosely tied to each other as well as the 
supporting the media collective, Mosireen (Shestawy:13). Firstly, however, we zoom in on the 
symbolic power of taking part in clashes, which enables Cairo’s photo and video activists to obtain 
documentation during clashes. This participation is closely tied to why clash documentation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
by breaking down the hierarchy between the journalist and the audience in Egypt in the wake of 25th of January 
revolution (Dorpmueller 2012:3) 
42 Graduate student, Sahar El-Zahed, Claremont University, considers in an essay the ways, in which the YouTube 
videos of Egyptian youth activist, Asmaa Mafouz, may be contributing to the development of a new political language 
for Egypt (Wall:2011). 
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possesses the power to unite Revolutionaries and discredit the course of Egypt’s political elite. 
Secondly we draw attention to the Mosireen collective, which simultaneously was exploring new 
excluded venues for rearticulating documentation in the spring of 2012. 
Documentation that rearticulates  
Cairo’s photo- and video activists are taking part in the struggles in between the Security Forces and 
the front line fighters in order to document the unequal clashes. This daring action is held in high 
esteem within the Egyptian public, where it is regarded as essential in order to enforce socio-
political influence and change in Egypt. According to Dr. Lucie Ryzova, the continuation of violent 
clashes between Egypt’s Security Forces and revolutionary protesters is neither an equal struggle 
over territory nor a physical struggle of superiority. This hegemony is already in the hands of the 
Egyptian military. Ryzova, who is a researcher on social and cultural history in Egypt at the 
University of Oxford, therefore refers to the clashes as “symbolic battles”.43 In line with Ryzova’s 
terminology, the clashes may be defined as a discursive battle for influence on the hegemony over 
the public media “spectacle” of popular interpretation. In reference to the clashes at the Muhammad 
Mahmoud Street in November 2011, Ryzova writes: “the fight itself was the message”. 44 The 
violent battle took place between Egypt’s superior Security Forces and “the front line”. According 
to Ryzova the front line consists mainly of “young male and socially marginal” for whom the battle 
may rather be defined as a struggle for a temporary feeling of dignity than for abstract goals of 
democracy.1 Both Ryzova and our informants draw a diverse social profile of those people beyond 
the front line, who form a kind of supportive “symbiotic social alliance” with the front line fighters, 
based on a collective memory of the 18 days and the ongoing struggles for “the revolution”. As we 
investigated from where Cairo’s new photo and video activists got the courage to take part in the 
potentially damaging and even deadly clashes, we found out that the social alliance between 
Revolutionaries entail mutual efforts of protecting other Revolutionaries during battles and the act 
of documenting these. Darwish explained to us that this meant to protect others from “being taken 
away”, “tortured”, “raped” or  “hit in the eyes” by army soldiers (Darwish:11). According to her the 
force of “the commitment” among the Revolutionaries goes beyond personal protection and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ryzova, Lucie (29-11-2011): The battle of Cairo's Muhammad Mahmoud Street. Al Jazeera English. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/ opinion/2011/11/201111288494638419.html. Read: 26-10-2012. 
44 Ryzova, Lucie (29-11-2011): The battle of Cairo's Muhammad Mahmoud Street. Al Jazeera English. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/ opinion/2011/11/201111288494638419.html. Read: 26-10-2012.  
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mutilation: “…the commitment that you have to someone [the Revolutionaries], who would rescue 
you with his eye…Knowing them or not knowing them. It’s commitment, I think, for everybody, 
it’s a bit forced.” (Darwish:11). The special bond of the Revolutionaries may explain why for 
instance Sheshtawy among others articulates a discourse on the revolutionary battleground fighter 
as “young” and necessarily “crazy” (El-Masry:4-5, Sheshtawy:18-19). Both Shehstawy and El-
Shamy articulate that they are more afraid of having their camera ruined in clashes than actually 
getting arrested or injured (Sheshtawy:12, El-Shamy:2). The bravery of actually daring to document 
the violations of Security Forces is tied to the publicly recognition and encouragement this fuels. 
Sheshtawy for instance shared with us an example of the supportive symbiotic social alliance on the 
battleground, as he told us about by a random man who provided moral support by yelling: “Where 
is your camera? Keep shooting, keep shooting. You are brave”. Sheshtawy elaborates: “They call us 
soldiers, yeah people with cameras, they are soldiers. We have a weapon and that is the difference. 
We don’t have rocks, but we do have weapons.” (Sheshtawy:21). According Sheshtawy, the quality 
of the pictures, he takes, depends on the danger at stake in that very moment: “…if you do it the 
safe way you will not get anything, which is worth sharing. It has to be, I mean all the pictures that I 
am really really proud of I could have died while taking them.” (Sheshtawy:7). The prevalent role, 
which violence and documentation play in creating an exposing spectacle to rearticulate the 
hegemony of the Egyptian military and the SCAF has not surprisingly made commentators and 
even researchers term the Egyptian protest culture a form of “social information warfare” (Niekerk 
2011:1) or “war of information”45. The video or photo activists turn the clashes into a “symbolic 
battle”, in which their camera is “a weapon” to rearticulate public discourses of the military as the 
protector of the Egyptian people and the transition to democracy. Violations committed by Egypt’s 
Security Forces, which have been captured on camera, have proven to be of great influence, when 
they are transmitted to the Egyptian public as in the case of the facebook page “We are all Khalid 
Said”. According to Ph.D. researcher, Bret Van Niekerk, along with other researchers in the field of 
Information Science, argues that information and communication technologies have worked as a 
transmission medium through which anti-government perceptions have been spread. According to 
Van Nierkerk, they are a platform for the protestors to present their messages to the local and global 
community in “…an attempt to promulgate antigovernment perceptions and to apply further 
pressure on the respective government leaders to step down” (Niekerk 2011:1413). Cairo’s new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Kouddous, Sharif Abdel (07-01-2012): Egypt's new war of information. Egypt Independent. http://www.egypt 
independent.com/opinion/egypts-new-war-information. Read: 03-04-2012.	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photo and video activism in other words disturbs and reorientates by attacking the hegemony of the 
Egyptian military. This is done through the public exposure of military violations, as the role of the 
military as the guardian of “the revolution” is being rearticulated. Both Sheshtawy and El-Shamy 
shared with us how they often work to disrupt either through a shock of brutality or the beauty of 
bravery. El-Shamy for instance explained that:  
“…for example the Khaled Said photo after his jaw was broken. It was not an artistically beautiful photo you know, but 
it was provocative. This is one side where a photo is very very powerful, but ugly. At the same time there were many 
photos during the revolution of one man standing alone against the army” (El-Shamy:4). 
Unlike the street artists we spoke to, the photo activists seemed more concerned with portraying 
“the real drama” of “the ongoing revolution”. They seemed to distance themselves from the 
mourning process in their images through a “fearless” identity of the courageous battleground 
fighter. This enables the photo activists to collect, expose and amplify real life dramas of unequal 
clashes and fuel the unity of the Revolutionaries through the beautiful shots of brave actions during 
clashes. Scholl for instance argues that the expressive dimension of artistic activism, such as the 
playful ambiguity within the more abstract art pieces on Mohammad Mahmoud Street, is often 
within cultural activism made more confrontational and instrumental in order to achieve a tactical 
goal, as for instance the continuous “hunt” for “dangerous” military violence among the photo and 
video activists indicates (Scholl 2011:169). Duncombe finds that cultural activists may overcome 
the dilemma of getting lost in playful or ambiguous spectacles by staying in clear touch with “the 
real drama” or excluded reality at stake through a spectacle that amplifies it (Duncombe 2007:146). 
The pictures of Egypt’s Security Forces clear violations work to rearticulate the Egyptian army and 
thereby add discredit to it, while working to consolidate the antagonism between the military and 
the Revolutionaries.  
Now we turn our gaze towards the activism of Mosireen. During the last year and since its 
beginning, Mosireen has organised public anti-military video-screenings, which they have termed 
“Cinema Al-Tahrir”. For these screenings footage by photo activists as Sheshtaway and El-Shamy 
is presented and spread. As illustrated in the very beginning of this thesis, these public screenings 
create a space for disruptions to happen and participatory processes of interpretation and 
participation to be facilitated. Darwish for instance shared with us that: 
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“…sometimes (…) you find people in the audience starting to talk with the character, and it has this very interesting 
democratic thing happening and sometimes you have to stop the video, because they start having conversations that’s 
more important than the video and it’s like shut down the video, let’s have our conversation.”(Lubna:20). 
Furthermore Darwish shared with us that Mosireen has supported the production and dissemination 
of the public-awareness campaign, “Kazeboon” or “Liars”. The campaign exposes military violence 
first and foremost through decentralised self-organisation and loose networking, which has resulted 
in independent local self-organised public video-screenings of military violence by Egyptian youth 
across Egypt. Yet in the spring of 2012, Mosireen suggests a turn in the subject in need for 
documentation, exposure and rearticulation. Lubna shared with us that although the Egyptian state 
media is narrow in its public discourse, she finds that there is no longer a need to rearticulate the 
illegitimacy of the SCAF (Lubna:19). When we observed Cinema Al-Tahrir they did not screen any 
recent acts of military violence committed against protesters. Instead they drew attention to a 
historically rooted yet excluded socio-economic issue: the lack of dignified working conditions in 
Egypt. Mosireen does so by screening a video called “Our right to honourable work” illuminating 
the unjust conditions and the protesting of a group of workers in Egypt. Along the lines of the anti-
capitalist discourse, which Keizer expressed, Lubna aspires to redirect the gaze of the media 
towards socio-economic issues caused by the Egyptian state system: 
“The propaganda campaign that the government are doing, saying that; Okay, now! We all have to work hard, it’s not 
time to watch films, ‘cause we have Egypt involved and stuff like that, so poor workers, who are going on strike, telling 
them they are not following, they are not supporting Egypt. It’s not for public good.” (Lubna:23) 
According to Darwish the public opinion now needs to be directed towards “social injustice”, 
towards the idea that: “the army is lying about the economy (…) the army is actually in support of 
this really neo-liberal agenda, we have in the country. (…) It’s more about showing like the army as 
liars and as thieves” (Lubna:20). Yet a worry raised by the Revolutionaries, including Darwish, is 
whether the official labelling of civil disobedience with terms like “thuggery” and “foreign 
espionage” has made it easy for the general public to disassociate itself from the injustice 
committed by the military and thereby ignore the fact that they should be held accountable.46 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Associate Director of the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Nancy Messieh, for instance 
articulates the discourse of the Egyptian campaign “No Military Trials” in an article in which the state 
discourse on civil disobedience is debated. Messieh, Nancy (16-07-2012): Public Opinion Plays Witness to Egypt’s 
Military Trials. Atlantic Council. Egypt Source. Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. 
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Mosireen is according to Darwish struggling to cope with the pressure of state media. She draws 
attention to how national television campaigns have made any rearticulation of the state discourse 
an act of “thuggery” or a part of “the foreign agenda”47: “…it’s just like months, almost a year and a 
half of propaganda campaign (…) it means that people see it on TV every day, every day, every day 
and people believe in it and it makes this work very hard.” (Dariwsh:16).  
Through the dissemination of videos and photos into Egypt’s public spaces, Mosireen, and the 
photojournalists aspire like the street artists to disrupt and rearticulate not only state media and the 
discourse of the SCAF, but also the influence these have on the Egyptian people. In contrast to the 
civil society activism of Mesaha, these acts of rearticulation are not based on international or state-
sponsored discourses. They are rather discourses highly rooted in the common collective memory of 
the Egyptian people. They are polarising the difference between the Egyptian army and the 
Revolutionaries without giving in to the authoritarian structures of the Egyptian state. In order to 
achieve the tactical goal of a clear statement for popular identification, these street and media 
activists are enforcing the antagonism either through a reminder of the victims of and the mourning 
tied to military violence of the Egyptian regime or through the exposure of real life dramas of 
military brutality or socio-economic state repression. In spite of the differences between their means 
of cultural activisms and the respective strengths and limitations of these means, we shall in the 
next chapter argue that “transparency” signifies their spectacles. We shall argue that in order to 
create identification, build trust and promote socio-political change, Cairo’s new cultural-political 
players are by means of “contextually rooted” spectacles strongly guiding the Egyptian people 
towards a redefinition of the discourse on civil and political freedoms as only “western” and 
necessarily contrasting national security and unity. But before moving on to the next chapter, we 
illuminate the consequences of enforcing the antagonism between the SCAF, the Egyptian military 
and the Revolutionaries, whereby a temporary closure of possibilities for identification are excluded 
from Egypt’s public realm.     
Confined to the identity of the Revolutionaries? 
Cairo’s new cultural-political players express how they do not want to be confined to the identity of 
the Revolutionaries, but despite their efforts not to, they are obviously struggling. In this paragraph 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Hill, Jess (15-02-2012): Will Egypt’s Workers Rise Up Again?.The Global Mail. http://www. theglobalmail.org/ 
feature/will-egypts-workers-rise-up-again/60/. Read: 06-02-2013. 
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we show how the distinction between public self-expression and representation for the sake of itself 
and for the sake of socio-political transformation is blurred as public self-expression and ownership 
signify the popular identity of the Revolutionaries. And lastly how Cairo’s new cultural-political 
players aspire to go beyond the identity and discourse of the Revolutionaries.  
Keizer distances himself from “the political activist” by saying: “I don’t want to be labelled as a 
political person. So what happens, when the revolution is over? It means I have nothing to do or 
create?” (Keizer:4). The graffitist, Sad Panda, likewise feels caught by the discourse of 
Revolutionaries:	  
“…it’s just about how everybody expresses themselves in a way or another. (…) when people relate what I do to 
politics or to the current situation here in Egypt, it’s actually bullshit, because I have been doing this way before the 
revolution, so it’s just just sad, just writing on the wall…” (Sad Panda:2).  
Both Keizer and Sad Panda are positioned contrary to how they aspire by the Egyptian public due to 
the broader popular discourse on the revolutionary “graffiti artist”. Keizer explained to us how he 
tries to avoid this public discursive fixation of him by not exclusively focusing on the demands of 
the Revolutionaries. Instead he aspires to diversify his street art: “A lot of artists these days are 
investigating too much energy into the political field, so I target so many other issues like women’s 
rights, disabled people.” (Keizer:4). Keizer is not only interested in fighting for the demands of “the 
ongoing revolution”, because this fixation excludes other issues of equal importance to him.  
The discourse of the Revolutionaries is, as Darwish terms it, “fresh” referring to the momentum of 
“the revolution”. Yet a preoccupation with “new” discourses or practises such as “new” media or 
“the latest” demands may, according to Associate Professor at the University of Oslo, Albrecht 
Hofheinz, rather smoothen and even obscure the public space needed for other equally important 
issues to be raised. Earlier in reference to Hoodf, we drew attention to how an obsession with “the 
new” technologies and the speeded online sense of democracy has lead to a culture of accelerated 
online activism among the Revolutionaries, which is at risk of further inducing exclusion and 
elitism rather than participatory democracy (Hoofd 2012:12). With insights into Arab culture and 
Arab internet use, Hofheinz, however, points out that the horizon of understanding gets limited by a 
preoccupation with “the new” and a preoccupation with “the political” within the public realm. This 
preoccupation thus moves the focus away from long-term developments, reaching far back into 
history, as well as private and personal dynamics simultaneously at stake (Hofheinz 2011:1423). 
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Enforcing the antagonism between the SCAF and the Revolutionaries also enforces a closure of the 
discourses tied to these identities. The Revolutionaries have been confined to “the political” in the 
sense that the identity is constantly generated in opposition to Egypt’s political elite and the tied 
demands to it. Senior associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program, Marina Ottaway, noticed a 
tendency within Egypt’s political field to neutralise the differences between the SCAF and the 
military. This, according to Ottaway, rather simplified and blurred the fact that there is no way to 
determine in this transitional period whether the SCAF speaks for itself or for the entire military.48 
Ottaway rather finds that the SCAF appears uneasy in its role as substitute president, but, 
nevertheless, maintains stability and continuity and therefore is not an obstacle to democratisation. 
Although Cairo’s new cultural-political players are subjected to the discourse of the 
Revolutionaries, their activism cannot be confined to the articulation of a discourse against the 
SCAF or the Egyptian military. On the contrary, they are concerned with acts of rearticulation or 
disruption, which amplify excluded realities of injustice rooted in the Egyptian history and present. 
Furthermore from a discourse theoretical perspective, the closure of discourses inevitably means to 
gain hegemony, although the Egyptian society is not constituted by the binary of the antagonism 
(Jørgensen & Philips 2002:36). This illuminates a dilemma, which prevails within cultural activism 
according to Duncombe. The dilemma is embedded in the question of whether it is possible to 
create a strong message without excluding or losing the diversity of possible participants needed for 
a message to be effective (Duncombe 2007:135). Duncombe for instance argues that: “If spectacles 
are to be politically useful, they have to be directed towards a political goal. If they are to 
communicate a strong message, they need to be fashioned into a coherent brand.”(Duncombe 
2007:135). Mosireen has managed as one of the few to fashion a coherent brand rearticulating local 
and global discourses on Egypt in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution.49 The Anglophone 
newspaper “Daily News Egypt” for instance wrote about Mosireen: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ottaway, Marina (03-11-2011): Egypt’s democracy: Between the military, Islamists, and illiberal democrats. The 
Carnegie Endowment. http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/03/egypt-s-democracy-between-military-islamists-and-
illiberal-democrats/6m0w. Read: 02-02-2013.  
49 Mosireen is referred to in a number of articles in local, regional and global news outlets from Egypt Independent to 
Aljazeera and the Guardian. Furthermore the collective have had their videos screened on Aljazeera. Stuhr-Rommereim, 
Helen (29-12-2011): A year in review: When history becomes art. Egypt Independent. 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/year-review-when-history-becomes-art. Read: 15-04-2012. Hill, Evan (12-12-
2012): Egypt's opposition struggles to unite. Al Jazeera English. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth /features/ 
2012/12/2012121111559813826.html. Read: 10-01-2013. Shenker, Jack (11-11-2011): Protesters prepare for global 
day of action against Egypt's military junta. The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/11/global-
protests-egypt-military-junta. Read: 29-01-2013.    
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“Taking citizen journalism to a new level, Mosireen has made a name for itself through its dedication to the Egyptian 
revolution, its commitment to empowering citizens through media, and its use of cinema as a means to subvert political 
systems.”50 
The Mosireen collective has managed to build trust, encourage participation and fashion a coherent 
brand, but the media collective is still caught in the very same dilemma of being fully subjected to 
the identity of the Revolutionaries, which Keizer is trying to avoid. Their efforts are first and 
foremost confined to those, who already define themselves as Revolutionaries and who aspire to 
make “revolutionary action” as Darwish terms it: 
“I mean, for example everything that has to do with revolutionary action, people trust us, because they have seen us 
before. They know what, who are, what we did before and people create trust (…) so when it comes to the 
revolutionaries, it’s not hard for us, but when it comes to somewhere, where it’s not revolutionary trying to do 
something, it’s very hard, and sometimes you have to fight and sometimes you have to explain to people and sometimes 
you have to run.”(Lubna:17).  
Darwish emphasises that Mosireen for instance rely on revolutionary “committees”, when they tour 
outside Cairo. Yet what has proven to be most effective according to Darwish is decentralised self-
organisation and loose networking that facilitate independent local and self-organised public video-
screenings. These are as Darwish terms it more “spontaneous slash organic” (Darwish:18). In the 
paragraph on “the multiple and contradictory discourses on the Egyptian activist” we illuminated 
that our informants are well aware of the need not just to go beyond class divisions within Cairo, 
but also beyond Egypt’s populous capital in order to facilitate popular processes of socio-political 
transformation. We also noted previously that this was pursued through a pre-figurative form of 
politics, including participatory and non-hierarchical forms of individualised and loose participation 
in activist spaces and networks. Yet as our findings on each of the activisms show, these 
organisational practises are pursued differently depending on whether the activism in question is 
collective or individual. Keizer, for instance embraces his independence and individualised activism 
as counter-advertiser as he aims to disrupt the wealthy areas rather than the barometer art of 
Mohammad Mahmoud Street. He finds that this segment is particularly disconnected from “the 
revolution” and therefore he aspires to disrupt those “…people that have been inconvenienced by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 El Adl, Omar (05-02-2013): Mosireen teaches citizen journalism in Nag Hammadi. Daily News Egypt. 
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/05/mosireen-teaches-citizen-journalism-in-nag-hammadi/. Read:05-02-2013.  
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the revolution, because they have invested interest in the old regime. So those people who are over-
fed, over-paid, over-indulged, over-everything, you know.” (Keizer:10).  
In the following chapter, we discuss the potential of Cairo’s new “cultural activisms” to reach out to 
the Egyptian society at large. We do this not by considering various ways of decentralised forms of 
organisation, but in terms of creating popular identification through cultural activist spectacles 
aiming to facilitate socio-political transformation processes. In other words, we now term Cairo’s 
new street art activism and media activism “cultural activism” in correspondence to the definition of 
Firat and Kuryel. More precisely, we draw particular attention to the murals of the Port Said martyrs 
by the network of graffiti artists and Mosireen’s video on protesting workers. We do this in order to 
not only determine what makes these spectacles, spectacles of transparency and popular 
identification, but also to question further whether these spectacles challenge the binary of the 
“authentic” Egyptian identity and the corrupting western influences. This binary has justified 
continuous harassment of human rights NGOs and the denial of human rights of Egyptian citizens 
also in the transitional period.  
Before moving on to the next chapter, we would like to make some recapitulating remarks. Firat 
and Kuryel’s definition of cultural activism focuses on an outright form of hegemonic 
rearticulation. We found this definition to overlook the fact that Cairo’s new cultural-political 
players are curtailed by hegemonic projects such as the very identity of the Revolutionaries as well 
as restricting and censoring state and society mechanisms. They are also implicated in socio-
economic exclusion through acts of neo-liberal complicity or because of a dependency on new 
media in the attempt to reach out to the average Egyptian. However, rather than taking a point of 
departure in the limitations of Firat & Kuryel’s simplified definition of global cultural activism, we 
may conclude that these limitations actually explain what signifies Cairo’s new activism in Egypt’s 
transitional period. Based on the previous analysis of Cairo’s new activisms, we discovered a co-
existence between a civil society activism, still masked by a state-sponsored apolitical discourse, 
and more forwardly rearticulating invention-based activisms, corresponding to a global definition of 
“cultural activism”. We would argue that this co-existence of approaches to “cultural activism” and 
the enclosed constraints and forms of complicity is particularly important to understand, as it 
signifies Cairo’s new activisms and what is at stake in Egypt’s transitional period.       
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Spectacular struggles for a new Egyptian Identity 
In this final chapter of our thesis, we zoom out from the three activisms, outlined in the previous 
chapter, and in on the cultural activist spectacles of the Port Said Murals and the video by Mosireen 
about precarity in Egypt. We do that in order to question these spectacles’ potential for reaching out 
and creating identification among the Egyptian society at large. The relation between the state and 
Cairo’s new cultural-political players is a struggle over the meaning and course of “the revolution”, 
in which both the Revolutionaries and the state orchestrate rearticulating interventions. Yet 
understanding them as public rearticulations does neither explain what lies behind nor which 
transformative power they carry with them. According to Duncombe cultural activism has to 
respond to the dreams and desires of ordinary people, because a spectacle demands popular 
identification for it to become effective and powerful (Duncombe 2007:158). Cairo’s new cultural-
political players identify themselves with the revolutionary youth movement and only for the sake 
of at least limited progress with the liberal representatives of formal politics. But what about their 
cultural activist spectacles, whose dreams and desires are they targeting? Or in other words, whose 
frustrations and ideas of liberation are at the centre of their spectacles in order for them to facilitate 
identification and action for socio-political change? In order to demonstrate how Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players attempt to create popular identification, we draw on our previous findings 
and illuminate the acts of disruption performed by the graffiti artists and the video activists, which 
we define as cultural activism in contrast to the civil society activism performed by Mesaha. Firstly 
we illuminate how Cairo’s new cultural-political players in particular aim to build trust and 
encourage credibility in their quest for broader identification, which actually make them practice a 
cultural activism of “transparency”. Secondly we therefore elaborate on the Port Said Murals by the 
graffiti artists and the video “Our Right to Honourable Work” by Mosireen, as two types of 
“transparent” disruptions or cultural activist spectacles. As we shall show, we discovered that the 
reasons for this quest for “transparent” spectacles for popular identification needs to be understood 
within “the logics” of the Egyptian cultural-politics and cannot be explained by discourse theory or 
theories of cultural activism. We discovered that these acts of “transparent” disruption amplify 
excluded realities of tremendous transformative power in the Egyptian context in the wake of the 
25th of January Revolution.  
	  
	  Creative	  struggles	  for	  Tahrir	  	  
80	  
	  
This finally makes us question whether Cairo’s new cultural activists with their spectacles are able 
to deconstruct and rearticulate the binary or contradiction, which during the rule of Mubarak had 
been enforced between “Egyptian nationality” and “Western values of democracy”? Or whether 
they end up reproducing the binary of monolithic representations of Egyptian culture in contrast to 
struggles for civil rights and liberties? Yet as we shall show Cairo’s new cultural political players 
aspire to go beyond self-representation and amplify excluded realities of political power. We shall 
argue that they manage to deconstruct the aforementioned binary and push for change through 
powerful public discourses, but that they are still continuously designated a position within the 
foreign agenda discourse linking them to corrupted and untrustworthy foreign values and 
conspiratorial political agendas. This makes them particularly vulnerable to the proposition of being 
in “an illusion of autonomy” in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution, in which we shall take a 
point of departure in the following.  
The illusion of autonomy 
The relation between the Egyptian state and Cairo’s cultural-political players may have experienced 
a rupture in the wake of 25th of January Revolution, which has the potential to redefine this relation. 
In the beginning of January 2012 the emergency law was partially lifted and around 3000 political 
prisoners were released from state prison on the one-year anniversary of the anti-Mubarak revolt.51 
Yet state practises under the SCAF were rather similar to the Mubarak regime’s, which meant that 
cultural-political players continued to be detained, interrogated and released on bail for criticising 
the SCAF or the Egyptian government, who continued to perceive and act on such criticism as cases 
of “thuggery”.52 This invigorates the question of whether any change is encountered at all by the 
Egyptian state in the wake of 25th of January Revolution and whether Cairo’s new cultural-political 
players in spite of this are able to enforce any? Was for instance the release of political prisoners a 
gesture of goodwill or containment on behalf of the state? In spite of the nascent progression within 
formal politics, Egyptians are acting on as well as they are caught in historically ingrained state and 
society relations from authoritarian state practices and moralising discourses, which both reduce 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Stork, Joe  (25-01-2012): Egypt: Exceptions to Ending Emergency Law Invite Abuse - Immediately Free Emergency Law Detainees, 
Transfer Cases to Regular Courts. Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/24/egypt-exceptions-
ending-emergency-law-invite-abuse. Read: 20-03-2013.  
Daily News Egypt (25-01-2012): Egypt releases prisoners on revolt anniversary. Daily News Egypt 
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/01/25/egypt-releases-prisoners-on-revolt-anniversary/. Read: 19-03-2013. 
52 Stork, Joe (10-09-2011): Egypt: Retry or Free 12,000 After Unfair Military Trials - Civilians Tried Since February Exceed Total 
Under Mubarak. Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/10/egypt-retry-or-free-12000-after-unfair-
military-trials. Read: 15-02-2012. 
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and fuel any newfound motivation for subjective and collective action for socio-political change. 
Before we discuss the capacity of Cairo’s new cultural-political players to reach out and create 
identification among the Egyptian population at large, we therefore begin with an elaboration of 
those state practices and moralising discourses of the Egyptian society that has imposed censorship 
on Cairo’s cultural-political players. Before the 25th of January Revolution these have caused 
Mehrez to describe segments of Egypt’s cultural-political players as lost in “an illusion of 
autonomy”.  
Before the 25th of January Revolution Mehrez found that Cairo’s cultural-political players at times 
had a tendency to practice a cultural activism, which was marked by “an illusion of autonomy” 
(Mehrez 2010:222). Mehrez writes that already during the rule of Mubarak an expansion of 
cultural-political imagination and creativity took place. This, however, at times resulted in work by 
Cairo’s cultural-political players disregarding hegemony seeking discourses on the Egyptian 
national identity. A hegemonic discourse on Egyptian culture and identity was according to Mehrez 
enforced by the state in response to dominant conservative and often religious forces in the 
Egyptian society, which she terms “street censorship” (raqabat al-shari’)53 (Mehrez 2010:222). The 
term “street censorship” was actually invented by the cultural players themselves to describe the 
interventions by non-state actors: “…to constrain and contaminate the intrinsic values of the 
cultural field, by imposing conservative religious ones on the secular players.”(Mehrez in reference 
to Jaquemond 2010:7). The interference of non-state actors or third parties sought according to 
Mehrez the authority of censors at the margin of the Egyptian legal system, which they bypassed in 
reference to superior, moral or religious norms (Mehrez 2010:211). Although street censorship was 
a non-state practice of judgment, it occasionally resulted in state-orchestrated intimidations, surprise 
raids and searches by security forces (Mehrez 2010:221). Both Mehrez and Pratt among others, 
whom we referred to in our theoretical chapter, write about Egypt’s cultural-political players and 
their struggles to reproduce Egyptian national identity as authentic and uncorrupted by western 
influences in a context of increased social and economic globalisation. Pratt argues that the failure 
not to deconstruct the contradiction between “Egypt” and “the West” within the Egyptian public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Professor of Arabic Literature, Richard Jaquemonde has written an academic article on “The Shifting Limits of the 
Sayable in Egyptian Fiction”, which Mehrez draws on in order to explain the phenomenon of “street censorship” as a 
part of the cultural-political dynamics between the state and the cultural players in Egypt. Jacquemond, Richard (2004): 
The Shifting Limits of the Sayable in Egyptian Fiction. The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies. 
http://www.arabworldbooks.com/Readers2006/articles/jacquemond_fiction.htm. Read: 05-03-2012.  
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space hampers processes of liberation. The binary rather enforces a conflict between “western” 
liberation practises, such as the struggles for human rights, and a public consensus about Egyptian 
culture as necessarily “authentic” if uncorrupted by western influence (Pratt 2005:69). If cultural-
political players for instance threatened the binary between opposing “western” and “Egyptian” 
value systems, state regulations could leave them fragmented and disarmed due to successful 
strategies of polarisation (Mehrez 2010:20). As Mehrez notes, the Egyptian state had during the 
years of Mubarak given up Egypt’s public space to religious authorities and communities, Islamic 
as Coptic, and other non-state actors allowing them to censor cultural-political work, but it had not 
done so without subordinating the censoring practices in relation to the state that maintained its 
hegemonic power position (Mehrez 2010:11). In the wake of the 18 days the country’s art world 
started to shake off decades of repression and cloaking procedures of hiding their politics in thick 
layers of allegory and began more openly to express “…deep-seated social problems such as sexual 
frustration, poverty and corruption, subjects long off limits under former president Hosni Mubarak” 
1. The Islamist forces, however, consisting of the MB and the Salafis, have simoultanously emerged 
as major power brokers in post-revolutionary Egypt. This includes their conservative interpretation 
of Islam, which continues to influence and impose moral regulations on Cairo’s cultural political 
players. State and society censorship are in other words remarkably similar in the wake of the 25th 
of January Revolution, yet challenged. As illuminated in the first part of our theoretical chapter, the 
Egyptian state deemed the “western” or “foreign” discourse performed by “foreign” human rights 
NGOs a threat to the Egyptian national unity and security and on this basis justified raids by 
Egypt’s Security Forces. An accelerated control of civil society and civil liberties is in other words 
still present in Egypt even in the wake of the 18 days. An accelerated control of civil society and 
civil liberties was according to Mehrez closely connected to the rather cosmetic and contradictory 
political state practices. These were partly depending on an authentic Egyptian image in clear 
opposition to Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood and partly the official media as well as the 
cultural scene to articulate the Egyptian state’s “modern” and “secular” hegemonic discourse in 
clear opposition to the western values and liberation discourses. When cultural political players in 
other words articulate a discourse of liberation on freedom and human rights, they are at risk partly 
of getting attacked by state agents for their “foreignness” and partly at risk of reproducing the 
binary and opposition between “western values” and “Egyptian culture”, if representations are not 
carefully rooted in an Egyptian context. The state initiative to appropriate change through neoliberal 
policies for global consumption, as illuminated by Mehrez and Elychar among others, and 
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simultaneously discipline the culturally corrupting western discourses on behalf of street censorship 
give reason for professor of sociology, Asef Bayat, to call the Egyptian state a remarkable 
“seculareligious” blend of concession and control (Bayat in Khalaf 2011:60). The 25th of January 
Revolution is perceived as breaking with the barrier of fear for political expression, experimental 
freedom and newfound public ownership. Although the Egyptian government for instance has 
rejected some World Bank loans after the 25th of January Revolution and multiple forms of grass-
roots activism have arisen, state practises of accelerated civil society control are obviously not 
entirely dropped. From this perspective mobilising identities for liberation like in the case of the 
three activisms has to be understood in relation to an Egyptian state system, which has functioned to 
keep “liberation” a superficial and punishable endeavour and still does even though it may have 
begun its own transition. Pratt argues that a multi-party systems will not change the fact that 
monolithic representations of Egyptian national culture needs to be challenged in order to break 
with justifications of the binary and open up for processes of pluralism, diversity and inclusiveness 
in the public realm (Pratt 2005:86). As we approach the deconstruction of the Port Said Murals and 
Mosireen’s video on dignified working conditions in Egypt, we look into the capacity of these 
spectacles to redefine the binary in their quest to create identification and change and not get lost in 
the euphoria of liberation or a need to accommodate spectacles to an uncorrupted Egyptian culture. 
However, first we look into why Cairo’s new cultural-political players may still need to construct a 
subtle balance between the binaries in their public spectacles in order to achieve influence. Now we 
zoom in on how Cairo’s new cultural-political players in an environment of distrust and accusations 
of “foreignness” try to mobilise identities for liberation, while struggling to escape “the foreign 
agenda discourse”, which they come to represent.  
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The rooted distrust and the power of transparent spectacles 	  
The foreign agenda discourse represents a big, if not the biggest, challenge for Cairo’s new cultural-
political players as they engage in their activist endeavours to create identification for socio-
political change. Before turning our attention to the Port Said murals and Mosireen’s video on 
honourable work in Egypt, we would like to clarify what makes the foreign agenda discourse so 
intrusive and challenging for Cairo’s cultural-political players, who we believe subsequently try to 
cope with it through “transparent” spectacles. Many of our informants express how they encounter 
various degrees of distrust and reservation from the Egyptian people, which is linked to their 
“foreignness” or the “foreignness” of their activism. Keizer for instance expresses that: “Some 
people thought I was a German street artist doing graffiti in Cairo, because of my name and then 
people started attacking me saying that I am predominately western.” (Keizer:1). Yet it is not just a 
question of applying a global vocabulary. As Darwish reveals her mere appearance may be a 
decisive factor as well: “…sometimes, I mean, I chose personally not to go some places [for 
Mosireen’s public screenings], because my presence may challenge the screening.” (Darwish:18). 
Based on our informants’ accounts, Cairo’s new cultural-political players are often “caught” inside 
the foreign agenda discourse. Within this discourse they come to represent the unreliable and 
untrustworthy foreign agenda. Cultural activism, which does not rely on the Internet, is according 
Sheshtawy the best way to cope with the environment of distrust: 
“…pictures are the best way to do it. It is like with Kazeboon54 and the message of them, if you know them. They reach 
people without Internet. I have a lot of things featured in Kazeboon. This is my way of getting my message out there, so 
I don’t always go out and talk to people, because Egyptians they don’t trust you, if they don’t know you. They will 
think you are a liar, so the best way to do it is to show them.” (Sheshtawy:16).  
Cairo’s new cultural-political players are not just designated a position within the foreign agenda 
discourse, they also articulate a similar concern among themselves about invading foreign agendas, 
which makes up a part of producing the discourse. Keizer for instance is highly concerned about 
“non-progressive” foreign agendas, which is revealed in his disapproval and rejection of an 
opportunity to be in an article for the Times Magazine:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 We mentioned “Kazeboon” in the previous paragraphs on Egypt’s new photo and video activism (page 69).  
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“…their article was not producing any kind of harmony or progressive sense, but it was more about how Christians in 
Egypt are being killed and slaughtered and that the Islamists are, you know, rivalries and blood everywhere and they 
compared the Muslims to the Nazis back in Nazi...this bitch Dutch journalist (...) She is a white conservative pro-
Zionist” (Keizer:19).	  
Keizer is here very explicit about which foreign agendas, he finds too intrusive and which he is 
trying to resist. They are ranging from western or European discourses of islamofobia, Israeli 
orthodoxy and discriminative stereotyping. Like this Cairo’s new cultural-political players are 
struggling to resist intrusive “foreign agendas” as well as they are struggling not to represent the 
foreign agenda discourse themselves. The photo and video activists for instance shared with us that 
it is not easy to collect footage outside the clashes, because observant behaviour is often fuelling 
suspicion: “…usually they [the Egyptian people] think we belong to another country (…) many of 
us are all the time considered to be like a reporter, therefore a spy, therefore paid by the CIA” 
(Lubna:16). Building trust is therefore to our informants in general an essential practice to 
disembody the highly intrusive discourse of the foreign agenda and to achieve influence in an 
environment of widespread distrust. Among Cairo’s new cultural-political players a discourse on 
the importance of building trust becomes a starting point for establishing an NGO like Mesaha and 
for involving more people in anti-authoritarian efforts like the activism of Mosireen. The co-
founder of Mesaha, Yassein, told us that in particularly the clashes on Mouhammed Mahmud street 
destabilised the relation between Mesaha and its neighbours (Yassein:7). In terms of establishing 
credibility both Darwish and the photo activists express that the state’s implementation of the 
foreign agenda discourse through state media hampers their work and makes it “very hard” 
(Darwish:16, Sheshtawy:16). 
The discourse of the SCAF: The foreign bogeyman and the outlawing of thuggery 
The Australian Middle East correspondent, Jess Hill, terms in an article for The Global Mail the 
play on the “foreign bogeyman” within state media “tedious”. However, this approach to the foreign 
agenda discourse undermines the struggles of our informants, on whose work the state’s scare 
campaigns has a tremendous impact. The partial lift of the emergency law and a continuation of 
scare campaigns indicate that the SCAF is not hesitant to deem counter-hegemonic initiatives acts 
of thuggery or foreign conspiracy. As illuminated in the paragraphs on media activism, a scare 
campaign was launched on national television by the state in the wake of the 25th of January 
Revolution. In the campaign the military generals warn Egyptians of the conspiratorial “foreign 
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hand”, which is organising “…conspiracies hatched against the homeland … whose aim is to topple 
the state itself so that chaos reigns and destruction spreads.”55 The discourse of the Egyptian state 
media enforces resistance towards civil disobedience and in particular anti-military disobedience 
among the Egyptian population, which is looked upon as “a part of a plot to overthrow the state”. 56  
In the wake of the 25th of January Revolution the foreign agenda discourse and a discourse on 
thuggery represent the state’s most powerful means of hegemonic intervention. These discourses 
corner rooted cosmopolitans like our informants and put them greater risk of being deemed thugs. 
In Egypt the term “thug” or “baltagi” is not directly associated with the foreign agenda discourse. It 
has a long history, in which the government has tied it to “social terrorism” with a clear reference to 
the Islamic opposition. “Social baltagi” has primarily since the 90s referred to the violent behaviour 
that erupted between government agents and young men in popular quarters.57 Within legal 
regulations in the late 90s “thuggery” was deemed “antisocial and threatening” and punishable with 
stiff penalties.58 As Associate Professor of Anthropology, Farha Ghannam, notes these legal 
regulations granted security forces extensive powers to: “…stop, search, question, and detain 
individuals suspected of threatening order and security” (Ghannam 2012:34). Ghannam’s fieldwork 
in a low-income neighbourhood in Cairo shows how the discourse on “baltagi” shapes 
understandings of “the ongoing revolution” within the Egyptian public, in which “baltagi” usually 
refers to a man, who uses violence to impose his own will on others or to further his own personal 
interests (Ghannam 2012:32). Yet as later debated in an article by the state-sponsored traditional 
news outlet, Ahram Online, the term “thug” may actually have lost all meaning a year after the 18 
days due to the wide, frequent and often conflicting use of it. The term is namely not only applied in 
reference to civil disobedience, but also in reference to acts of police violence.59 We as well as other 
researchers noticed how “conspiratorial” thinking dominated both the Egyptian military’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Hill, Jess (15-02-2012): Will Egypt’s workers rise up again? The Global Mail. http://www.theglobalmail.org/feature/ 
will-egypts-workers-rise-up-again/60/. Read: 11-02-2013. 
56 Hill, Jess (15-02-2012): Will Egypt’s workers rise up again? The Global Mail. http://www.theglobalmail.org/feature/ 
will-egypts-workers-rise-up-again/60/. Read: 11-02-2013.  
57 The concept of “Baltagi” dates back to the Ottomans as Ghannam notes. At that time it was associated with a group 
of men who were equipped with knives and axes and charged with protecting and serving the sultan and his family 
(Ghannam 2012:34 in reference to Al-Masry al-Youm 2011: Baltagiyya between the Past and the Present. Al-Masry al-
Youm, July 19: 12.). 
58 Ghannam (2012:34) here draws on the research of professor Salwa Ismail and her book “Political Life in Cairo’s New 
Quarters: Encountering the Everyday State” from 2006. 
59 Shukrallah, Salma (07-06-2011): Who are Egypt's thugs? Ahram Online. http://english.ahram.org.eg/News 
Content/1/64/15715/Egypt/Politics-/Who-are-Egypts-thugs-.aspx. Read: 15-03-2012. Lindsay, Ursula (03-13-2011): 
First Draft of History - Al-Ahram finds a new voice for a new Egypt. The Daily Beast. http://www.thedailybeast.com/ 
newsweek/2011/03/13/first-draft-of-history.html. Read: 21-02-2013. 
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perception on the Revolutionaries as well as the other way around.60 In particularly the Port Said 
killings, of which the Port Said murals are a direct consequence, remains an unsolved mystery of 
divergent opinions between Revolutionaries and the Egyptian state, on who actually were the 
“thugs” causing the killings and therefore must take the responsible. Although “baltagi” may be 
added various conflicting meanings, the state usage and implementation of the term is far from 
losing its hegemonic meaning to those engaged in cultural activism, including Cairo’s new cultural-
political players. Furthermore political scientist Ahmed Badawi argues that one of the most 
powerful tools, which “unscrupulous” power holders have, is to discredit their critics by terming 
their counter-claims a conspiracy theory.61 The struggle to build trust, in spite of claims of foreign 
or local thuggery among Revolutionaries, makes not only “transparent” practices, but also 
“transparent” spectacles a key to achieve influence within media and street art activism, rather than 
an open spectacle of playful ambiguity or at least a minimum of ambiguity.  
Transparency as an activist tool in post-revolutionary Cairo 
Before we concentrate on a more in-depth analysis of the Port Said murals and Moriseen’s video 
about honourable rights, we now turn our attention towards the “transparency” of Cairo’s new 
cultural activism and clarify what we mean by “transparent” spectacles. Doncumbe defines the art 
of creating strong messages, the art of not excluding or losing the diversity of possible participants 
needed for a message to be effective. According to him, “transparency” is not only central to ensure 
the diversity of mass participation and non-hierarchical structures, but it is also important to portray 
the public reality in a way, in which people can relate to it and identify with it (Duncombe 
2007:151). Portraying an unaltered reality for public identification is of particular importance in 
Egypt, where multiple forms of exclusions have enforced apathy and political impotence. Photo 
activist, Mosaab El-Shamy shared with us that he for instance tries to avoid any editing of the 
pictures, he takes:   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 In an article for OpenDemocracy (A non-profit news agency, which publishes academic yet popular news articles) the 
research associate in political science, Ahmed Badawi, illuminates how a lack of evidence is not a justifiable reason to 
dismiss that the Port Said killings were not a state conspiracy. He furthermore shows how blaming others of 
conspiracies within politics is a powerful tool. Badawi, Ahmed (22-03-2012): Making sense of Egypt: Part One, in 
defence of conspiracy as a method. OpenDemocracy. http://www.opendemocracy.net/ahmed-badawi/making-sense-of-
egypt-part-one-in-defence-of-conspiracy-as-method Read:03-11-2012.  
61 Badawi, Ahmed (22-03-2012): Making sense of Egypt: Part One, in defence of conspiracy as a method. 
OpenDemocracy. http://www.opendemocracy.net/ahmed-badawi/making-sense-of-egypt-part-one-in-defence-of-
conspiracy-as-method Read:03-11-2012.	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“I think that what I mainly try to avoid whether during taking the photo or while editing the photo mainly during editing 
the photo is manipulation of the photo, because I think that is one read line where you should not go to unless you 
actually saying that this is a manipulated photo” (El-Shamy:10). 
El-Shamy aspires to amplify “the real drama” or the undeniable and unaltered reality. This is 
exactly what should be at the core of a cultural activist spectacle according to Duncombe. He finds 
that although cultural activists operate in spectacular ways, they first and foremost mobilise support 
for an excluded reality or issue, which needs to be amplified to gain political significance. For the 
photo activists, pictures of martyrs are proof of the violence committed by the Egyptian military, 
while for the graffiti artists, paintings are another kind of proof, which we shall explore in the 
following paragraph. Professor of Communication at Portland State University, David Ritchie, has 
done research on the use and interpretation of metaphors and stories in the creation of a popular and 
political public language. He argues that metaphors and stories play a significant part in the 
processes of creating socio-cultural transformation, because they activate perceptual stimulations 
and emotions and bring about changes in shared memories (Ritchie in Wagoner 2011:115). The 
unedited nature of the pictures or images in other words have a language of its own, which 
according to Sheshtawy is enough to create “a shock” and “a demand of reflection” needed to bring 
about a message (Sheshtawy:10). In spite of the aspiration to avoid editing and manipulation and 
achieve the total exposure of real life dramas during clashes for instance, the photo activists are not 
that different from the street art activists. They are all apart of constructing the public metaphors 
and stories, which become tied to excluded real life dramas. Furthermore they know what “chocks” 
or “touches” or what “provokes”. Sheshtawy for instance shared with us that:  
“…it is not easy to have a goal in mind when I am taking a picture, but sometimes I make a list. Like for instance today 
I want to take a picture of a soldier beating someone, a picture of a protester crying, I want to take a picture of a guy 
throwing teargas back at the army.” (Sheshtawy:9).   
From this perspective Sheshtawy and El-Shamy’s images are not transparent in the sense that they 
are not “staged”. Yet Duncombe finds the spectacles of cultural activism must be staged, because it 
is exactly through the staging that the spectacle functions to amplify the real issue or the excluded 
reality or identity. It needs to be staged according to Duncombe in order to dramatise and expose 
associations elusive to the mediated reality and to make visible the unseen reality (Duncombe 
2007:156). As El-Shamy points out: “In Muhammad Mahmoud it was images and videos, which 
completely chocked the whole society” (Mosaab:12). In other words capturing real life dramas has 
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the capacity to disrupt “the whole society” or at least those in touch with Egypt’s public media 
sphere. In the following we shall elaborate on why certain “transparent spectacles” of “real life 
dramas” in the shape of murals and video screenings have such a strong disruptive effect in Egypt. 
These are closely tied to a collective memory, as Ritchie noted, which adds certain meanings to 
these public spectacles for public identification and socio-political transformation.  
As we go into scrutiny with the discussion of whose liberation and frustrations Cairo’s cultural-
political players are attempting to amplify and fight for we take a point of departure in the murals 
on Muhammad Mahmud Street of the Port Said martyrs. As pointed out in the theoretical chapter, 
Elseewi argues that the 25th of January Revolution was a revolution of individual subjectivity, 
because Egyptians have arrived at the centre of their own narratives. A newfound individual 
subjectivity is evident within the accounts our informants, where self-determined individuals 
practice various forms of cultural activism independent from the state. In the following, we argue 
that Cairo’s new cultural-political players go beyond self-representation, because they themselves 
are not at the centre of the spectacles, they disseminate. At the centre are the excluded realities of 
the average Egyptian. The foreign agenda discourse and the state’s enforcement and 
implementation of it through scare campaigns on national television and raids by the Security 
Forces play a central role for the making and presentation of both the spectacle of the Port Said 
murals and the video about honourable work by Mosireen. This indicates how Cairo’s new cultural-
political players position themselves within Egypt’s new climate of cultural politics in which they 
seek, through transparent spectacles, to articulate Egypt’s new cultural identity. We argue that their 
spectacles do not reproduce the post-colonial or neo-liberal discourses of the Egyptian state or the 
global community nor do they reproduce any state-sponsored hegemonic discourse on Egyptian 
authenticity. Rather these spectacles reinvent a new discourse of Egyptian authenticity in their 
attempts to combat foreign dependence and neoliberal forces of social irresponsibility in response to 
the frustrations and dreams of liberation among the broader Egyptian population. By going into 
depth with the murals of the Port Said martyrs and the discourses connected to these we aim to 
show how the graffiti artists through the spectacles, they create, aspire to create identification for 
change. They do that by amplifying the reality of those on the margin of the Egyptian society, 
which is the majority of the Egyptian population, who in the wake of 25th of January Revolution are 
ascribed revolutionary power. In order to understand how the murals of the Port Said martyrs are 
more than a temporary intervention created to facilitate a process of mourning, but also a 
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rearticulation of the hegemonic discourses and visualisation of excluded realities we need to briefly 
take a closer look at the Port Said incident and the socio-economic and political issues related to it.  
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The Port Said incident and the murals of the Port Said 
martyrs  
The murals of the Port Said martyrs refer to a soccer game, which took place in the beginning of 
February 2012. It was held in the northern city of Port Said and despite the victory of the host team 
“al-Masry” (The Egyptian), their fans went on a rampage after the game resulting in the killing of 
74 people, mainly fans from the opposite team “al-Ahly” (The national).62 Among the Egyptian 
population a “conspiratorial” perception spread in the aftermath. This perception of the events 
claimed that the killings were planned and facilitated by the army and the police as an act of 
revenge on the soccer fans, because these fans had played an active and forceful part in the 
revolutionary events.63 From the point of view of the Revolutionaries this incident was in other 
words “a massacre”. The Egyptian soccer fans or ”the Ultras”, as they are also named, are one of 
Egypt’s largest civic groups. Furthermore they have emerged as the most militant opposition to the 
Egyptian military in the spring of 2012. The Ultras are supporters of the 25th of January Revolution, 
but already before the 25th they were involved in troubles and clashes with the Egyptian police. 
Protesting against police brutality was for instance one of the major reasons for the widespread 
participation in the early revolutionary events by the Ultras.64 To the Ultras, the Port Said event was 
not a lack of security, but an act of murder and an attempt to destabilise Egypt and undermine “the 
ongoing revolution”. One of the persuasive reasons65 for this interpretation was the fact that the 
incident took place exactly one year after the attack of camel-riding “thugs” during the 18 days of 
popular protests, a battle in which the Ultras were the strongest force against the pro-Mubarak battle 
riders.66 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Badawi, Ahmed (22-03-2012): Making sense of Egypt: Part One, in defense of conspiracy as a method. 
OpenDemocracy. http://www.opendemocracy.net/ahmed-badawi/making-sense-of-egypt-part-one-in-defence-of-
conspiracy-as-method. Read: 01-12-2012.   
63 Armbrust, Walter (01-02-2012): The Ambivalence of Martyrs and the Counter-revolution. Cultural Anthropology – 
Journal of the society for Cultural Anthropology. http://www.culanth.org/?q=node/491. Read: 25-11-2012.   
64 Badawi, Ahmed (22-03-2012): Making sense of Egypt: Part One, in defense of conspiracy as a method. 
OpenDemocracy. http://www.opendemocracy.net/ahmed-badawi/making-sense-of-egypt-part-one-in-defence-of-
conspiracy-as-method. Read: 01-12-2012.  
65 Fawzy, Seifeldin (02-18-2013): The Show Trial of Port Said. Jaddaliyya. 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/10249/the-show-trial-of-port-said. Read: 05-03-2013. 
66 As the Egyptian journalist, Yasmine Fathi, writes in an article for Ahram Online “the battle of the Camel” took place 
on the 2nd of February 2011 as pro-Mubarak camel riders invaded Tahrir Square and transformed peaceful protest into 
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During the 18 days of protests and in the following clashes it has been publicly well known in 
Egypt that the Ultras have been a persistent part of the frontline battle fighters. As earlier stated in 
reference to the research conducted by Dr. Lucie Ryzova about the clashes of the Mohammed 
Mahmud Street, the front line battle fighters, including the Ultras, are largely made up by men, 
among which large parts are often socially marginalised, unemployed and living in Cairo’s 
peripheral informal neighbourhoods.67 In many ways they have subsequently come to represent the 
struggle of the Revolutionaries or the average Egyptian and their demands of “Bread, liberty and 
human dignity”. This makes the name of “Ultras” a strong metaphor for the struggles of the 
Revolutionaries as well as the street art of Muhammed Mahmoud Street, which is why we take a 
point of departure in their Port Said murals and the fatal story of the Ultras. “The Ultras” were 
during our stay in Cairo simply written with a spray can on government buildings as a clear sign of 
public resistance. The young graffiti artist, Mostafa Tefa, shared with us that he along with other 
youngsters once wrote the name of the Ultras on a wall, while singing a song about what the police 
did to the soccer fans of Port Said, with the result of getting chased by the police (Tefa:2). Yet as 
Ryzova illuminates, the reality of the frontline fighters is rather different from that of Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players. Neither they nor Cairo’s new cultural-political players take an active part 
in the clashes against the Security Forces to acclaim abstract future-oriented dreams of democracy. 
Yet while the media activists are taking part in a symbolic battle of media representation, the 
participation of the frontline fighters needs to be understood as a way of getting payback and 
regaining “honour”: 
“For them, this is a battle that is not articulated as being "for something", but as a visceral fight to settle accounts with 
the security forces. For them, it is a battle of karama ["dignity"], but not of karama as a universal human honour. It is 
rather a historically and socially constituted honour that has a lot to do with how honour and masculinity were 
constructed locally. They were not fighting for any high-minded outcome such as democracy; in fact, most possibly 
they do not think anything "good" would come out of the fight. But the fight gave them back their dignity, even if 
temporarily.”68 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
violent clashes. The battle has been described as the event that “turned the tide” in the sense that the public opinion 
changed irreversibly against the Mubarak regime. Fathi, Yasmine  (02-02-2012): Egypt's 'Battle of the Camel': The 
day the tide turned. Ahram Online. http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/33470.aspx. Read: 08-03-2013.  
67 Ryzova, Lucie (29-11-2011): The battle of Cairo's Muhammad Mahmoud Street. Aljazeera. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/11/201111288494638419.html. Read: 02-12-2012. 
68 Ryzova, Lucie (29-11-2011): The battle of Cairo's Muhammad Mahmoud Street. Aljazeera. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/11/201111288494638419.html. Read: 02-12-2012. 
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The mistreatment of the lower-class marginalised frontline fighters, among which we find the 
Ultras, is an excluded reality by the Egyptian state and its loyal media outlets. In fact, as illuminated 
in the previous paragraph, the state-allied media has created a discourse on the frontline fighters as 
“thugs” due to their significant role in keeping “the revolution alive” through active frontline 
participation during clashes within the public space of Cairo.69 Yet on the day after the Port Said 
killings, clashes erupted in Downtown Cairo in particular on Muhammad Mahmud Street. While the 
fighting was taking place, the portraits of some of the Port Said martyrs were painted on the AUC 
wall on Muhammad Mahmud Street. 
Professor of Sociology at the American University of Cairo, Mona Abaza, asserts that it is not a 
coincidence that the murals of the Port Said martyrs were painted on the walls of the Mohammad 
Mahmud Street just next to the university. This particular street has according to Abaza become a 
contested public space in Cairo, where many clashes have taken place and many martyrs fallen 
(Abaza 2012:129). Cultural anthropologist, Walter Armbrust, further states how the images of the 
martyrs in the months after the fall of Mubarak have been the most effective symbol when 
attempting to express the discourse of the Revolutionaries, not only because the images of the 
martyrs within the Egyptian public raise the question of who killed them, but also because they 
embody intangible social and political tensions.70 Such tensions are attempted amplified by the 
graffiti artists, who have chosen to portray the Port Said martyrs or the late Ahlawy supporters. As 
shown the SCAF has created a discourse on the frontline fighters including the Ultras as thugs. 
Through public disruptions in the shape of the martyr drawings this discourse is attempted 
rearticulated as the martyrs are portrayed glorified with lively eyes and wings emphasising their role 
as the immortal protectors of “the ongoing revolution”. They become immortal in the sense that 
they are not erased from the collective memory of the Revolutionaries.71 In connection to the role of 
street art as capable of amplifying excluded realities or discourses the young graffiti artist, Ziad 
Amin, argues that: “…some drawings that make people think, see the reason of the problems. Not 
the revolution. Like we can use the walls to make our own revolution (…). We can send our 
message to people. The SCAF uses the newspapers.” (Amin:17). Thus it could be argued that the 
murals of the Port Said martyrs not only rearticulate protesters as saints and heroes of “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Ryzova, Lucie (29-11-2011): The battle of Cairo's Muhammad Mahmoud Street. Aljazeera. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/11/201111288494638419.html. Read: 02-12-2012. 
70 Armbrust, Walter (01-02-2012): The Ambivalence of Martyrs and the Counter-revolution. Cultural Anthropology – 
Journal of the society for Cultural Anthropology. http://www.culanth.org/?q=node/491. Read: 25-11-2012.    
71	  Cf. Appendix nr. 2: Enclosed our reader may find some photos from our stay of the murals of the Port Said Martyrs. 	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revolution” instead of thugs, but also disrupt the representations of an otherwise repressed and 
excluded reality of groups, which are socially, economically and politically marginalised. As the 
SCAF identifies the Ultras as thugs and as “the reason for the problems” of instability, the murals of 
the Port Said martyrs point to a different explanation, which goes further back than the 25th of 
January Revolution, namely to the regime’s historic use of violent repression. The street art 
network, which Amin and Tefa are a part of, thus create a discourse alternative to the discourse of 
the SCAF within the public space of Cairo by amplifying excluded realities or by attempting to give 
voice to those excluded and condemned within the state discourse. In the following paragraph we 
take a closer look at the transformative powers of the Port Said murals. 
An open and transparent spectacle of guiding metaphors  
By creating an open yet guided spectacle, the graffiti artists reinforce media attention and public 
awareness about the post-revolutionary and violent repression enforced by the Egyptian military. 
The creation of this public spectacle creates a space for dissent discussion, which has quickly 
transformed the murals of the martyrs into visual media representations circulated through various 
media outlets.72 The Mosireen member, Sherif, argues that in the wake of the 18 days Egypt’s 
public discourses are very often driven by their visual imagery:  
“I mean in the sequence of the resent events it has been driven by a lot of visual imagery. (…) if you look at the extent 
of the media coverage and photography and stuff, I think we are trying to take the often very sudden portrayals of the 
revolution with all these images. Probably images filmed during the 18 days from sit-ins and prayers and so on, I think 
there were a lot of completely or only aesthetic pictures, using aesthetics, politicizing aesthetics, taking what is beautiful 
but also ugly and injecting it with a content, a political content.” (Scherif:6).  
In connection to the use and role of image and discourses aiming to create social change, Ritchie 
argues that:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 News outlets and bloggers quickly circulated images of the Port Said murals for public salience. Below the reader 
find an example of each. One by the blogger “Suze in the City”, whom we were recommended to follow by several with 
regards to new street art in Cairo and one by the English-language news web site, AhramOnline, published by the 
Middle East’s oldest newspaper, Al-Ahram Establishment. Suze in the City. (19-02-2012):AUC and the Port Said 
Mural – A Personal Plea. http://suzeeinthecity.wordpress.com/2012/02/19/auc-and-the-port-said-mural-a-personal-
plea/. Read. 23-04-2012.   
El Shimi, Rowan (10-02-2012): PHOTO GALLERY: Graffiti artists spray paint Cairo in memory of Port Said Martyrs. 
AhramOnline. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/5/35/34126/Arts--Culture/Stage--Street/PHOTO-GALLERY-
Graffiti-artists-spray-paint-Cairo-i.aspx. Read. 20-04-2012.  
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“(…) the nonpropositional aspects of language use is as important as “content”, and that the perceptual, imaginative, 
emotional, and relational nuances of language use can reveal at least as much about the role of communication in social 
change as the propositional aspect” (Ritchie in Wagoner 2012:100). 
In other words Ritchie argues that the role of stories or narratives as well as emotionally-charged 
metaphors and images like the martyr murals are at least as powerful and influential in creating 
social change as more “rational” and “logical” arguments. He further argues that metaphors provide 
the basis for abstract conceptual thoughts (Ritchie in Wagoner 2012:102). Hence the use of 
metaphors and stories can open up for interpretation as well as they speak to people’s emotions. The 
Port Said murals did not just embrace a mourning process in solidarity with the mothers of the 
diseased, they spoke to a desire for governmental accountability within the Egyptian population as 
the emergency law had given Security Forces extended powers and therefore caused the killings to 
happen in the first place. The martyr murals are an open spectacle, where emphasis is put on the 
creation of a space for inclusive interpretation and thus mass participation within Egypt. But it was 
also a “transparent” spectacle clearly seeking national solidarity by drawing on a collective memory 
of the Port Said incident and years of governmental exclusion and violent repression. This spectacle 
is clearly directed at an Egyptian audience and at the core of the spectacle is a call for a just legal 
system, with which the Port Said incident could presumably have been avoided or the police could 
have been held accountable. We therefore argue that the Port Said murals represent a new Egyptian 
authenticity, in which the fight for civil rights and liberties is rooted in the Egyptian culture and 
identity and therefore not associated with “western” influence. Rather it challenges the binary 
division. However, as Duncombe notes with the creation of open spectacles there is a risk of 
fuelling misconceptions. Amro Ali, who is a Middle East analyst and PhD scholar, argues that 
elevating fallen protesters into figures of saint–like qualities also minimises and simplifies the 
dynamics of their lives, which led to their deaths.73 Like a static image of the revolutionary days at 
Tahrir Square, the Port Said murals may also create popular identification, but the murals may also 
enforce a one-dimensional interpretation of “the front line fighters” just as heroes in spite of the 
reasons behind their fate. Like many other places in Cairo, however, new layers of images were 
added to the walls of the Mohammed Mahmud Street during our stay and thus new spaces for 
interpreting the current events were continuously created enforcing an understanding of “the 
revolution” as an ongoing and multi-dimensional process. In the end of May 2012, the mothers of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Ali, Amro (05-06-2012): Saeeds of Revolution: De-Mythologizing Khaled Saeed. Jadaliyya. 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/5845/saeeds-of-revolution_de-mythologizing-khaled-saeed. Read: 28-02-2013.  
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the Port Said martyrs were added to the mural, on which they were displaying photos of their 
deceased sons.74 Yet again the murals were representing those suffering indirectly from violations 
of the Egyptian state. Text was also added to the mural right before the presidential elections in the 
end of May 2012. In large Arabic letters across and in between, the painted images of the martyrs 
and their mothers a sentence stated: “Forget the past and stay with the election”. According to 
Abaza, this was a quote of indirect sarcasm loaded with irony. She argues that the statement:  
“…attacks the entire procedure of the elections and those who believe that the elections could be the solution to 
circumventing the might of the military junta [the SCAF] (…) [these] words convey the idea that the elections are 
merely a bluff to divert citizens from the martyrs and the 12.000 people incarcerated under military rule” (Abaza 
2012:138).  
We would argue that the new layer of text had the potential to trigger a disruption of temporary 
confusion due to the element of sarcasm. Or as the young graffiti artists, Mostafa Tefa, who aspire 
to create further distrust in the government and more power to the dreams of the Revolutionaries 
states:  
“...yeah he75 doesn’t believe in the coming president. He means that that he will be under the SCAF and that is 
why…and that is why he will do graffiti and the people, who died ... and he will say the people, who died, we don’t 
have to let their dreams go away.” (Mostafa Tefa: 13).  
Due to the amount of street art in Down Town Cairo, the mere representation of martyrs was not 
new. We therefore found the sarcastic quote particularly interesting in its attempt to disrupt and 
create socio-political change by indirectly rearticulating a public state discourse drawing all 
attention towards the elections and thereby acting as though the death of protesters never happened 
or “their dreams” of revolutionary change never existed.  
Through the creation of the Port Said martyr murals, it becomes evident that such cultural-political 
players as the graffiti artists in this case do not place themselves at the centre of the discourses, 
which they aspire to create within Egypt’s public space. They do not represent themselves, but the 
discourses of excluded voices. However, it could be argued that there is a limitation to this kind of 
cultural activism based solely on images, namely the possibility of merely representing and as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Appendix 2: Here the reader finds pictures of the Port Said Murals, taken while we were in Egypt.  
75 Since Mostafa Tefa does not speak English his friend Jenifer was translating for him. Jenifer, however, found it 
difficult to express herself in English and she did not translate Mostafa Tefa’s statements directly, but gave an account 
of what he expressed during the interview. Hence ”he” in this quote by Mostafa Tefa refers to Mostafa Tefa himself.	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previously stated simplifying or objectifying “the other” for the cause of the Revolutionaries as 
opposed to providing an actual voice for those excluded. Darwish addresses this issue in the 
following quote in which she argues that: “…most martyrs they come from very poor 
neighbourhoods and their parents are barely making a living, and these people aren’t heard, even 
when it comes to the martyrs, the martyrs who were like highlighted everywhere.” (Lubna:14-15). 
What becomes particularly interesting about Darwish’s phrasing of this issue is the difference she 
emphasises between representations “everywhere” and actually being “heard”. From this 
perspective visualising the martyrs is not going against representation and creating the needed form 
of social change. On behalf of Mosireen, Darwish rather believes that the needed change will be 
facilitated or enforced by providing “the battle ground fighter” or the socially marginalised with an 
actual voice or the opportunity to articulate themselves. In the following paragraph we shall explore 
this on the basis of Mosireen’s video, which deals with the lack of honourable working conditions 
in Egypt. The martyr murals may be capable of moving people from identification to action, as for 
instance Armbrust notes, yet as we shall discover videos similar to that of Mosireen’s actually 
provide Egyptians with the capacity to aspire themselves as their spectacle produces a new Egyptian 
authenticity, in which common Egyptians take on the so-called “western” discourse on civil rights 
as their own.76 
In the following we provide an account and analysis of the proportional and nonproportional 
content of Mosireen’s video “Our right to honourable work” in order to underline how Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players through disruptive spectacles amplify the excluded reality or discourse of 
the Egyptian labour movement, which continues to provide identification and fuel action among 
average Egyptians. In spite of being another example of a “transparent” spectacle like the Port Said 
murals, the screening of this video does not aspire to revitalise metaphors for state accountability 
and social justice as much as it takes a direct point of departure in the unaltered voice and reality of 
frustrated men and women like the Ultras, who now push for change from the margins of the 
Egyptian society.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Armbrust, Walter (01-02-2012): The Ambivalence of Martyrs and the Counter-revolution. Cultural Anthropology – 
Journal of the society for Cultural Anthropology. http://www.culanth.org/?q=node/491. Read: 25-11-2012.    
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Our right to honourable work  
As illuminated in the beginning of this thesis, we were among the audience on that April night, 
where Mosireen screened the video “Our right to honourable work”. They screened several movies 
that night and several speakers were invited, yet we focus on the discourse of this particular video. 
The video begins with a couple of protest banners. One of them for instance saying: “Minimum 
wage – A share in profits – A dignified life for every worker”. Like this Mosireen introduces their 
video as addressing one of the most pressing socio-economic issues in Egypt: Social deprivation in 
the wake of an increasingly privatised Egyptian labour market. The movie revolves around a group 
of Egyptian workers, working for the European company Bticino-Legrand Co.77 in the city of Sadat 
in northern Egypt. They are as the banner indicates not just protesting for a higher minimum wage, 
but also for more dignified working conditions, which eventually should enable them to live a life 
with dignity. Throughout the approximately 10 minutes long video, workers from Bticino-Legrand 
Co. one by one share their work experience with the company and for which reasons they find the 
working conditions unjustifiable. The voice and message of each worker is equally clear and 
coherent, despite the diversity among the workers given a voice. Young and middle-aged men and 
one women share their common frustrations about not getting a proper salary or not being able to 
afford a proper household as well as frustrations about damaging their health from hard labour and 
not getting a medical assurance. Together their voices form a clear and coherent message about 
what makes the working conditions at Bticino-Legrand Co. unjust and what needs to be done about 
it. They want to hold their management accountable, as they want to hold the Egyptian government 
accountable for the lack of rights and social injustice in Egypt. Before we elaborate further on 
Mosireen’s video, we take a look at the cultural-political dynamics in the spring of 2012, by which 
we may be able to further explain why Mosireen went from anti-military campaigning to 
illuminating a specific example of protesting workers. 
Social injustice and the revolutionary power of the workers’ movement 
Historical state practices of social injustice not only continue according to video activist, Lubna 
Darwish, in spite of the 25th of January Revolution, their effects are also excluded from Egypt’s 
public space and in particular from formal politics: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 The Bticino-Legrand Co. factory produces electrical components for building automation and entry systems. Btincio 
is a division of the French Legrand group. 
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“…we are over the period, where the army is like a hero of the people and a patriarch of.. you know, something like that 
and all that crap. But what’s being unspoken now is just those social justice issues that have been put in the background 
of the revolution, because ... whether it’s the Islamists or the liberals, they don’t care about this [social justice] actually, 
they just say social justice and their like political campaign. Everybody is saying social justice. It’s like common 
ground.” (Darwish:19). 
Darwish further elaborates that what is remarkable about the political state of affairs is that: 
“Nobody is actually suggesting a real social justice plan or a political campaign or whatever.” 
(Lubna:20). As illuminated in the chapter on Egypt's cultural politics, the regime has frequently 
applied terms like “reform”, “change” and “modernisation” in relation to structural adjustment 
policies and corporate legal reforms, which in the end have been reduced to a reform-friendly image 
of the state and to pay lip service to the international community. According to the research of 
Laura Gribbon and Sara Hawas about the signs and signifiers of the Egyptian revolt, prodemocracy 
rhetoric is “buzzwords” of lacking realisation. Pro-democracy rhetoric such as “social justice” is 
therefore often perceived as “a buzzword of the regime” (Gribbon & Hawas 2012:114). The 
Egyptian has state therefore not just been playing on liberal, but also neoliberal discourses to 
construct its “outer face”. The expansion of the neoliberal market in Egypt was, as earlier 
emphasised in reference to Elyachar’s research on the socio-economic reality of Egyptians, a subtle 
political project, which on the surface aimed at “empowerment” by creating a world in the image of 
neoliberalism by state force (Elyachar 2005:214-15). The growing private sector, however, 
subsequently suffered from an increase in cronyism and dispossession, which rather enforced socio-
economic inequality and socio-political hierarchies and which will continue to do so if these 
policies are not changed (Saif 2011:2). In the spring of 2012, the video activists of Mosireen no 
longer aspire to delegitimise the army or the SCAF itself, as Darwish emphasises. Rather they 
aspire to illuminate the pressing yet excluded issue of unjust working conditions in Egypt and 
rearticulate the hegemonic neoliberal discourse of the state, which purports to empower the poor. 
When screening “Our right to honourable work”, Mosireen articulates an antagonist discourse of the 
workers movement, which had arisen long before the 25th of January Revolution. The independent 
journalist, Hashim Kassem, however, disagrees with Darwish. He thinks that the Revolutionaries 
had not managed to delegitimise the SCAF at this point in time, too the contrary, they had lost their 
leverage. For this reason he rather believes in the workers’ movement, which according to him has 
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the power to mount a national strike that could force the SCAF to negotiate.78 Kassem’s belief in 
the revolutionary power of workers, however, illuminates a reason for the turn in Mosireen’s 
activism away from anti-military attacks on the SCAF and towards enforcing representations of the 
Egyptian workers’ movement. Investigative journalist, Jess Hill, further asserts the power of the 
Egyptian workers’ movement in an article for The Global Mail, in which she illuminates how 
Egypt’s military regime is particularly concerned with disarming journalists like the video activists 
of Mosireen from documenting the workers’ movement. Promoting a growing movement, which 
according several academic researchers has inspired the 25th of January Revolution and therefore 
possesses the power to start another, is other words not without risks.79 Nevertheless, Mosireen 
aspires to disrupts Cairo’s public realm with this video and illuminate the contingent hegemonic 
position of the SCAF and the Egyptian military, as the video fuels existing processes of 
identification among workers with a discourse on how to achieve civil rights and political influence. 
Promoting new authentic identities of “revolutionary” power 
In Mosireen’s video the dissatisfied worker, Zakaria, stands in a crowd of other workers, while he 
emphasises how they after the 25th of January Revolution, no longer are afraid to express 
themselves or to act on injustice compared to before:  
“We are thankful to all those people who brought about the Egyptian revolution in the first place. And gave us the 
opportunity to speak. We were unable to say anything before. We lived with the fear of state security kidnapping 
anyone, who dissented. Today we can raise our demands without the fear of being charge to a law that is itself unjust.”80  
Zakaria clearly taps into the discourse of the Revolutionaries, in which a “revolutionary” freedom 
of public expression and action is often articulated in clear opposition to “before”. Yet if we take 
look back into the Egyptian history similar struggles for freedom had taken place. Professor in 
Middle Eastern History, Joel Beinin, asserts that workers were by far the largest component of the 
burgeoning culture of protest already in the 2000s, throughout which they undermined the 
legitimacy of the Mubarak regime (Beinin 2012:1). Beinin further states that during the rule of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Hill, Jess (15-02-2012): Will Egypt’s Workers Rise Up Again?.The Global Mail. 
http://www.theglobalmail.org/feature/will-egypts-workers-rise-up-again/60/. Read: 06-02-2013. 
79  Hill, Jess (15-02-2012): Will Egypt’s Workers Rise Up Again?.The Global Mail. 
http://www.theglobalmail.org/feature/will-egypts-workers-rise-up-again/60/. Read: 06-02-2013. 
80 Mosireen (03-03-2012): Our Right to Honourable Work. The Mosireen Collective. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T-lxkEelJpY. Seen during our stay and Egypt and reviewed several times hereafter.  	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Mubarak, the mission of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) had been to represent 
workers. Yet ETUF had rather functioned as “an arm” of the Egyptian state system to control them. 
ETUF, however, had not been able to prevent militant labour dissidence, which had been escalating 
since the late 1990s. In 2008 another factory city, al-Mahalla, erupted into two days of violent 
protests, because of calls on April 6 for a strike to demand a national minimum wage. These 
protests and calls for demonstrations triggered what came to be known as the 6th of April Youth 
Movement, which later played a significant role in mobilising protesters for the 25th of January 
Revolution and onwards. Yet already back then protesters set fire to the headquarters of the ruling 
National Democratic Party, and chanted “down with Mubarak”, just as the protesters did during the 
18 days of 2011. Protesting with anti-Mubarak slogans in other words happened years before the 
uprising that tumbled Mubarak (Beini 2012:6). The Egyptian labour movement has not just been 
economically deprived from having an influence on their own living standards. Both Hoofd and 
Beinin confirm the statement of Darwish, which we illuminated earlier in reference to the exclusion 
of workers from having a representative public voice. According to Beinin, workers did not make it 
to “the headlines” even though they played an important part in bringing down the regime of 
Mubarak (Beinin 2012:3). Hoofd further highlights that the Arab population is continuously 
portrayed in the global media as being supposedly authentically desiring “freedom and democracy”, 
which she argues excludes the fact that the protests are foremost a result of mass unemployment 
among young men (Hoofd, 2012:107).  
In the video by Mosireen, the “western” discourse on the importance of civil rights is clearly and 
carefully rooted in the specific Egyptian context of struggling workers. Another example of this in 
Mosireen’s video is the middle-aged worker, Gama’a, who terms Egypt’s political elite, from 
Mubarak to the SCAF, “the oppressor”. He forms a critique of “the law of the oppressor”, which he 
argues does not ensure workers any rights against precarity.81 To the contrary as another worker, 
Khalid, argues, this law transforms their work into “cheap labour” and the workers into “slaves” in 
the global economy, because: “The law was in place to serve business men only” as Khalid states.82 
Through the voices of the workers Mosireen illuminates the link between the lack of rights and 
social deprivation. Furthermore, Mosireen has included voices stating how the enforcement of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Mosireen (03-03-2012): Our Right to Honourable Work. The Mosireen Collective. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T-lxkEelJpY. Seen during our stay and Egypt and reviewed several times hereafter.   
82 Mosireen (03-03-2012): Our Right to Honourable Work. The Mosireen Collective. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T-lxkEelJpY. Seen during our stay and Egypt and reviewed several times hereafter.  	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social deprivation ironically leads workers into thuggery. Abdul, another worker in the video, 
explains how the working conditions make workers inclined to steal or beg.83 The conditions in 
other words force workers into a situation, in which they feel inclined to become “thugs” in order 
for them at least to make a reasonable living for themselves as their relatives. Infuriated Gama’a 
expresses like Abdul his frustration about the insecurity of the working environment. He among 
other workers is enraged about the short-term contracts, which they are obliged to accept to make a 
living. He states: “After this what will we turn to? Thuggery, rubbery, murder … everything! I need 
to eat … I need a dignified livelihood”.84 These statements from Mosireen’s video “Our right to 
honourable work” illustrate the hypocrisy of the state’s discourse on protesters by amplifying the 
specific case of the workers at Bticino-Legrand Co. Through statements and campaigns the state 
transforms these workers into “thugs” and their civil disobedience into “thuggery” without linking it 
to Egypt’s economic system, which leaves the very same workers frustrated and desperate just to 
make a dignified living. These captivating accounts are in other words capable of activating a 
collective memory among the Egyptian people of being a victim of dysfunctional social justice 
policies, to which frustrating emotions are tied. The statements function to show the contingency of 
the state’s neoliberal logics and to rearticulate the state’s claim that privatisation empowers the 
poor. So when the regime states, as Darwish previously illuminated, that it is time to work for the 
public good and not to watch movies, it makes sense from a neoliberal perspective, through which 
progress is defined by a growing private sector supposedly empowering poor workers. Yet it does 
not make much sense from the perspective of the Egyptian labour movement, through which neither 
extensive state control nor neoliberal state policies have ever brought the Egyptian population an 
experience of greater socio-political or economic progress.  
Through the voices of just a few workers, Mosireen’s video tells the story of the workers at the 
Bticino-Legrand Co. factory in Sadat, who took upon themselves “the revolutionary protest tools” 
like the workers of the notorious 6th of April Movement and the Revolutionaries and likewise began 
a strike in response to their management’s decision to force them to take short-term contracts and an 
unresponsive Ministry of Labour making them accept unjustifiable salaries. As an anonymous yet 
determined woman argues in the video: “We conquered a corrupt system in the government – we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Mosireen (03-03-2012): Our Right to Honourable Work. The Mosireen Collective. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T-lxkEelJpY. Seen during our stay and Egypt and reviewed several times hereafter.  	  
84	  Mosireen (03-03-2012): Our Right to Honourable Work. The Mosireen Collective. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T-lxkEelJpY. Seen during our stay and Egypt and continuously hereafter.  	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need to conquer the same system in the factory”.85 By the end of the video, the Mosireen collective 
highlights that the strike, which the workers at Bticino-Legrand Co. performed, finally provided 
them with a higher salary, while still having to struggle for fixed contracts. 
Beinin emphasises that in the wake of the 25 of January Revolution: “A higher minimum wage and 
a substantial start on institutionalising independent, democratic trade unions are the most important 
achievements specific to workers’ interests” (Beini 2012:10). The workers movement managed to 
secure a higher minimum wage and establish hundreds of new, independent enterprise-level unions 
within the first year of “the ongoing revolution” (Beinin 2012:1). In response to the efforts and 
achievements of the labour movement, the video of Mosireen further provides a capacity to aspire, 
which is not just the power of making videos or painting the streets for political expression, but the 
story of a new authentic Egyptian identity that took upon itself to enforce civil rights and liberty 
without any reference to western influence.  
Recapitulating remarks 
Before recapitulating on this chapter, we like to make a comment on the theoretical considerations 
of Elseewi and his depiction of the Egyptian revolution as “a revolution of individual subjectivity”. 
These theoretical considerations have formed a basis for arguing that the spectacles of Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players go beyond “individual subjectivity” in the sense that they go beyond self-
representation and seek to root discourses of liberation carefully in the Egyptian cultural setting in 
order for public identification processes to be fuelled. Elseewi argues that a new Egyptian culture, 
placing individuals at the centre of their own narratives in profound ways, has been fuelled through 
the years by the introduction of satellite television and Internet access. And according to Elseewi 
the new Egyptian culture of individual subjectivity continues to encourage Egyptians to imagine 
themselves not as objects of state hegemony, but as subjects of history. Pursuing individual 
subjectivity has, however, its consequences according to Hoofd. She argues that activism has 
intricate ties to neo-liberalism, because individuals and groups, who are aspiring the liberal and 
humanist ideas of freedom, are increasingly called upon to subjectivise themselves and to take 
action by all the technological possibilities available. Under an activist regime, she therefore argues 
that the citizen-subject is compelled to be active, creative and free (Hoofd 2012:7), yet that this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Mosireen (03-03-2012): Our Right to Honourable Work. The Mosireen Collective. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T-lxkEelJpY. Seen during our stay in Egypt and continuously hereafter.   
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“…subjugates the individuals under the hegemonic culture of spatial disengagement and 
meritocracy. This logic of speed, and no longer ‘the west’, then makes up the current ideological 
centre.” (Hoofd 2012:13). Within Pratt’s study, civil society participants comply with the 
hegemonic discourse of Egyptian identity as threatened by the corrupting “western” imperialism, 
which makes them sacrifice human rights in the name of national security and unity. Yet if we take 
the spectacles of the Port Said murals and Mosireen’s video on the labour movement as a hint of the 
Egyptian future, the binary contradiction between the “western” monopoly on human rights and 
“eastern” security measures for unity is in the process of being dismantled and the Egyptian reality 
redefined. Dabashi may call the historical period, into which we have entered with the Arab 
uprisings, an end of post-colonialism in this particular sense, but we need to be aware of new 
ideological centres of exceeding power. We find that Hoofd makes a significant comment to 
Elseewi’s interpretation of the development of an Egyptian culture of individual subjectivity as she 
argues that the fantasy of liberation is only to be understood as an actual possibility for a small elite, 
who is rather free to use various technologies, change job or travel the world (Hoofd, 2012:108). 
Cairo’s new cultural-political players may aspire to reach out beyond their own socio-political and 
socio-economic affiliation. They are, however, a group of rooted cosmopolitans who may represent 
a segment of the Egyptian population, who not only have a tendency to get lost in “an illusion of 
autonomy”, they also represent “an illusion” to many Egyptians’ terms of socio-economic standing, 
if not a “foreign agenda”. We have focused on the Port Said Murals and the movie on “Our Right to 
Honourable Work”, because they amplify representations of liberation, which Cairo’s new cultural-
political players are creating. We have done that exactly to underline how Cairo’s new cultural-
political players are not practicing a cultural activism, which only represents a western discourse of 
high morals and abstract human ideals, too the contrary.  
During our fieldwork we had to ask carefully to understand properly what the spectacles of Cairo’s 
new cultural-political players were about due to their cultural and historical specificity and 
rootedness in a collective memory of the Egyptian people. This we found a strong sign that they are 
not reproducing a western discourse on liberation, which is representing “an ideal eastern other” 
made for global consumption. Furthermore Cairo’s new cultural-political players are not, as Elseewi 
puts it, at the centre of their own counter-hegemonic discourses nor are they only mediating these 
through internet technologies, which primarily is of Hoofd’s concern. Cairo’s new cultural-political 
players may for the time being struggle to disseminate their cultural activism physically or virtually 
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across class divisions in Cairo and beyond Cairo, but they certainly aspire to. Yet Hoofd’s critical 
insights are not to be dismissed, because the spectacles certainly are performances of activists or 
“rooted cosmopolitans”, who are struggling to transfer their capacity to aspire and pursue liberation. 
The spectacles of Cairo’s new cultural-political players therefore take on certain features in order to 
build trust and identification for socio-political change.  
Cairo’s new cultural-political players from the civil society activists to the street art activists and 
media activists do not want to fit into the former national narrative and project that apply the 
cosmopolitanism of upper-middle class professionals and internationally oriented organisations, 
spaces and practices to polish the reform-friendly image of the Egyptian state, whose intention to 
make reforms has proven to be superficial. By illuminating the Port Said martyrs and the successful 
labour strikes the spectacles of the graffiti artists and the video activists push forward the major 
role, which these figures from the martyrs to the workers and their actions play in delegitimising the 
regime and enforcing socio-political change. We would argue that Mosireen’s video on “Our right 
to honourable work” and the Port Said murals are not acts of cultural-political players lost in the 
illusion of autonomy in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution nor acts of the neoliberal 
compliance with the state and the global community. At the core of each of these spectacles is the 
real drama of the ongoing revolution. There is the continuation of the unjustified state violence, 
which makes the martyrs a strong metaphor for a state not held legally accountable for its actions, 
and the continuation of socio-economic repression, which makes the protesting workers a strong 
metaphor for a state not taking any social responsibility. These are topics reaching far back into the 
Egyptian history amplifying a need of a long-term development perspective. These spectacles 
therefore rather illuminate than obscure the various forms of strife and marginalisation internal to 
the Arab world, which Hoofd for instance argues often, disappears in the mist of misleading media 
representations of Arabs simply desiring freedom and democracy (Hoofd, 2012:107). They are 
carefully rooted in the Egyptian cultural-political economic history and exactly because of that they 
are forceful in responding to the rupture of the 25th of January Revolution and in particular the 
video of Mosireen is forceful in responding to a need to redefine the hegemonic discourse on 
Egyptian cultural authenticity as necessarily corrupted by discourses on the power of civil rights 
advocacy.  
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Conclusion 
In these concluding remarks, we take a point of departure in the theoretical and methodological 
considerations tied to this thesis, before we move on to our final analytical conclusions, discussions 
and perspectival thoughts for further research.  
We have in this thesis taken a closer look at the transformative powers of a new generation of 
globalised and individualised youth, who are committed to, not just the imagination of 
revolutionary change and its embeddedness in the Egyptian national identity, but also to the 
realisation of it. We have interviewed on a group of “Cairo’s new cultural-political players”, whom 
we have defined as urban middle class youth professionals, who understand themselves as particular 
Egyptian in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution in spite of their cosmopolitan identity. In 
spite of counter-revolutionary attempts, they do not withdraw from politics, although they do not 
believe in the formal powers of Egyptian politics. Nor do they hesitate in the uncertainty of the 
transitional period in Egypt. That is at least our experience and interpretation of Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players after having interviewed nine of them during our stay. To our surprise 
religion was not on the agenda during the process of conducting these interviews despite the 
growing power of the Islamist forces in Egypt. Rather the foreign agenda discourse came to 
dominate our empirical findings as well as our methodological considerations as our attempt to 
follow closely a team of politically engaged and creative activists in post-Mubarak Cairo failed.  
This thesis has explored how Cairo’s new cultural-political players aspire to create socio-political 
change by means of creative approaches to activism in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution in 
spite of constraining state structures, counter-revolutionary attempts and various forms of 
complicity among the players themselves. We have applied a discourse theoretical approach, which 
has enabled us to extrapolate how Cairo’s new cultural-political players tap into Egypt’s post-
revolutionary public realm. Within the public space of Cairo, they construct new identities, for 
themselves and for the Egyptian population. In other words, at stake is a double process or struggle 
of recreating their own identities in response to the new possibilities after the 18 days of popular 
protest as well as the identity of what it means or should mean to be Egyptian in the wake of the 
25th of January Revolution. In the wake of the 25th of January Revolution a rupture of former 
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hegemonic discourses and practices, from the power of the president to the role of the citizen, have 
fuelled processes within the Egyptian society of redefining former hegemonies and hierarchies 
towards greater popular inclusion and public participation. Cairo’s new cultural-political players 
identify themselves with the identity and discourse of the informal Revolutionaries and informal 
ways of political participation such as loose networking and independent and participatory spaces. 
Yet they are also committed to their own individual and collective activism from creative idea 
generation through flash hubs to spectacular spectacles of street art, open air film screenings and 
provocative photography. Our primary concern has not been to look at how Cairo’s new cultural-
political players construct their own identities, but to look at how they mobilise identities for socio-
political transformation, why they mobilise in this particular way and which kind of transformation 
they are pursuing. Based on our interviews and fieldwork, we have drawn attention to three of 
Cairo’s new activisms, which we term: civil society activism, street art activism and media 
activism. By means of discourse theory and theories of contemporary activism, we have explored 
the transformative potential of these three of Cairo’s new activisms. We have done that by 
determining whether they could be defined as “cultural or creative activism” in reference to the 
definition of “cultural activism” provided by Firat and Kuryel. Furthermore we discovered that 
Cairo’s new cultural-political players tap into a global set of activist practices, which made us apply 
the terminology of Duncombe’s “ethical spectacle”. We did this in order to word their activism as 
“disruptive” public interventions of “open” spectacles, which are amplifying “excluded real life 
dramas” for popular interpretation and “participatory” participation. However, neither this 
terminology nor the aforementioned theories were adequate for us to understand why Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players sought these different forms of activism or which kind of change they were 
pursuing. Furthermore these theories could be criticised for overestimating the potential of change, 
which was the reason why we included both recent locally and globally oriented studies of cultural 
politics focussed on the developments in Arab world and Egypt. These have firstly supported our 
empirical findings such as our informants’ articulations of the emancipatory dynamics of the 25th of 
January Revolution with regards to the new role of new media and art as popular tools to political 
expression within Cairo’s public space. Secondly they have enabled us to understand how cultural-
political players in Egypt have been prone to sacrifice civil rights and liberties continuously in the 
name of national security and Egyptian authenticity due to the binary division of the world into 
western liberalism and Egyptian authenticity. Furthermore they are with the new media possibilities 
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prone to reproduce neoliberal forces of inequality due to neoliberal state policies and a post-colonial 
constitution of the world.  
We have therefore divided our analytical endeavours into two chapters, in which we firstly dealt 
with how Cairo’s new cultural-political players aspire to create socio-political change by means of 
creative approaches to activism and secondly we have dealt with why they chose to make exactly 
these forms of activism and cultural activist spectacles in order to reach out to and create 
identification among the Egyptian population at large. This finally leads us to conclude that Cairo’s 
new cultural-political players are taking an active part in the reconstruction of a new Egyptian 
national identity, which we would argue calls for further research. We now move on to our final 
analytical conclusions and discussions. 
In our first analytical chapter about “Three of Cairo’s new activisms”, we discovered that the 
founders and activists of Mesaha do not, in spite of their flash hub interventions, practise outright 
public rearticulation. Rather they pursue “revolutionary activism” and cultural activism under the 
state-sponsored apolitical name of “community development”. This made us include Jensen’s 
definition of hybrid inbetweenness, which he argues signify cultural activism in an authoritarian 
context. This means that the activists of Mesaha reproduce as well as they challenge the hegemonic 
state practises. Because Mesaha’s discourse of “community development” is apolitical on the 
surface just as the state’s discourse on the Egyptian civil society, we argue that this imply an 
enforcement of the binary, illuminated by Pratt, which separates an authentic “Egyptian” culture 
from the corrupt “western” of among other elements human rights practises. Like this the 
revolutionary Egyptian activist struggles to escape various forms of complicity. Just the fact that 
Egyptian activists are often confined to rooted cosmopolitans with middle class background, like 
our informants, reveals an embedded hierarchy within the Egyptian society, in which the capacity 
and access to volunteer in individualised activism and to apply Internet and media technologies is 
limited.  
In contrast to civil society activism neither street art activism nor media activism give in to the 
authoritarian structures in their struggles to facilitate socio-political change. Rather these kinds of 
activism fashion anti-capitalist and anti-military “spectacles”, which aspire to disrupt and 
reorientate or rearticulate the public opinion. They do this through the amplification of spectacles 
that are highly rooted in Egypt’s long history of authoritarian repression and the present popular 
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quest for justice. Media activists and street art activists take an ethical position in opposition to neo-
liberalism and socio-economic inequality and act on it through their activism. Yet they are 
simultaneously implicated in neo-liberal practices of wanting to transform their activism into 
capital. Furthermore media activism in particular seems to be based on the documentation of 
authoritarian aggression, which fuels the antagonism between the military and the Revolutionaries. 
This, however, has constraining consequences in terms of enforcing the dichotomy and Mosireen’s 
efforts to go beyond the Revolutionaries for change. We may finally conclude that in Egypt’s 
uncertain transitional period it is important to be aware of the co-existence of “cultural activisms” 
from a civil society activism, that is still masked by a state-sponsored apolitical discourse, and new 
pluralistic and spectacular forms of cultural activism, which are remarkably rooted in the Egyptian 
history of repression, but also often confined to the identity of the Revolutionaries.  
In our second analytical chapter on “Spectacular struggles for a new Egyptian Identity”, we zoomed 
in on the cultural activist spectacles of the Port Said Murals and the video by Mosireen about a 
group of struggling workers. We did this in order to question these spectacles’ potential for reaching 
out and creating identification among the Egyptian society at large. We drew attention to how 
Cairo’s new cultural-political players in an environment of distrust and accusations of “foreignness” 
and “thuggery” try to mobilise identities for liberation through “transparent” spectacles in an 
attempt to deal with the widespread distrust and “the foreign agenda discourse”, which they come to 
represent.  
At the core of their identity and activist practices prevail a dilemma of staying within or going 
beyond hybrid identities and a position of creative inbetweenness. This position has for a long time 
made it possible for Cairo’s cultural-political players to somewhat transcend the boundaries of state 
and society control, although these have often left them with a disillusion of autonomy in relation to 
the Egyptian state and the rest of Egyptian population. As Bayat pointed out in 2010, it is not 
enough for the youth generation to remain within their ”creative inbetweenness”, if they want to 
change Egypt. For this they need to think and act politically as the Egyptian workers, who formed 
the 6th of April movement (Bayat in Khalaf 2011). In the wake of the 25th of January Revolution 
daring acts with obvious political agendas like the Post Said murals and Mosireen’s public video 
screenings take place in Egypt’s former rather governmentally controlled public space leading the 
way for a new cultural-political hegemony and Egyptian authenticity. Here discourses of civil rights 
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and liberty are not detached from, but rooted in the Egyptian people and their current reality of 
immense social injustice.  
 
The “transparent” spectacles of Cairo’s new cultural political players gain political significance, 
because they mobilise identities, which have resonance in the Egyptian population. The murals of 
the Port Said martyrs are strong metaphors of popular identification, because they are reminding 
Egyptians of the continuation of military violence and an unfair military legal system, which does 
not hold the regime accountable for its violent actions. The accounts of infuriated and protest 
oriented workers in Sadat amplify, like the Port Said murals, the legal impediments of the state and 
the consequences of the neo-liberal state policies. These have not empowered but taken advantage 
of the old, as well as young, job seeking generation. Through these spectacles state practises of 
hypocrisy, exclusion and hierarchy are revealed as they articulate the excluded discourses of those 
constantly pushed to the edge of “thuggery” in their quest for a dignified livelihood. We therefore 
argue that Cairo’s new cultural activists manage to deconstruct the binary and push for change 
through powerful public discourses, but that the dissemination of these spectacles is hampered by 
the ingrained foreign agenda discourse. This makes them particularly vulnerable to the proposition 
of being in “an illusion of autonomy” in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution as they are still 
continuously designated a position within the foreign agenda discourse of “corrupted and 
untrustworthy values”. This may result in the exact opposite, a reproduction of the binary.  
 
Cairo’s new cultural-political players may enjoy greater individual subjectivity within the public 
space, at this point in time and in particular virtually, yet they do not create spectacles of self- 
representation. We therefore made a comment to Elseewi’s theory, because Cairo’s new cultural-
political players do not put themselves at the centre of their own discourses or spectacles. They 
rather root these in the Egyptian context, which creates political significance. Activist practices of 
self-representation and increased technological possibilities for activism do not mean that Egyptians 
or Arabs have shaken off postcolonial dynamics. Rather we find that researchers need to be aware 
of the fact that self-representations are tied to technological speed elitism, which may rather hamper 
the emancipatory processes. They may rather enforce misconceptions about who is really behind the 
Egyptian uprising as well as they may enforce socio-economic inequality. Taking into consideration 
the struggles of Cairo’s new cultural-political players to build trust and to go against representations 
of the foreign agenda discourse, we cannot predict the course of the transformative spectacles. The, 
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at first, “transparent” and binary challenging spectacles may end up being reduced to the binary. 
This is if they come to be understood as acts of disillusioned cultural activists, who rather represent 
foreign agendas, than trustworthy spectacles for identification and inspiration among the Egyptian 
population at large. Nevertheless, this is exactly what makes transparent spectacles of powerful 
excluded realities forceful in combination with a loosely networked and highly decentralised, local 
and self-organised activism and the path to achieve trust and subsequently influence.  
 
Cairo’s new cultural-political players are an example of how Egyptian youth are in the process of 
learning how to manufacture powerful dissent by which they are taking an active part in 
constructing Egypt’s new post-revolutionary identity. Whether the public dissenting and counter-
hegemonic expressions of Cairo’s new cultural-political players will continue to grow in the same 
disrupting and spectacular way, as it did during our stay in Cairo one year ago, is an important area 
for further research. More than two years after the 25th of January Revolution, the former leading 
MB member, Mohammed Morsi, has been elected president and the Islamists continue to increase 
and use their power to Islamise the public space of Egypt in the name of the “revolution”. An 
enclosed appendix in this thesis further discusses why a more subtle approach to the religious 
discourse does not have to be a political deficit as well as it opens up for further research along 
these lines. Already during our stay the Islamists lost credibility due to their opportunistic political 
decisions, which the Revolutionaries saw as a neglect of the real demands of the “revolution”. 
However, if the uncertain alliance between the Islamists and the SCAF develops into a more stable 
one, it is most likely that the informal scene of Cairo’s cultural activism will be challenged by 
immense restrictions forcing Cairo’s new cultural-political players to continuously reinvent 
persistent practices of survival to counter the new religious and military authoritarianism of Egypt. 
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Appendix nr. 1: List of informants:  
 
Key informants 
 
Ahmed Abdel Mohsen: 38 year-old freelance filmmaker and teaching assistant at the F+F film school in 
Zurich, where he lives. He travels to Egypt often, where he has been a part of running and developing a 
cultural centre in Southern Egypt.86 Mohsen has made a documentary film “Hala, Laila and Karima”, which 
is about the life of three female activists and artists during and after the 25th of January Revolution.    
 
Astrid Thew: 32 year-old anthropologist from Germany. She is also the co-founder and project manager of 
the newly established multi-cultural mobile art collective Mahatat.87 She has been a part of organising 
Mahatat’s public art events in Cairo after the 25th of January Revolution such as miming in the Metro by 
clowns.  
 
Mia Jankowitz: 35 year-old Irish director of Cairo’s Contemporary Image Collective (CIC)88, which is an 
independent non-profit art initiative working with educational media projects and contemporary art. She is 
educated in visual culture in London. 
 
May Shehab: 35 year-old project manager at the non-profit organisation and art gallery DARB1718. She 
returned to Egypt in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution after 5 years in South Africa, where she 
completed a Ph.d. in tourism and development studies.  
 
Sad Panda: is a former visual artist. He has done various images of sad looking pandas in the streets of 
Cairo all his life. He draws on friends and fans to get his graffiti done as he is not capable himself. Sad Panda 
is his cover name, as he does not wish to reveal his identity.     
 
Tamer El-Samy: 34 year-old independent filmmaker and educated from the Australian Film school in 
Jordan. He has an educational and professional background within accounting. He became an active member 
in the newly established Social Democrat Party just after the 25th of January Revolution. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 The Fakra cultural center in Aswan: http://fekraculture.com/en/home.php   
87 http://mahatatcollective.com 
88 http://www.ciccairo.com 
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Cairo’s new cultural-political players 
 
Ahmed Elmasry: 20-year-old engineer student and new member of the 6th of April Movement. He returned 
to Egypt from Qatar where he lived with his family to participate in the 25th of January Revolution. He does 
graffiti in the shape of stencils for the 6th of April Movement.  
 
Ahmed Nazmi: 28 year-old co-founder of the community development organisation, Mesaha. After living in 
Toronto for 12 years he returned to Egypt right before the 25th of January by coincidence and decided to stay 
to participate in the revolutionary events.     
 
Keizer: 34 year-old newly established street artist with a professional background within advertisement. 
During our stay in Cairo he was in the process of turning his street art into an art exhibition. He is half 
French and half Egyptian. He has lived in Egypt, Cairo his whole life, but has travelled over longer periods 
of time. Keizer is his artist name and he wishes to remain anonymous.  
 
Lubna Darwish: 25 year-old co-founder of the media collective Mosireen89. Lubna Darwish interrupted her 
PhD. in comparative literature at the University of California Davis to return to Egypt to participate in the 
25th of January Revolution.  
 
Mosaab El-Shamy: 23 year-old freelance photographer/citizen journalist, who holds an education as a 
pharmacist. He began taking photos during the 25th of January Revolution and has afterwards become 
recognised for his work via Twitter. He is an active blogger as well.   
 
Mostafa Sheshtawy: 24 year-old freelance photographer/citizen journalist. He has an education within 
engineering. He returned to Egypt from Qatar to participate in the 25th of January Revolution. Besides being 
an active blogger he has been a part of starting a student union at his university, the German University in 
Cairo in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution.   
 
Mostafa Tefa: 17 year-old secondary school student, who became a part of a network of street artists in 
Cairo after the 25th of January Revolution. He comes from the Giza area in Cairo where he still lives. Tefa is 
his artist name, which he uses in order to stay anonymous.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 http://mosireen.org/ 
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Muhammad Yassein: 25 year-old co-founder of the community development organisation Mesaha. He is 
also a sociology student, who commutes between Egypt and Jordan, where he works for a developmental 
organisation.  
 
Ziad Amin: 21-year-old art student, who became a part of the network of street artists in Cairo after the 25th 
of January Revolution. He lived in Down Town Cairo during our stay, but has now moved back to Luxor 
where he also grew up.   
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Appendix 2: Photos of the paintings of the Port Said Martyrs and the mothers of the martyrs on the 
wall of Mohammad Mahmoud Street in Cairo. Afterwards photos from the public screening we 
attended of Mosireen’s video “Our right to honorable work” and one images from the video. 
Photographer: Anne Herholdt. 
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Mosireen (03-03-2012): Our Right to Honourable Work. The Mosireen Collective. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T-lxkEelJpY. Seen during our stay and Egypt and reviewed several times 
hereafter.  	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Appendix nr. 3: Reflections on the interview and transcription 
process 
 
Conducting interviews in English 
All the interviews were carried out in English and thus a foreign language for both us as interviewers and for 
the informants, as we do not speak Arabic. Where most of the informants appeared confident and nuanced in 
expressing themselves in English, especially Mustafa Tefa and his translator Jenifer and Ziad Amin were 
limited by speaking in English. The language barrier we experienced during these interviews might have lead 
to the exclusion of in depth discussions about cultural activism in post-Mubarak Egypt, however, all of these 
three informants were able to convey major points about their motivation for and practices of cultural 
activism.  
 
Transcription  
We have chosen to transcribe all our interviews. We have chosen to do so in order to have an overview of 
our collected data when analysing. This overview of our data makes it possible for us to have an eye for 
similarities and differences and main themes in the interviews. Our analysis will thus be based on a full text 
of the interviews. In the transcriptions we have aimed at including all spoken words, but not paralinguistic 
characteristics (Gaskell 2000:53) since we are not making a thoroughly linguistic analysis where breaks, 
repetitions etc. are of importance. The recordings of the interviews with Lubna and Ziad both took place in 
Mosireen’s space. After conducting these two interviews and listening to the recordings we realised that the 
acoustic of the location made it difficult for us to hear what the two informants were saying word by word. 
Thus there are passages in these two interviews where we cannot guarantee the correctness of the 
transcriptions. In the rest of the interviews there may occur incidences where we have not been able to hear a 
specific word because of background noise. We, however, do not make use of quotes where we are not sure 
of the content/the statement of the informant.  
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Appendix 4: What about the role of religion and the Islamic 
forces? 
In this enclosed appendix we ask what role religion plays within the cultural activism of Cairo’s 
new cultural-political players and whether it needs to play a role in order for the cultural activism of 
our informants to build identification with the Egyptian people and not to become disillusioned 
about the socio-political power relations? At the end of the day economic stability, health care and 
education is more relevant to the average Egyptians than freedom chanting demonstrations and 
protests videos and street art in Tahrir Square. This leads us to the question of the priorities of the 
Egyptian people, which need to be present in a spectacle in order for it to create identification and 
encourage action. Commentators and researchers have noted on the need for a change of tactics 
among the liberal forces, which include our informants, to recognise and approach the challenge of 
creating a discourse of co-existence between Islamic and liberal forces in order not to end up with 
one final option, a new authoritarianism lead by the Egyptian military.  
In this paragraph we comment on the role of religion within the cultural activist spectacles of 
Cairo’s new cultural political players and we point to an explanation for this role by elaborating on 
the relation between Cairo’s new cultural activism and the “revolutionary” youth movement and 
generation. Yet before doing so, we briefly introduce a discussion on the role of religion and the 
Islamic forces within Egypt’s formal and non-formal politics, which took place among 
commentators and researchers approximately a year after the 25th of January Revolution. Some 
commentators and researchers at this point found the role of religion and the Islamic forces, such as 
the religious discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi groups, to be ignored by liberal 
Egyptians, which for their part resulted in a subsequent political impotence rather than political 
influence.  
Formal liberal politicians were, as previously noted, the closest formal representatives of Cairo’s 
new cultural players. They had, however, for various reasons not managed to create identification 
with Cairo’s new cultural-political players. One of the reasons were, as pointed out by Darwish in 
the paragraphs on Mosireen’s video for the Egyptian labour movement, a lack of taking clear social 
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responsibility by suggesting a “real” social justice plan for Egypt. Furthermore their ignorance 
towards the importance of religion among the Egyptian population was according to commentators 
and researchers at risk of resulting in an intensification of distrust due to the lack of identification 
with their secular discourse of abstract human ideals, which was rather reproducing the facade 
rhetoric of the Egyptian state than changing them. In an article for OpenDemocracy, Dr. Solava 
Ibrahim shares her research on state-society relations in Egypt, which shine light on the significance 
of the religious discourse in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution. She writes that: “…many 
liberal forces decided to underestimate - or even ignore - the power of Islamist parties and their 
'religious' discourse”90, which Ibrahim finds grounded in a fear of Islamic radicalisation with the 
Iranian theocracy as the potential future dystopia. Both Ottaway and Ibrahim criticise either the 
“reluctance”, “fear” or “nativity” of the liberals, who are engaged formally as informally in 
Egyptian politics in response to a liberal tendency to hold back from acting on and approaching the 
religious discourse and the Islamic forces.91 Taking the political environment of Egypt into 
consideration and the concerns raised by Ottaway and Ibrahim about the ignorance of the liberals, 
we find it suitable to question the extent to which the cultural activist spectacles of Cairo’s new 
cultural-political players are ignoring the religious discourse. In the following we question whether 
Cairo’s new cultural-political players in their attempt to respond to the demand-based discourse of 
the Revolutionaries and the 25th of January rupture of Egyptian politics, may be aiming to 
consolidate a new Egyptian authenticity, but end up actually being confined to an illusion of 
autonomy and revolutionary freedom due to the lack of religious identification within their 
spectacles? Although the religious discourse is not completely invisible in the video of Mosireen or 
in the murals of the graffiti artists, it is not at the core of their message either. Rather it is, as we 
shall argue, present with subtlety for reasons that may be tied to the role of the religious discourse 
among Egyptian youth.  
The infuriated worker, Gama’a, whom we previous referred to in reference to Mosireen’s video, 
refers in a passing remark to the presence of God as he advocates for legal adjustments in Egypt: 
“Well who put that law in place!? Isn’t it the oppressors?” he asks and rounds off: “May God have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Ibrahimi, Solava (13-01-2013): Why are Egyptians and the west surprised by Islamists victory in post-revolutionary 
Egypt. OpenDemocracy. http://www.opendemocracy.net/solava-ibrahim/why-are-egyptians-and-west-surprised-by-
islamists-victory-in-post-revolutionary-egypt. Read: 20-02-2013.  
91	  Ottaway, Marina (03-11-2012): Egypt’s Democracy: Between the Military, Islamists, and Illiberal Democrats. The Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/03/egypt-s-democracy-between-military-
islamists-and-illiberal-democrats/6m0w. Read: 20-02-2013. 
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vengeance on them”. The graffiti artists, on the other hand, pictured the mothers of the martyrs as 
they dress in public with their veils or “hijabs”92, all of them. Like this religion is present in the 
shape of sayings and metaphors. Yet the presence of religion is of greater importance according to 
Ibrahim than subtle sayings and metaphors, if liberals aspire to gain any kind of political 
significance. She asserts that religion is at the centre of the Egyptian people’s lives and therefore 
needs to play more than subtle or discreet role:  
“In my own research, I asked Egyptians in two poor communities, in Menia (Upper Egypt) and in Manshiet Nasser (a 
slum area in Cairo) about 'what they value the most in life'. To the surprise of the liberals, it was not freedom, dignity or 
social justice that ranked highest, nor even income or jobs, but rather religion! This demonstrates the profound purchase 
of such a discourse on Egyptian society - despite the secular nature of their revolution93.” 
 Yet we found a reason for the subtle presence of religion within the cultural activist spectacles of 
our informants, which may explain partly their lack of questioning or responding directly to the 
religious discourse and the subtle presence of religion in their spectacles. This may have to do with 
the fact that religion plays a different role among Egyptian youth. And since 54 percent of Egypt’s 
population make up the under-twenty-four demographic, there is good reason to respond to their 
dreams and desires for the future, or in other words their terms of identification and trust building 
(LaGraffe 2012:72). Professor in Sociology, Asef Bayat, is, as previously mentioned, concerned 
with the power dynamics of everyday life practices in Egypt or what he terms the social “non-
movements”. Ibrahim may claim that the reason for the deficit in political influence among liberals 
is their abolishment of the religious discourse, but as Bayat argues the current doctrinal religious 
regimes and discourses in the Middle East posses a limited capacity to contain the increasingly 
globalised youth, which makes youth movements a considerable transformative and democratising 
promise (Bayat in Khalaf 2011:64). This, however, does not make it irrelevant to further question 
which role religion then plays among Egyptian youth and whether Cairo’s new cultural activists are 
creating spectacles, which are responding to it? According to Bayat, young people in Egypt do not 
only redefine their religion, they redefine ”youthfulness”, which means that “youth” is not a 
question of age, but of the discourses tied to the social category of “youth”.  The Egyptian youth 
redefine “youthfulness” by not radically departing from the hegemonic religious discourse, enforced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  The hijab is a code of Islamic dressing, which entails a headscarf worn by Muslim women.	  
93 Ibrahimi, Solava (13-01-2013): Why are Egyptians and the west surprised by Islamists victory in post-revolutionary 
Egypt? OpenDemocracy. http://www.opendemocracy.net/solava-ibrahim/why-are-egyptians-and-west-surprised-by-
islamists-victory-in-post-revolutionary-egypt. Read: 20-02-2013.	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by the state and in particular street censorship, but by making it work in their own interest. As Bayat 
points out, youth may for instance be devout Muslims, who pray fast and fear God, but still they do 
not need to practice Islam as stated by any religious authority in order to achieve identification. 
Bayat argues that: “the young attempted to redefine and reemagine their Islam in order to 
accommodate their youthful desires for individuality, change, fun, and “sin” within the existing 
moral order.” (Bayat in Khalaf 2011:62). 94 The moral imperatus of the “seculareligious” Egyptian 
state has been for youth to compete in the global community while simultaneously guiding them 
into religious piety in order to withstand both foreign cultural influences and home-grown political 
Islam (Bayat in Khalaf ed. 2011:60). Yet already before the 25th of January Revolution for instance 
the so-called televangelists responded to the position of youth as “inbetween”.  
The televangelists and the role of creative inbetweenness in post-revolutionary Egypt 
According to our informants the 25th of January Revolution sparked a call for a new public political 
positioning, which was leaving many Egyptians irresolute about their political standpoint. Besides 
the popular recognition of new forms of activism and political participation such as street art 
activism and citizen journalism in Egypt, “the televangelists” (Al-duah al-gudud) are likewise 
influential opinion formers in terms of political positioning. Among the most influential trends 
marking Egypt in the wake of the 25th of January Revolution, citizen journalism and the 
televangelists are illuminated by Dr. Sabine Dorpmueller, who has done research on the new 
mediascape in Egypt at the Netherland-Flemish Institute in Cairo. The televangelists are according 
to Dorpmueller not just “young” Islamic lay preachers on Egyptian TV, but they are Egypt’s most 
popular public television figures, whose religious and socio-political oriented discourse is termed 
“activist” by Durpmueller, because it sets standards for opinions and actions in Egypt and beyond 
(Dorpmueller 2012). The socio-cultural anthropologist, Yasmine Moll, states that prior to the 
revolution, the televangelists were, characterised as offering Muslim youth a “post-Islamist” 
religious discourse that was apolitical.95 His programmes, however, have according to Bayat opened 
up for a new religious subculture reinvented by Egypt’s globalised youth (Bayat 2011:63). As Moll 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  “Reclaiming youthfulness” was first published in Bayat’s book “Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the 
Middle East” and later included in the current publication “Arab Youth / Social mobilisation in times of risk” from 
2011, which we are referring to.	  	  
95	  Moll, Yasmine (14-02-2012): Building the new Egypt Islamic-televangelists revolutionary ethics and productive 
citizenship. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4276/building-the-new-egypt_islamic-televangelists-revo. Read.05-
01-2013.	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states, after 18 months of fieldwork conducted on both producers and viewers of the Islamic 
televangelist programming, he found that the televangelists are now providing a compelling ethical 
frame for how to build a new Egypt:  
“Most commentators on the recent parliamentary elections in Egypt have framed the Muslim Brotherhood on the one 
hand and increasingly politicized Salafi religious actors on the other as metonyms for the projected role of Islam in a 
post-revolutionary public sphere. The conceptions of ethics put forward by al-duah al-gudud, however, are also 
refashioning politics and the practices of citizenship.”96 
According to Moll, the televangelists are encouraging young Egyptians to reclaim a lost Islamic 
cultural and social responsibility, personal initiative and productive efficiency. The televangelists 
are in this way tapping into the neoliberal culture of “personal initiative” and “productive 
efficiency” enforced by the Egyptian state, but they are combining it with an “Islamic cultural and 
social responsibility”. The discourses of the televangelists are therefore a part of redefining 
Egyptian politics and the practices of political participation on a grass root level as well as they are 
like Cairo’s new cultural-political players involved in neo-liberal complicities. They are not 
conveying messages, which are meant to reform Islamic theology, rather they are promoting spirituality and 
development through faith by stressing ethical values and advocating for de-radicalisation of Islam. 
Furthermore they are, according to Dorpmueller, trying to reconcile Islamic morals and values with a 
modern lifestyle by engaging in and encouraging dialogue with the Western world (Dorpmueller 2012). 
According to Bayat what therefore signifies Egyptian youth is a “creative inbetweenness” (Bayat 
2011:62). Although he is not referring to Jensen’s concept of the same name, they are not that far 
apart either. In reference to the cultural theorist, Homi Bhabha, and his concept of “hybridity”, 
Jensen argues that exactly because some Indian media programmes within authoritarian states are 
hybrid, meaning that they are embracing contradictory discourses and thereby defy public 
categorisation, they are cable of achieving influence and maintaining their ability to operate from 
their “inbetweenness” (Jensen in Wagoner 2012:212). As we discovered through our research on 
civil society activism apolitical spaces like Mesaha are able to combine an apolitical public space 
with aspirations for revolutionary activism and like this create spaces for “hybrid identities” to 
unfold into cultural activism. Although the apolitical discourse of Mesaha placees their participants 
in a position, from where they can achieve influence and keep operating, it is not rearticulating the 
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authoritarian structures. And it is this dilemma, which made us question the transformative power of 
practices of “inbetweenness” and the potential, they posses to create socio-political change. These 
practises are not neutral. They are simultaneously reproducing authoritarian structures and global 
structures of post-colonialism. As Bayat points out, it is not enough for the youth generation to 
remain in their ”creative inbetweenness”, if they want to change Egypt. For this they need to think 
and act politically as the Egyptian workers, who formed the 6th of April movement. We argue that 
none of Cairo’s new cultural-political players, from the civil society activists to the street art and 
media activists, are abolishing the religious discourse, rather they are understanding and responding 
to its subtle role. Cairo’s new cultural-political players are not abolishing religion nor religious 
symbols, rather they understand the hybridity and contradictions of the youth generation, which 
does not want authoritarianism, Islamic radicalisation or an Egyptian state based entirely on 
neoliberalism in spite of various forms of complicity. Too the contrary, Cairo’s new cultural-
political players respond to a youth generation that wants to build a new Egypt without giving up 
their religion, quest for individuality or their dreams of democracy, but which struggles to go 
beyond practices of creative inbetweenness in the wake of the rupture of the 25th of January 
Revolution.  
 
  
	  
 
 
